A critical evaluation of the United Nations volcanic emergency Management system: evidence from Latin America.

• Author: Macias, Jesus Manuel
• Position: PREVENTION, MITIGATION and PREPAREDNESS

A chronic problem in the management of volcanic emergencies is the collective struggles and conflicts among the parties involved, many of which are beset with faulty public policies. Examples abound in the literature associated with this field, including the Taal volcano in the Philippines and the emergency management challenges that occurred with the eruptions of Soufriere (1976) and Soufriere (1979) volcanoes in Guadalupe and St. Vincent islands, respectively. All of these cases demonstrate the potential that conflicting scientific views can have in shaping emergency responses, and their ability to influence public policies that overlook critical risks faced by the populations most threatened by volcanic eruptions. (1)

The organizational arrangements and decisionmaking schemes used in managing volcanic emergencies received a good deal of attention after the Armero disaster in Colombia produced by the Nevado del Ruiz Volcano in 1985. This eruption formed an enormous lahar (debris flow) that buried most of the population of the town of Armero, killing 20,000 to 24,000 people, a volcanic disaster of nearly unprecedented proportion and the fourth worst such disaster on record. (2) One of the consequences of the Armero disaster was the creation of the U.S.-based Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP), an interagency cooperative program that attempts to "reduce eruption-caused fatalities and economic losses in developing countries." (3) Another outcome, which garnered strong support from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), was the adoption of organizational measures recommended by the Volcanic Emergency Management Manual of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO). (4)

Many countries in Latin America and elsewhere adopted the resulting UNDRO-USGS management scheme. It assumes that people are aware of volcanic hazards and wish to protect their communities; that laws exist at the local, regional and national levels that would make it possible to create and carry out protective measures; that there is ample scientific knowledge to construct alternative scenarios of the eruptions and their destructive effects; that it will be possible to disseminate warnings with sufficient lead time for people to take protective action; and that an emergency plan can be put in place. The manual includes the following social actors:

* A group of scientists in charge of monitoring the volcano who issue forecasts to appropriate authorities about the probability and nature of the risks of volcanic activity. They would not intervene in the activities of civil authorities in charge of protecting the population.

* An emergency management committee that includes public officials and representatives from other community organizations, which interprets and uses the scientific knowledge for the population's protection.

* An effective mass communication system that disseminates the decisions of the emergency management system and provides people with information about the volcanic threat and the recommended protective actions.

The UNDRO-USGS scheme assumes that a variety of technical resources as well as preparedness and response programs for the authorities and threatened population are already in place. (5) The scheme does not consider the cultural and social complexities linked to emergency response in the developing world; rather, it primarily examines the risk of volcanic eruption from a natural science perspective. (6) The risks associated with the decision to evacuate or resettle communities are often not considered sufficiently. While the manual is suitable for actors that have a high level of technical proficiency, it is less optimal for volcanic emergencies that affect communities and regions where such expertise is lacking. At times, this deficit can be as basic as having no system of public warnings. (7)

In the analysis that follows, we examine the emergency management program involving population evacuation and resettlement that has been used in volcanic risk situations on five volcanoes in three developing societies: Chichonal, Popocatepetl and Volcan de Fuego, in Mexico; Tungurahua in Ecuador; and San Cristobal in Nicaragua. The responses to these incidents shed light on the efficacy of the organizational measures recommended by the Volcanic Emergency Management Manual of UNDRO. We offer a critical assessment of these policy frameworks and analyze the political contexts of disaster relief, while illustrating the roles that disaster refugees and indigenous peoples are subjected to in such cases. The paper concludes by characterizing the difficulties faced by the UNDRO approach as examples of the difficulties that are often associated with international technology transfers.

