Defense Department Spending and "Hawkish" Voting in the House of Representatives

• Published date: 01 September 1981
• DOI: 10.1177/106591298103400310
• Date: 01 September 1981
• Author: Bruce A. Ray
• Subject Matter: Articles

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPENDING AND
"HAWKISH"
VOTING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BRUCE A. RAY
Northern Illinois University
ONGRESSMEN
employ many cues when deciding how to cast their
~
votes.’ One cue at least as important, if not more important, than most
others is the demands, interests, and economic involvements of the
representative’s own constituents.2 It also has been argued that this relationship
exists even when legislators claim their independence from constituents.3
3
Thus, a representative’s vote on a bill with substantial and clear-cut
implications for the economic well-being of his constituents virtually may be
dictated by his need to &dquo;please the home-folks&dquo;: a congressman from
Brooklyn would be expected to support federal loan guarantees for New
York City, a legislator from a tobacco-producing area would most likely
resist an attempt to reduce federal subsidies for that commodity, a repre-
sentative from Seattle would be a supporter of any military aircraft to be
built by the Boeing Corporation, and so on. The beauty of an omnibus rivers
and harbors bill, for example, is that a majority of the nation’s congressional
districts can be given an economic stake in its passage, thereby greatly en-
hancing its charices of success.
The cue of district interests is strong. It can even override a con-
gressman’s basic ideological leanings. Former Rep. Robert Leggett (D., CA),
for example, has a well-deserved reputation as one of the members of the
Armed Services Committee most eager to cut military spending. He did not,
however, allow this to interfere with his need for constituency service. He
lobbied hard for such local projects as Mare Island Naval Shipyard and
Travis Air Force Base, and has been quoted as saying: &dquo;I’ve got to be picky
and choosy about what I try to terminate, because if I’ve got a large sub-
marine with 8,000 people working on it in my district, I’m not about to
terminate the contract and put 8,000 people out of work.&dquo;4
The query of this investigation is how close the connection between
district interests and the vote(s) in question must be before a member’s
position is influenced. A representative with 8,000 constituents employed on
a Defense Department contract will almost assuredly vote to continue that
project. But will these same 8,000 DOD paychecks have a more far-reaching
impact upon the legislator? Will they influence him to support Department
NOTE: I wish to thank William Avery, William Claggett, Kathryn Newcomer and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. They, of course,
bear no liability for any flaws or failings which may still remain.
1
See, for example, Aage Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1973); or John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and
Row, 1973).
2 See, for example, Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1951); Lewis A. Dexter, "The Representative and His District," in New
Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby
(2nd ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 3-29; or Thomas A. Flinn and Harold L.
Wolman, "Constituency and Roll Call Voting," Midwest Journal of Political Science 8 (May
1966): 192-99.
3See, for example, Heinz Eulau, et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical
Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American Political Science Review 53 (Sep-
tember 1959): 742-56.
4 Craig Liske and Barry Rundquist, The Politics of Weapons Procurement: The Role of Congress
(Denver: University of Denver Press, 1974) p. 85.

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of Defense policies in general, rather than just the specific case which di-
rectly involves him? In other words, does the domestic allocation of DOD
outlays induce &dquo;hawkish&dquo; voting in the U.S. Congress?
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX MODEL
Several studies, rooted in &dquo;elite theory,&dquo; have expounded on the subject
of an immense military-industrial complex which relies upon its
civilian appendages in industry and our universities to supply much of the
research, technology, and sophisticated weaponry deemed essential for de-
terrence and defense. These civilian institutions and numerous citizens
prosper on the manna of massive defense expenditures. This tendency in
turn produces a political component - a corps of local, regional, and na-
tional politicians whose political self-interests now dictate promotion of or at
least acquiescence in such spending on behalf of their constituent.
5
Although this support of the military-industrial complex is rooted in consti-
tuency service, it does not stop there. Rather, states the theory, it develops
into a much more pervasive pro-military orientation. Craig Liske and Barry
Rundquist term this more general support of Defense Department desires
&dquo;agency-serving&dquo; behavior which, they point out, is &dquo;a substitute for, or an
extension of, constituency-serving.&dquo;6
Several studies have attempted to test this model by relating DOD out-
lays, by state, with Senate voting Although the impact of domestic defense
spending upon Senate voting is not conclusive, there has been some support
for the hypothesis. Senators from states with disproportionately large in-
volvements in the military-industrial complex are slightly more likely to be
&dquo;hawks.&dquo; And &dquo;doves&dquo; from highly involved states, such as Ernest Gruening
of Alaska and Ralph Yarborough of Texas, both Democrats, may have been
electorally punished for this constituency disservice.’ However, the correla-
tions are quite small, and a senator’s party identification and ideological
leaning may be more important determinants of his vote on national security
issues than the military involvements of his state.9
Tests of the model for the House have also provided little support for
the hypothesis that large concentrations of defense spending in a represen-
5
Patrick M. Morgan, "Politics, Policy, and the Military-Industrial Complex," in The Politics of
U.S. Foreign Policy Making, ed. Douglas M. Fox (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear...