Defending Uselessness: Rousseau’s Harmless and Happy Idleness

• Author: Jacob T. Snyder
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211035835
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211035835

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Introduction

Idleness is morally and politically problematic. Even if

we wish for more free time, it is a conflicted wish. Idle

hands are the devil’s workshop, and working, as Judith

Shklar argues, is a central duty for democratic citizens

(Shklar 1991, 63). In liberal societies at least, working

and contributing to the economy is a form of citizenship.

At the same time, there seems to be a growing demand for

idleness and leisure, and not just from critics of liberal-

ism, but even from the liberals themselves. For instance,

Rose argues that we are owed, as a right or entitlement,

hours for “what we will” (Rose 2016). But what benefit is

there to “free time”? And is it coherent with our duty to be

productive? Arguably, no one explains and highlights the

conflicts and tensions in the human soul better than

Rousseau, and this includes the tensions in the desire for

idleness. As Todorov asserts, Rousseau offers three dis-

tinct, and potentially contradictory, lives to lead in

response to the challenges of human life created by civi-

lization: the citizen, the moral individual, and, most rele-

vant here, the solitary individual who lives a life of

idleness (Todorov 2001, 18).1 Closely reading Rousseau,

therefore, offers us a way to explain our desire for idle-

ness and the promises that may be fulfilled in it, but also

helps us recognize, and perhaps resolve, its tensions, such

as the tension between idleness and the duties of the citi-

zen and moral individual. Despite these tensions,

Rousseau finds idleness defensible, but only if certain

conditions hold; and as we will see, those conditions set a

high bar for idleness to be both morally defensible and

capable of delivering its promises for human happiness. I

address those conditions and promises by interpreting

Rousseau’s Reveries of the Solitary Walker.2 Rousseau’s

final writing should be of interest to us here, as Rousseau

there describes his highest happiness comprised of an idle

floating in Lake Bienne (Rousseau 1992, 64),3 and

amongst his descriptions of that idleness, also gives a

moral and political argument as to its legitimacy.

Though he discusses Rousseau’s idleness at some

length, Todorov concludes that it is not the solitary indi-

vidual, but the moral individual, that Rousseau “recom-

mends without hesitation” (Todorov 2001, 65–66).

Though Todorov is justifiably quick to qualify the hap-

piness of the moral individual as “frail,” it is still a curi-

ous claim, as the two prominent examples of such a path

in Rousseau’s corpus, Emile and Julie, are hardly rec-

ommended “without hesitation.” As impressive as the

two characters are, Emile still requires governing at the

end of his education, and in the Solitaires, we see that

Emile’s life cannot summarily be called happy. Similarly,

Julie’s happiness is conflicted, and she dies, most likely

willingly (see also Okin 1979, 175–76; Slonina 2020,

10). Though the happiness of the idler is also “frail,”

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35835PRQXXX10.1177/10659129211035835Political Research QuarterlySnyder

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1Dalton State College, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jacob T. Snyder, Assistant Professor of Political Science and

Philosophy, Dalton State College, 650 College Drive, Dalton, GA

30720, USA.

Email: snyder.jacob.t@gmail.com

Defending Uselessness: Rousseau’s

Harmless and Happy Idleness

Jacob T. Snyder1

Abstract

While also valuing useful citizenship, Rousseau offers what is perhaps the most substantive modern account and

defense of idleness. According to Rousseau, idleness’ attraction lies in its relation to human nature and its capacity for

producing our highest happiness. However, Rousseau is also careful to show that most existing forms of idleness are

false, and true idleness is a difficult achievement. The happiness available in idleness can only be attained when free

from vanity, obligation, and foresight. This specific form of idleness is also the only form that is morally and politically

defensible. Though Rousseau argues, in the First Discourse, that the useless are pernicious, this is only true of the falsely

idle that seek to undermine common morality and political attachment. True idleness, while still useless, satisfies

Rousseau’s core moral principle to not harm.

Keywords

Rousseau, idleness, leisure, happiness

2022, Vol. 75(3) 906–917

Article