Case Notes

• Publication year: 2015
• Citation: Vol. 19 No. 12

CASE NOTES

Appeal Pointers

An opening brief may be stricken and the appeal may be dismissed or sanctions may be levied against an appellant if the opening brief does not contain a statement of points of error in the form required by HRAP 28(b)(4). HRAP 30.

Supreme Court

Civil Procedure

Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. SGWG 30700, October 21, 2015, (McKenna, J.). This appeal challenged the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs on statute of limitations grounds. At issue on certiorari was whether the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction operated to toll this state's statute of limitations, and, if so, at what point, under the particular circumstances of this case, did such tolling end. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction does toll the statute of limitations in this state, as such "cross-jurisdictional tolling" supports a primary purpose of class action litigation, which is to avoid a multiplicity of suits. See Levi v. University of Hawaii, 67 Haw. 90, 93, 679 P.2d 129, 132 (1984). Further, under the unique circumstances of this case, cross-jurisdictional tolling ended when the foreign jurisdiction issued a final judgment that unequivocally dismissed the putative class action. In this case, Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed within two years (the applicable limitations period) of the filing of the final judgment and, therefore, was not time-barred.

Quiet Title

Kaupulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula (k), No. SCWC 30475, October 8, 2015, (McKenna, J.). This case involved a title dispute between Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee Ka'upulehu Land LLC ("KLL") and Respondents/Defendants-Appellants Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula, et al. (collectively "Defendants"), stemming from KLL's "Complaint to Quiet Title" to the property at issue (the "Property"). Despite having obtained the Property through paper title derived from a common grantor, KLL claimed that it and Defendants' title to the Property was defective because the common grantor had actually sold the Property prior to his death. KLL claimed that neither it nor Defendants received valid title to the Property. KLL claimed that it was therefore entitled to one-hundred percent (100%) of the Property through adverse possession. In the alternative, KLL claimed that if title to the Property descended to the common grantor's heirs, it was a co-tenant with Defendants. Defendants, on the...