Defense of Intoxication

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

IV. Defense of intoxication

A. Voluntary intoxication

1. Definition

Voluntary intoxication is the substantial impairment of mental capabilities as a result of voluntarily consumption of alcohol or drugs. The defendant is accountable for the fact of ingesting alcohol or drugs that are known, or should be known, to cause such effect.

2. Applicability and effect

In a majority of jurisdictions, voluntary intoxication may be an affirmative defense if the defendant is so intoxicated that the condition negates an element of the offense. Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30 (1989); MPC § 2.08(1). There is no constitutional right to a defense of voluntary intoxication, and a state may preclude such a defense. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 52-56 (1996).

Negating the actus reus

If the defendant is sufficiently intoxicated, the defendant may not be able to commit the actus reus. However, if the act is committed, the intoxicated defendant cannot argue that the actus reus was involuntary because the initial act of ingesting alcohol or drugs, which may have rendered his act involuntary, is itself a voluntary act.

Negating mens rea

Intoxication by alcohol or drugs does not render the defendant not guilty. What renders the defendant not guilty is being sufficiently intoxicated that the defendant lacks the ability to form the requisite mental state. The mere consumption of alcohol, without a showing of how the alcohol affected the defendant, is not enough to generate an issue of voluntary intoxication. In Lewis v. State, 79 Md. App. 1, 10 (1989), the Court of Special Appeals held that evidence of consumption of even an inordinate amount of alcohol, standing alone, is irrelevant without evidence of the effect the alcohol had on the defendant's ability to have the mental state.

In State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 607 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that the degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent is substantial. In Dubs v. State, 2 Md. App. 524, 539-40 (1967), the Court of Special Appeals held that the issue is not whether the defendant was drunk when he or she committed the crime, but whether the defendant was so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the requisite intent. In Beall v. State, 203 Md. 380, 386-87 (1953), the Court of Appeals held that there was evidence of a specific intent to kill because the defendant was sober enough (a) to break into the home; (b) to go upstairs; (c) to take a loaded revolver from a box; (d) to leave the porch after he...