Death by Government.

• Author: Carpenter, Ted Galen

R. J. Rummel, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, has justifiably acquired a reputation as an outstanding scholar of violence perpetrated by the political state. His book Death by Government (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994) is a detailed, searing, and compelling indictment of the mass murder (more than 169 million victims) committed by governments during the twentieth century.

Rummel has also long been a proponent of the "peaceful democracies" thesis: that democracies are markedly less prone than are authoritarian or totalitarian states to resort to violence in the conduct of their external relations and that democracies never (or almost never) fight other democracies. In Power Kills. Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), he provides the most systematic development of that thesis to date. Unfortunately, his reach greatly exceeds his grasp.

The realist faction of foreign policy scholars--especially the so-called structural realists, who argue that conflict is inherent in an international system that has no central authority and is made up of nation-states with conflicting interests--is Rummel's principal target. The realists are wrong across the board, he contends.

Wrong with regard to war and lesser international violence. Wrong about

civil collective violence. Wrong about genocide and mass murder. There is

one solution to each and the solution to each case is the same. It is to

foster democratic freedom and to democratize coercive power and force.

That is, mass killing and mass murder carried out by government is a result

of indiscriminate, irresponsible Power at the Center. (p. 3)

In addition to that general conclusion, Rummel asserts that several key propositions about democracy and violence have been "uncovered or verified." Among the more important are the following: "Well established democracies do not make war on and rarely commit lesser violence against each other" (p. 4). "The more two nations are democratic, the less likely war or lesser violence between them" (p. 5). "The more a nation is democratic, the less severe its overall foreign violence" (p. 5). Indeed, Rummel contends that for "theoretical reasons" he "would expect no violence between democracies at all" (p. 101).

He advances (with varying degrees of conviction) three explanations for the peaceful nature of democracies. The first-level explanation is that the publics in democratic societies generally prefer to avoid war. Rummel argues that although that factor (emphasized by other scholars) has some validity, it must be viewed with caution. He acknowledges that "democratic peoples have become jingoistic on occasions and enthusiastically favored war... They can also be aggressive today, pacific tomorrow" (p. 132).

Rummel attaches greater importance to the second-level explanation: the influence of democratic institutions and culture. "Where by virtue of their institutions democratic people must, to maintain democracy, negotiate and compromise rather than fight, this becomes part of the cultural heritage" (p. 138).

Moreover, he states,

since we deal with others through a cultural matrix, it is also natural for

democratic people to perceive other regimes in these terms, to believe that

all basic issues between nations can be settled by people sitting down at a

table and talking them out, and to tolerate the existence of other regimes

and ideologies that do not openly threaten one's democratic way of life.

(p. 38)

The converse is equally true: totalitarian regimes see other regimes as being as ruthless, duplicitous, and brutal as themselves, and they act accordingly, thereby intensifying the cycle of violence.

Even more significant than the impact of democratic political culture, Rummel contends, is the third-level explanation: the operation of a "social field" based on diversity and individual...