Cultivating ripeness through UN peacekeeping operations.

• Author: Stover, Mark
• Position: The Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay

"Peacekeeping itself cannot bring a final resolution of conflict; but it can help create conditions for political leaders to forge a lasting settlement."--Richard Holbrooke (1)

"Outside interventions are typically more effective when third parties entrench and institutionalize their role in the peacemaking and peace-building process, that is, when they cultivate ripeness."--Fen Osler Hampson. (2)

United Nations peacekeeping missions have always faced complicated objectives, inevitable in an organization that is required to place political realities ahead of military considerations. During its first four decades, the United Nations managed this paradox through the creation of missions that engaged primarily in border and ceasefire-monitoring activities designed to respect the dynamics of the Cold War system. An early warning of the potential dangers in mixing political and military objectives came with the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, which had an ambitious political mandate that was unachievable on the ground (3) and ultimately resulted in the untimely death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. (4)

Nevertheless, while the superpower stalemate of the Cold War precluded frequent peacekeeping deployments, the 1990s provided the opportunity for an ambitious peacekeeping agenda that was overly optimistic, leading to unrealistic mandates. The failure of UN missions in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia prompted strong debate within the international community. In response, the United Nations undertook an intensive internal review of its peacekeeping operations, most notably with the Brahimi report and subsequent reforms aimed at achieving an improved deterrence through strength without turning the institution into a war-fighting machine. (5)

New tools and processes for measuring the achievements of peacekeeping missions, need to be developed from current theory. Notably, the concept known as ripeness theory aims at identifying the timing and emphasis of specific initiatives that lead to successful peace negotiations in post-conflict environments. Peacekeeping missions have employed effective strategies, including transitional justice initiatives, disarmament and repatriation programs, economic development schemes, improved policing methods and institution building. However, further study of the timing and sequence of such activities in the context of particular conflicts must include the variables of hostility level, local capacity and international capacity. (6) Particular attention must be paid to the reconciliation process, societal perceptions and psychological climates between former enemies. Given the UN's limited resources, such research could lead to the improved effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping mission design and an increase in the scope and number of successful operations.

Examining the concept of ripeness from its theoretical underpinning to its potential application as a peacekeeping tool requires shifting from the traditional use of ripeness theory as a lens for analyzing decisionmakers to developing a concept of societal ripeness. Ripeness for leaders is not the same as ripeness for societies. Leaders often have particular values and motivations not equally shared by the societies they rule. Jonas Savimbi, late leader of the Angolan movement UNITA, for example, spoke of peace when it seemed a good way to advance his power but returned to advocating war when he lost the general presidential election.

By analyzing the two recognized variants of traditional ripeness--natural and cultivated--and by looking at their counterparts on the societal level, one can examine how the potential for ripeness in post-conflict societies can be enhanced by peacekeeping activity even after the leaders have negotiated a ceasefire. (7) Finally, it is important to consider the development of indices for measuring societal ripeness through peacekeeping missions and to address the obstacles to promoting ripeness as a mission goal.

RIPENESS THEORY

Determining and developing the readiness for conflicted parties to pursue successful negotiations is the central question of traditional ripeness theory in the context of international relations. Sustained yet unresolved conflict can result in a wide array of conditions, from hurting stalemates and enticing opportunities, to imminent catastrophes and entrapments. (8) These conditions, when mutually perceived by all parties, can lead to the nonviolent resolution of conflict. (9) The moment of mutual perception, and more practically the time when parties seek alternative policies in good faith, is the ripe moment.

According to I. William Zartman, one of the leading scholars of ripeness theory, ripeness alone is not a sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations. However, other factors such as valid representatives, third-party support and local involvement, may be necessary to take advantage of this opportunity to negotiate. The theory is also not self-implementing or self-fulfilling: "Although ripeness theory is not predictive in the sense that it can tell when a given situation will become ripe, it is predictive in the sense of identifying the elements necessary (even if not sufficient) for the productive inauguration of negotiations." (10)

This logic may be applied to decisionmakers in a conflict situation. For ripeness to exist, these actors must make an internally subjective recognition of an externally objective reality. For example, they must recognize the stalemate and then choose or be prompted into acting on that perception. Historical examples provided by successful peace agreements prove the existence of ripeness in this sense and imply the causal factors that lead to its emergence. Ripeness theory is predictive of those factors necessary for the start of negotiations because the events leading to the decision can be analyzed. Therefore, ripeness itself can...