Defense acquisition.

• Position: READERS'FORUM

* There have been numerous articles and studies on the defense acquisition process and how to fix it. While excellent in their description of the processes, little is said about the environment in which programs have to be executed.

All programs, particularly major ones, are subjected to significant congressional scrutiny. The Air Force's KC-X program is a good example. Each of the competing contractors is strongly supported by congressional delegations in whose districts the work will be done. Both candidates are commercial aircraft which can be readily adapted to the tanker mission, but based on several years of competition and millions of dollars invested by both contractors, it is doubtful that a protest by the loser can be avoided.

Another factor in the environment is that established programs can be cut by Congress, because of budgetary or other problems. While not necessarily fatal to a program, it will cause reopening of the contract and a subsequent negotiation, always resulting in increased cost and schedule delays. It is also the prerogative of the Defense Department and the service comptrollers to also take some of the program budget to fund more critical needs. Based on experience, it is a lonely time for a program manager who has to cope with a sudden cut.

The complexity and sophistication of our weapon systems has grown dramatically over the past 25 to 30 years. In many cases, software, not hardware, is the dominant challenge to program management. These developments have occurred over a period when the numbers, the quality, and experience of the acquisition work force has slowly declined.

Goldwater-Nichols did much to improve the operational execution of the armed forces. But moving acquisition responsibility to the service secretary and removing the service chief from that responsibility did not help. The PEO process that also resulted just confuses accountability. The service chief owns all the resources in the acquisition work force and program execution is done in the field, not in Washington. Several sources, including CSIS, reviewed the situation and recommend that Congress restore the role of the service chief in the acquisition process. At the moment he is neither accountable nor responsible.

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To execute today's complex acquisition business, there needs to be service acquisition institutions with strong leaders who are empowered to manage the processes and control the acquisition work force so...