Cruelty, Competency, and Contemporary Abolitionism

• Published date: 15 December 2005
• Date: 15 December 2005
• Pages: 123-140
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1059-4337(05)37006-2
• Author: Michael Cholbi

CRUELTY, COMPETENCY, AND

CONTEMPORARY ABOLITIONISM

Michael Cholbi

ABSTRACT

After establishing that the requirement that those criminals who stand for

execution be mentally competent can be given a recognizably retributivist

rationale, I suggest that not only it is difficult to show that executing the

incompetent is more cruel than executing the competent, but that oppos-

ing the execution of the incompetent fits ill with the recent abolitionist

efforts on procedural concerns. I then propose two avenues by which

abolitionists could incorporate such opposition into their efforts.

The 2003 execution of Charles Singleton, a diagnosed paranoid schizo-

phrenic and convicted murderer, revived interest in a neglected aspect of

death penalty jurisprudence, namely, the requirement that those who are

slated to die for their crimes must be competent for execution. Subsequent

to his 1979 conviction for capital felony murder, Singleton filed numerous

appeals in the federal courts, arguing that his mental condition rendered him

unfit to die. Prison psychologists reported that Singleton believed his cell

was possessed by demons; that he was the victim of curses; that he had in

fact already been freed by the courts; and that his pending death was in fact

a pseudo-execution, because he would simply stop breathing and then ‘‘start

Crime and Punishment: Perspectives from the Humanities

Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Volume 37, 123–140

Copyright r2005 by Elsevier Ltd.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1059-4337/doi:10.1016/S1059-4337(05)37006-2

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up again somewhere else.’’ Singleton sometimes referred to himself as the

‘‘Holy Ghost’’ or ‘‘God and the Supreme Court.’’ In 1997, a medical review

panel determined that Singleton was a threat to himself and others and

ordered that he be given antipsychotic medication, which caused his delu-

sions to dissipate. Singleton’s execution was then rescheduled. Singleton’s

attorneys proceeded to file a habeas corpus petition, claiming that his in-

voluntary medication was not in their client’s medical interest (since his

‘‘artificial competency’’ would in fact lead to his death) and that the state

could not coerce Singleton into receiving drugs for the sole purpose of

restoring his competency for execution. The appeals court rejected these

arguments, citing both the state’s interest in expeditiously punishing of-

fenders and the fact that Singleton had, at various points during his incar-

ceration, willingly sought antipsychotic medication for his symptoms,

(Singleton v. Arkansas 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003); see Stewart, 2004 for a full

judicial timeline). The state of Arkansas executed Singleton by lethal injec-

tion on January 6, 2004. Singleton’s reported last words: ‘‘The blind think

I’m playing a game. They deny me, refusing my existence. But everybody

takes the place of another. As it is written, I will come forth as you go’’

(quoted in Kimberley, 2004).

Singleton’s case attracted extensive media attention, largely due to the

array of moral issues it raises concerning the use of antipsychotics within the

prison population. These include whether pharmaceutically induced com-

petence counts as genuine competency from a legal perspective and whether

prison physicians and psychiatrists have an obligation, in light of their duty

to do no harm to their patients, to refuse to provide antipsychotic med-

ications to those whose competency for execution would be restored there-

by. That Singleton’s case should garner such attention evokes our perennial

fascination with questions about criminal mentality and responsibility,

questions which are nearly impossible to avoid in the contemporary media

environment. Television in particular encourages us to fear and condemn

criminal behavior, while simultaneously permitting us the vicarious thrill

involved when we seek to understand or even occupy the criminal mind.

Twenty-four hour crime news coverage, with a special fixation on offenders’

personal history and motives; the proliferation of crime psychodramas,

some of which present the commission of crime from the first-personal

perspective of the criminal; and crime documentary series that painstakingly

recreate the details of criminal acts; all of these reflect and reinforce a will-

ingness to entertain the possibility of our own criminality, a possibility the

indulgence of which must of course be circumscribed by the condemnatory

sentiments and judgments we direct at the criminal. Doubtless an interest in

MICHAEL CHOLBI124