Damages

AuthorTheodore Eisenberg
Pages739-740

Page 739

From the earliest days of COMMON LAW, courts have ordered the payment of money ("damages") to compensate for legal wrongs. Two related but separable lines of cases shape the availability of damages for violations of constitutional rights. One line of cases involves inyterpretation of SECTION 1983, TITLE 42, UNITED STATES CODE, and its express provision for "an action at law" to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by state officials. Since the revival of section 1983 in MONROE V. PAPE (1961), it has been understood that damages are available to compensate for sonstitutional violations by state officials. CAREY V. PIPHUS (1978) reaffirmed this understanding, but held that substantial damages could not be recovered for PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS violations without proof of injury. Smith v. Wade (1983) clarified the standards governing awards of PUNITIVE DAMAGES under section 1983.

In actions against federal officials, which are not governed by section 1983, the Court, in BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN NAMED AGANTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS (1971), inferred a damages action based on the FOURTH AMENDMENT. Later cases, such as DAVIS V. PASSMAN (1979), extended the implied constitutional damages action to other constitutional provisions. The Bivens line of cases may be viewed as an extension of EX PARTE YOUNG (1908)

Page 740

and other decisions that allowed actions for injunctive relief to be based directly on the Constitution.

THEODORE EISENBERG

(1986)

Bibliography

NEWMAN, JON O. 1978...

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