Decoding Morris Janowitz: Limited War and Pragmatic Doctrine

• Author: Donald S. Travis
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18760272
• Date: 01 January 2020
• Published date: 01 January 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Decoding Morris

Janowitz: Limited War

and Pragmatic Doctrine

Donald S. Travis

1

Abstract

The American sociologist Morris Janowitz presented two world views of security

named “absolutist” and “pragmatist.” This dualistic paradigm endures into the 21st

century and explains how complex and contentious security options are debated

within the U.S. security establishment. His paradigm also reveals a condition called

the “hegemon trap,” which means that the more powerful militarily that a state

becomes relative to other states, the less likely it will fight a large-scale conventional

war, resulting in frequent and perpetual limited, low-intensity, and unconventional

wars. Based on experiences learned since the Vietnam War, the United States can

improve global security by balancing resources between absolutist and pragmatist

outlooks. This requires devoting a greater share of resources toward peacetime

engagement, stability operations, and unconventional warfare.

Keywords

pragmatism, U.S. government and politics, civil–military relations, stability

operations

The development of guerrilla and subversive war was intensified with the magnifica-

tion of nuclear weapons.... To the extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of

full-scale war, it increases the possibilities of limited war....

—B.H. Liddell Hart (1967/1991, pp. 363–364)

1

Carlisle, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Donald S. Travis, 89 E. Ridge St., Carlisle, PA 17013, USA.

Email: dontravis752@yahoo.com

Armed Forces & Society

2020, Vol. 46(1) 68-91

ªThe Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18760272

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In examining civil–military challenges in the United States since the September 11,

2001 (9/11) attacks, the essay “The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and

the Next QDR” provides context.

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Published one year before 9/11, it presented a

well-known assertion: “Since it will be difficult to challenge the United States

directly ...enemies will attempt to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while

exploiting its weaknesses” (McKenzie, 2000, pp. 2, 95). This reflected a growing

awareness that “war will increasingly be unconventional and undeclared and fought

within states rather than between them .... Precisely because we are militarily

superior to any group or nation, we should expect to be attacked at our weakest

points” (Kaplan, 2002, pp. 118, 121). It soon became apparent that traditional

deterrence strategies were not going to work well in the “war on terrorism” (Gray,

2003, p. v).

In response to the growing concern over varied threats from “nonstate” actors, a

new concept called asymmetry emerged. “Asymmetric warfare” was used during the

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process to support a prevailing narrative:

As America’s enemies were workin g to deflate U.S. warfighting dominance by

avoiding open combat to “exploit its weaknesses,” the military was going to respond

by upgrading its conventional forces through doctrinal and technological innova-

tions (Department of Defense [DOD], 2001). This narrative was centered on the

premise that conventional formations were going to defeat every conceivable enemy

with improved technologies and advanced weapons. A wide range of technological

innovations would allow the warfighter to identify, find, track, fix, and neutralize

any enemy “at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and across

the spectrum of military operations.” By making a long-term commitment to

resource conventional military units to achieve “full-spectrum dominance” on any

battlefield against all adversaries, the willingness to prepare for “military operations

other than war” (MOOTW) was diminished (Graham, 2009, pp. 208, 323–326;

Herspring, 2008, pp. 17–21; Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 1995; Metz & Johnson,

2001; Quester, 2007).

Subsequent and unforeseen military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other

war zones from 2003 to 2007 were neglected mainly because resources (intellectual,

organizational, and material) were squandered o n ill-fated attempts to introduce

futuristic innovations into conventional Army formations to fight the next big war

(Fallows, 2015; Mansoor, 2013, p. 275; Metz & Johnson, 2001, pp. 12–17).

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Half-

hearted attempts to perform stability and counterinsurgency operations along with

the training and assisting of partner mi litaries were carried out by a handful of

qualified Special Operations Forces (SOF) supported by legions of unprepared and

untrained conventional Marine and Army units supported by Air Force and Navy

close air support (Johnson, 2007, pp. 29–33; Knie, 2002, pp. 12–14; Mansoor, 2013,

pp. 10–14).

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Such challenges and disappointments faced by the U.S. military since the Korean

conflict are mainly the result of unresolved internal rivalries over how to prepare for

war involving the roles and missions of the armed services that impact decisions

Travis 69