Defense review: beltway dogfighting at its best.

• Author: Erwin, Sandra I.
• Position: Defense Watch

Military officials have, in recent weeks, been diligently articulating their thinking on how each service contributes to the overall national security strategy. This is the rhetorical drill that is expected during the preparation of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review. But this year's QDR debate is somewhat different, in that it is being shaped largely by the notion that, somehow, the Navy and the Air Force will need to help offset the growing costs of keeping the Army and the Marine Corps heavily engaged in the Middle East.

Also framing the discussion are the administration's marching orders to the Pentagon to cut spending from weapons programs to help pay for Iraq war costs and tax cuts. It all adds up to a surefire recipe for a nasty inside-the-beltway dogfight.

Veterans of past quadrennial reviews agree that it can get ugly, although they regard the process as a necessary evil that does not interfere with the close inter-service cooperation seen on the front lines.

"The QDR tends to bring out the worst in all of us," noted Gen. John Jumper, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. Similarly, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James E Amos, commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force, recalled the unpleasantness he experienced in the 2001 QDR. "It's a very painful process. It doesn't necessarily make friends among the services."

In anticipation of inter-service tension over budget issues, the civilian leaders at the Pentagon directed that the QDR be more about "major ideas" on the priorities of national security, rather than a "laundry list" of pet projects, according to outgoing Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith.

In the world of Pentagon politics, however, the grand concepts that end up in the QDR only can become relevant if they are associated with concrete weapon systems and technologies.

Among the assumptions of the 2005 QDR is that the services should work together as a seamless fighting entity, and that they must have a force that can combat "irregular" enemies, such as shadowy terrorist networks, and respond quickly to "catastrophic" events such as 9/11. At the same time, they will have to sharpen their conventional military capabilities to fight traditional wars.

For the Army and Marine Corps, the implication is that they will keep doing what they are doing today in Iraq, where they fight irregular enemies every day. In the context of the QDR, the burden is on the Navy and the Air Force to show how they contribute to...