Defending Instrumental Rationality against Critical Theorists

• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Author: Adrian Blau
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920958492
• Date: 01 December 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

2021, Vol. 74(4) 1067 –1080

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920958492

Political Research Quarterly

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Introduction

Frankfurt-School critical theory is hugely important.

Critical theory challenges “traditional” theory’s fact/

value divide and the ensuing tendency to support the sta-

tus quo. Critical theorists prefer a broader perspective,

with more emancipatory goals (Bohman 2019; Geuss

1981, 1–2; Horkheimer 1972, 188–243).

Such views have been extremely influential—and not

only among political theorists and political philosophers

(e.g., Allen 2015; Benhabib 1986; Fraser 1985; Marasco

2015). Critical theory is one of the nine major theoretical

perspectives covered in The Oxford Handbook of

International Relations (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) and

underpins many empirical studies in that field (see Risse

2015). Work on the public sphere by Jürgen Habermas, a

key critical theorist, underlies theoretical work on civil

society (e.g., Cohen and Arato 1992) and empirical work

by political scientists (e.g., Wampler and Avritzer 2004).

Critical theory is particularly important in deliberative

democracy, both in theory (e.g., Dryzek 1990; Hammond

2019; Rostbøll 2008) and underlying much empirical

analysis (e.g., Steiner et al. 2004). So, critical theory is

not just abstract: it is also widely applied in empirical

research in politics. The same holds in other disciplines

(Blau 2011, 40; 2019).

Critical theory is highly and increasingly diverse (Rush

2004, 7), but the critique of instrumental rationality is

“probably its most notable contribution” (Alford 2017,

425). Instrumental rationality—roughly, the ability to

choose good means to ends—is typically seen by critical

theorists as amoral, narrow, or having damaging effects.

Such concerns go back to predecessors of critical theory,

including Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, and

Lukács (Schecter 2010). And similar criticisms are made

by many outside critical theory (e.g., in an economics

textbook by Varoufakis 1998, 92–93, 100–101, 114,

264–65, 356–58). Much of my response applies to such

thinkers too. Of course, not all critical theorists discuss

instrumental rationality, and those who do so sometimes

offer different analyses (Smulewicz-Zucker 2017). But

the critique is central for many critical theorists and

informs many empirical studies as exemplified above.

My key argument is that this critique of instrumental

rationality is overstated. Critical theorists can and should

attack particular conceptions and applications of instru-

mental rationality. But instrumental rationality itself,

properly understood, is a sensible idea. And it is one that

958492PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920958492Political Research QuarterlyBlau

research-article2020

1King’s College London, UK

Corresponding Author:

Adrian Blau, Department of Political Economy, King’s College

London, Bush House, North East Wing, 30 Aldwych, London WC2B

4BG, UK.

Email: Adrian.Blau@kcl.ac.uk

Defending Instrumental Rationality

against Critical Theorists

Adrian Blau1

Abstract

Central to much critical theory is the critique of instrumental rationality (roughly, the ability to pick good means

to ends). This critique is overstated, I suggest. Critical theorists often depict instrumental rationality too narrowly,

and many criticize the wrong target, for example, attacking capitalist instrumental rationality when the fundamental

problem is capitalism, not instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, critical theorists’ critique requires certain changes to

orthodox accounts of instrumental rationality. I offer a more palatable definition, highlight instrumental rationality’s

essential contestability, and show that it can actually help us pick ends. Everyone needs instrumental rationality,

especially Habermasian critical theorists. And far from instrumental rationality being amoral, I argue that because

instrumental rationality almost always involves multiple ends, one end may prohibit immoral means, acting as a side-

constraint. Ultimately, the substance of critical theorists’ critiques remains highly important but should not be framed

in opposition to instrumental rationality.

Keywords

critical theory, Frankfurt School, Habermas, instrumental rationality, instrumental reason, means and ends

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