Chichonal Volcano, Mexico

The eruption of the Chichonal volcano in Mexico in 1982 was a catastrophic antecedent to the UNDRO-USGS management system. The Chichonal volcano is situated about 70 kilometers from Tuxtla Gutierrez, the capital city of Chiapas. Its eruption on 28 March and again on 3-4 April killed at least five thousand people, mostly from the Zoque ethnic community. (8) There was no monitoring equipment on site with the exception of a set of seismographs that had been installed by the federal electricity commission, or Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE), for the monitoring of seismic activity around nearby dams. Overall, the debacle revealed a deplorable state of neglect in Mexico's emergency response and preparedness.

The Mexican Army was the primary federal agency in charge of responding to this disaster. It arrived on the scene on 1 April, two days prior to the deadly eruption of the 3rd. Due to a certain degree of poor coordination between the army and local communities, evacuation efforts did not begin until after the second eruption. Perhaps some blame can be directed toward the army's decision to respond with a military plan, named DN-III-E, on the suggestion of a CFE geologist with no experience in either volcanoes or disaster relief, who opined that the eruption had ceased on 1 April. (9) Following this advice, the authorities used the mass media and other means to convince the Zoque ethnic communities to stay in their homes. (10) Two days later, the second massive eruption took place, killing the majority of the victims. Afterwards, as the army evacuated the survivors, they segregated them by gender and age, disrupting family networks. (11) Eventually close to 45,000 people evacuated to thirty-seven shelters in seventeen cities that were far from the volcano and from their homes. (12) Not much is known about the survivors. Between 1995 and 1997, as part of a research program of the Department of Anthropology of the Autonomous Metropolitan University-Iztapalapa Campus, Ignacio Zavala researched the forced population evacuation linked to the eruption of the Chichonal volcano. His study considered the symbolic-religious interpretations of the volcano as well as the effects of the management of the crisis. (13) He examined a number of families who became environmental refugees and were forced to improvise their own community and civil structures. They did so without external or government assistance, much less compensation for their losses, which aggravated their poverty. (14)

Popocatepetl Volcano

The Popocatepetl volcano, 45 miles southeast of Mexico City and 30 miles southwest of the city of Puebla, currently threatens more than 20 million people. It is one of the most active volcanoes in Mexico, with 15 eruptions since the arrival of the Spaniards in Mexico, although most eruptions have been mild. It became active a few days before Christmas in 1994. The eruption occurred days after a profound national economic crisis resulting from the devaluation of the Mexican peso and that required the financial assistance of the United States. With the Chichonal and Nevado del Ruiz volcanic eruptions as a backdrop, Mexican officials adopted the UNDRO-USGS model to address the dangers posed by the Popocatepetl volcano. The scientific committee for the Popocatepetl volcano was thus created in 1995 as part of the response to the eruptions of 1994; it was comprised of the five most reputable geologists in the country. Moreover, the National System of Civil Protection, or Sistema Nacional de Proteccion Civil (SINAPROC), through the initiative of the then-director of the National Center for the Prevention of Disasters, or Centro de Prevencien de Desastres (CENAPRED), created a national committee to give comprehensive technical assistance regarding the Popocatepetl volcano and other volcanoes and hazards. The SINAPROC national committee incorporated the committee to assess the Popocatepetl volcano as well as other committees on geologic, hydro-meteorological, chemical and public health hazards, and a subcommittee composed of social scientists. (15) This national body includes a number of seismologists and has a membership of approximately twenty-two geoscientists that participate actively in its meetings.

SINAPROC, as the agency of the Mexican federal government that attends to disasters, is similar in function to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States. SINAPROC was created in 1986 in the aftermath of the earthquake of 1985 that impacted Mexico City; until then, despite the Chichonal disaster, there had not been an effort to create such an agency. Thus, when the Popocatepetl volcano erupted in 1994-1995, SINAPROC was able to respond to the crisis. Initially, SINAPROC did not plan to include a group of scientists in its activities, but this decision was reversed by the then-director of CENAPRED in order to assist in the handling of emergencies and prevention of disasters. It was in this context that the UNDRO-USGS model was adopted, first for volcanic emergencies but soon after for all types of emergencies.

The eruption of the Popocatepetl volcano in December 1994 brought about an...