Cyprus: The predictable crisis.

• Author: Barkey, Henri J.

MOST international crises take leaders by surprise. While the region or issue that might blow up can often be identified in advance, the timing and contour of any particular crisis usually cannot. The coming dispute between Turkey and the European Union over the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, however, provides the rare opportunity of a corning crisis that can be pretty well scripted in advance. Barring significant new developments, none of which will come about without major outside intervention, the accession of the Greek part of Cyprus in 2004 to the European Union will trigger a severe crisis between Turkey and the West. The crisis is set to begin, however, at the end of 2002, when the EU plans to issue invitations to prospective candidates. Unless something is done to alter the current course of events, the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU will reverse much of the cooperadon that has developed recently between Greece and Turkey, increase tensions on the island, further alienate Turkey from Europe a nd generally worsen Turkish domestic political conditions. The resulting crisis could lead to Turkish annexation of Northern Cyprus, the permanent division of the island, a deep rupture between an aggrieved Turkey and Europe, and a possible military confrontation between two NATO members.

Avoiding this all-too-likely scenario should be a high priority for U.S. and European policymakers, even as they rightly focus the bulk of their attention, political capital and foreign policy resources on coping with the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Indeed, whereas the natural tendency in the face of such an overwhelming new priority would be to push the seemingly eternal "Cyprus problem" to the back burner, the issue is both more pressing and more important than ever before. It is more pressing because of a timetable that has the EU set to announce Cyprus' accession sometime next year, even if Turkey's objections remain. And it is more important because a clash with Turkey over Cyprus, at a time when the United States is trying to sustain a global coalition against terrorism and fight wars in the Middle East, would deeply damage American national interests. Knowing this, of course, Turkey will be all the more likely to dig in its heels over Cyprus and expect Europe to back down.

The United States has an important role to play in defusing the Cyprus time bomb before it explodes. Whereas the EU naturally holds most of the highest cards (namely the accession timetable and economic incentives), the United States--as Turkey's most important strategic ally and an important partner of Cyprus, Greece and the rest of the EU--has significant leverage on all the parties involved. Leaders in Washington should avoid the temptation to dismiss Cyprus as an unnecessary irritant as they deal with more important issues, and instead use the long lead time before the coming crisis to take action. This means not only pushing hard to achieve a political settlement on Cyprus before accession (the optimal, if improbable, scenario), but also starting to prepare for the more likely scenario in which such a settlement is not reached and the EU enlarges to accept Cyprus without one. Only by pulling a range of strings with Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the EU partners can this latter scenario be managed without pr oducing the crisis that would otherwise inevitably result.

The Divided Island

THE DIVISION of Cyprus has been one of the most in tractable problems in international relations for decades, frozen almost in place for over a quarter century. The current disputes date back to the early 1960s, when the delicate balance constructed between the Greek and Turkish communities at the time of independence from Britain collapsed, primarily as a result of attempts by Greek Cypriots to undermine the Turkish Cypriots' constitutional protections.

The constitutional system broke down after inter-ethnic clashes in 1963, after which Turkish Cypriots no longer participated in the government. Between 1963 and 1974, the minority Turkish Cypriot community was frequently harassed by the majority Greeks, and acts of communal violence escalated. Conditions changed radically when, in 1974, the ruling military junta in Athens, in part to compensate for its growing unpopularity at home, instigated a coup in Cyprus. The coup resulted in the overthrow of the elected president, Archbishop Makarios, and his replacement by a member of the main anti-Turkish terrorist movement, Nikos Sampson. Turkey, as a guarantor power, responded by invading the island on July 20, 1974. Unsatisfied with the military gains achieved by the time a ceasefire was implemented, Turkish troops went on the offensive again in August, resulting in the current territorial division of the island. Backed by the Turkish military, the Turkish Cypriots, representing 18 percent of the population, ended up with around 37 percent of the island.

Since then, all efforts to broker a solution to the conflict have failed. While the Greek Cypriots continued to enjoy legal recognition as the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot administration in 1983 declared its independence and formed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity recognized only by Turkey, and supported both by Turkish financial aid and some 30,000 Turkish troops. Over the years, numerous attempts have been made to bring the two sides together, and countless rounds of talks have been held under UN auspices with active U.S. participation. All have proven fruitless. The general contours of a possible deal on a new Cypriot federation have been known for years: the Turkish side would cede territory to more closely reflect its share of the island's population; the Greek side would recognize Turkish administration over its zone; citizens on both sides who lost property would receive compensation or the right to return home; and a new, decentralized government would be formed. But none of the plans has been able to overcome seemingly insuperable obstacles: the inherent difficulties of building a joint government for two antipathetic communities; the Greek Cypriots' unwillingness to countenance a formally separate Turkish Cypriot area within Cyprus; and the Turkish Cypriot--and Turkish--preference for the post-1974 status quo.

While those who experienced personal or property losses in 1974 suffered greatly in subsequent years, Cyprus has actually been relatively stable since its division. During the 1980s and early 1990s it was a major issue only for those with a direct interest in it, including the powerful Greek-American domestic lobby and its supporters in Congress. The Cyprus problem rose to new prominence in 1995, however, when the European Union put Cyprus at the top of its list of candidates for future EU membership. The agreement to do so was reached under strong pressure from Greece, frustrated by the lack of progress toward a settlement, and as a quid pro quo for Athens agreeing to an EU customs union with Turkey. EU leaders were also convinced that the prospect of membership in the Union--massive economic benefits for both Cypriot communities and the freedom for Cypriots to work and travel throughout the Union--would catalyze the resolution of the inter-communal divisions on the island.

They were wrong. The EU's playing of the Cyprus card only stiffened Turkish resolve against a compromise. The EU'S decision at the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit not to offer Turkey a path to EU accession further strained Turkish-European relations and made Ankara even less likely to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to cooperate. Two years later, with a Greek government now focused on deepening its integration with Europe and...