Defense Acquisition.

• Author: Kojro, Chester A.
• Position: READERS'FORUM

* The May 2010 article concerning the need for radical change in acquisition, "Without Radical Change, Many More Defense Programs Will End Up Like JSF," presents illustrative points comparing various programs, but it misses the key cause for failure. The services, the Defense Department and Congress have all confused "development" with "acquisition." At all levels, they address the two interchangeably, which is the source of the problem.

The military does not acquire technologies. In fact, except for a few government laboratory exceptions, it doesn't develop them, either. Instead, the military contracts for equipment which is produced by industry. Though the names have changed through various reformations, the process is straightforward: Combat development studies past experience and future expectations and produces operational needs and requirements. Materiel development then converts or translates those needs and requirements into designs and specifications. Acquisition then contracts with industry to purchase equipment that meets the requirements.

If satisfactory equipment is not obtainable, especially if the required technology is not yet mature, acquisition is impossible. Either the combat developer's requirement is reconsidered or reduced, or the materiel developer determines an alternative design. Failing that, the entire effort goes to research and development. Until those technology solutions are developed, matured, and transitioned for production by industry, acquisition remains impossible.

Stew Magnuson's article, "Army Seeks to Quiet Skeptics as It Tries New Acquisition Strategy," hits these points well. Congress rightly asks why the Army would ask for an additional $600 million in the fiscal year 2011 budget request on top of the $400 million allocated this year if the technologies were not ready to go into production, and there are no products available to buy. GAO states that the Defense Department approved low-initial production lots despite having acknowledged that the systems and networks were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required.

For an illustrative example, consider Grace V. Jean's story, "Improvements to Discontinued Army Humvees May Last Another 20 Years." The vehicle started as a tactical utility truck, essentially an unarmored, soft-skinned pickup. It was sent into combat alongside armored vehicles to face enemy fire and explosive devices and the military was surprised, perhaps shocked, at its...