Defense acquisition woes.

• Position: READERS'FORUM - Letter to the editor

* In the October 2009 issue of National Defense, Gen. Peter Chiarelli expressed frustration about the acquisition process. In the same issue, Sandra Erwin may have nailed it when she wrote that the current acquisition regulation can be traced to the Robert McNamara era. Perhaps the basic problem is not that acquisition policies are antique, but rather that they are not "antique." In the early 1960s something that was not really broken was replaced. What is in place now is not broken, it is shattered.

In January 1942, the Sikorsky R-2 made its first flight. It would become the first U.S. helicopter to actually be deployed. By 1962, the military had designed, developed and deployed approximately 18 distinct helicopters. Between 1962 and 1982, the Pentagon had fielded about six helicopters. Between 1982 and today, two distinct helicopters have been deployed, three if you count the V-22 Osprey.

In October 1942, the P-59 Aircomet made its first flight. This was the first U.S. jet propelled aircraft. By 1962, the U.S. military had designed, developed, and deployed 38 variants of combat jet aircraft and seven jet trainers with an aggregate production of between 45,000 and 50,000 aircraft. This does not count the one to two dozen types that never made it out of development. It also does not count those aircraft that were developed and deployed to fight World War II. Between 1962 and 1982, six jet combat aircraft were deployed. Counting the F/A-18E/F, since 1982 there have been about four combat aircraft fielded.

It should be noted that the RFP for the F-22 was issued in 1986 with an initial capability achieved in 2007. Production will be halted soon at 189. Most of the not-so-good aircraft from the 1950s had higher production numbers than that.

The M4 Sherman tank started development in about 1940. By 1960, the Army had fielded at least six distinct tanks. Since then, there have been two if you include the much-maligned M551 Sheridan, which really was not a tank.

What happened to make 1962 so significant? Other than being a convenient 20-year benchmark for several classes of weaponry, it was also the first year that the McNamara acquisition and procurement management policies began to take effect.

As the Defense Department looks for ways to reform acquisition, perhaps the best place to start is in the past. Given development track records before and after 1962, it would appear that we could do worse than to return to policies of the 1950s.

Don...