Decision-Making at the National Conventions

• Published date: 01 September 1960
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296001300304
• Author: Nelson W. Polsby
• Date: 01 September 1960
• Subject Matter: Articles

DECISION-MAKING AT THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS*
NELSON W. POLSBY†
The Brookings Institution
LTHOUGH
THE
RESULTS of national party conventions are highly un-
/B predictable, it is easy to foresee a resurgence of interest in these peculiar
manifestations of American democracy as the summer of 1960 draws
closer. In this article I shall draw together some common knowledge about de-
cision-making in these conventions, with the idea that it may help us to for-
mulate topics for further study.
In collecting this knowledge, I have drawn upon nine standard works on
American political parties,’ making an attempt to link a series of propositions
culled from these sources logically with one another and with widely accepted
assumptions about the operations of American politics. This attempt can not be
called a &dquo;theoretical model,&dquo; however, because I have not spelled out explicitly all
of the definitions and axioms actually employed here, on the grounds that such
an exercise is both tedious and unnecessary for a professional audience. In my
comments I try to (1) show the connections between propositions about national
conventions and more general knowledge about American politics, (2) suggest
hypotheses for empirical test, and (3) indicate the kinds of data that might bear
on some propositions. I begin with statements which may seem trivially true, but
which lay a necessary groundwork for understanding convention behavior. Our
national conventions are famous for puzzling casual observers, both foreign and
domestic. It therefore seems especially worth while to show that a great many
convention practices and events can be related to basic rules and circumstances
of American politics.
THE CONVENTION AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
1. Delegates to national conventions are expected to behave in a way that will
maximize their political power; that is, they are politicians.
. I am grateful to Robert A. Dahl and Aaron B. Wildavsky for several excellent suggestions, but
they are not responsible for any statements made here.
t This article was written prior to the 1960 conventions and so does not reflect the experiences
of these conventions.
1
In the order in which they were published, these sources are: M. Ostrogorski Democracy and
the Party System in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1926); C. E. Merriam and
H. Gosnell, The American Party System (New York: Macmillan, 1930); P. Odegard and
E. A. Helms, American Politics (New York: Harper, 1938); D. D. McKean, Party and
Pressure Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949); V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups (2nd ed.; New York: Crowell, 1950); H. R. Penniman, Sait’s Parties and Elections
(5th ed.; New York: Appleton, 1952); P. T. David, M. C. Moos, R. M. Goldman, Presi-
dential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vols. I-V (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1954); H. A.
Bone, American Politics and the Party System (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw Hill, 1955);
A. Ranney and W. Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Har-
court Brace, 1956). See also P. Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: Rinehart,
1940), and E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942). Uncited
statements of fact in this article, which I call "common knowedge," are treated in many
of these sources. The purpose of this article is not to establish the veracity of statements
so much as it is to present factual assertions about conventions in a fashion which connects
them with more general information about American politics.
609

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610
The rational dice player will place his bets in accordance with his chances
of winning under the rules of the game he is playing. Similarly, the &dquo;rational&dquo;
delegate will be expected to be reasonably well informed about how his behavior
affects his chances of achieving his goals, and will behave in accordance with his
information, his position in the game, and the goals he is intent upon achieving.~
2
_
The goal &dquo;political power&dquo; can for our purposes be specified as the ability
to make decisions, or to influence the making of decisions of government. In-
strumental to this is the achievement of access to those offices and officials em-
powered to make governmental decisions, and instrumental to access, in turn,
is the ability to staff the government, either by selecting officials to fill appointive
offices (patronage) or by significantly influencing the nomination and election
of elected officials. Since the latter are usually empowered to make appointments,
access to this class of officials is often instrumental to the dispensation of pa-
tronage. &dquo;Access&dquo; we may define as the opportunity to press claims upon deci-
sion-makers.3
3
This does not imply that those who have more access are more
successful in pressing their claims, but it is generally supposed that claims have a
better chance of realization when they are presented repeatedly and auspiciously
to decision-makers.
It may be well to emphasize that the term &dquo;politician&dquo; refers to but one of
many roles that individuals play, and it is only insofar as these individuals are
delegates to national conventions that they need be considered politicians here.
If delegates are politicians in other contexts -
members of Congress, for example
-
this fact may be expected to have impact on their behavior in the convention
situation, and may predict channels of communication in the convention.4 This
proposition, however, merely defines the frame of values within which delegates
will be expected to calculate their gains and costs.
2. At each level of government, party organization is controlled by the elected
chief executive.
Parties are organizations devoted to maximizing political power. At each
level of government, the elected chief executive (mayor, governor, President)
generally has the most political power, and as a result the party organizations
depend more upon access to chief executives than on any other source for their
political power. In addition, parties are accountable for the activities of chief
executives elected with their endorsement. Accountability means that when the
2
Sometimes delegates seem badly informed about convention events to outside observers. These
delegates may still be acting rationally if they are members of state delegations bound to
some candidate by law or bound to a delegation leader. One or another of these conditions
often applies to delegates, for reasons noted in the text, in which case relevant information
for them consists of keeping abreast of the preferences of their leaders. For a general dis-
cussion of the costs of keeping informed, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).
3
See the discussion of "access" in David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf,
1953), pp. 264-70, and 506-7.
4
Note this observation in David, Moos, and Goldman, op. cit., II, 173. "Some of the New York
delegation leaders were somewhat astonished and not entirely pleased at the evident or-
ganizational bonds between the New York and other Congressmen. The fact that Congress
creates a community, with its own system of favors, obligations, and friendships, seems to
have come as a shock to them, and they looked upon the behavior of the New York Con-
gressmen as verging on disloyalty to the delegation and to the state party organization."

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611
party endorses a man, it designates him as its agent before the electorate. The
fortunes of the party depend on the success of party candidates. Candidates come
and go, but parties and electorates remain, and it is assumed that the actions of
a party’s men in office will in the long run determine the extent and location of
the party’s appeal within the electorate, and its record of success at the polls.
Just as the party is greatly...