Crisis and Credit Allocation: The Effect of Ideology on Monetary Policy during the Great Depression and the Great Recession.

• Author: Caton, James

Often, the policy of a central bank may be described as easy or tight depending upon the rate of new money creation or the interest rates charged or targeted by the central bank. When the bank increases the rate of money creation, that is a sign of easy money. When it lowers interest rates, that is yet another sign of easing. Movements in the opposite direction are believed to indicate monetary tightening. The devil, however, is in the details. Policies that one might characterize as being easy or tight may be incorrectly attributed one of the descriptions (Sumner 2021). For example, lowering interest rates during recession without simultaneous expansion of circulating currency appears an ineffective policy for lifting aggregate demand back to the pre-recession trend. The problem of evaluating policy is compounded by ideological blinders. Guided by ideology, a policymaker prefers one policy or policy regime to another. That same policymaker will apply theory in a manner consistent with his or her ideology. Evaluation of the effects of policy will also depend on one's interpretive lens.

In this paper, I consider two regimes in which descriptions of policy as being easy or tight were incomplete: Adolph Miller's Fed, guided by the Real Bills Doctrine to hold speculative activity suspect, and Ben Bernanke's Fed, guided by a belief that large financial institutions should be kept from failing in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. For both of these cases, I argue that the interpretation of monetary policy must include not only changes in policy variables, but the ideologies ol those who shaped policy. Ideology informs the aims of policymakers and their interpretation of data. We can judge the motivations for, and the structure of, policymaker strategy and also better understand the long-term effects of these different regimes on the structure of U.S. monetary policy by considering the interaction between the ideology and theory that guides the policymaker.

I begin by defining ideology and elaborating its relationship to monetary policy. Then, I describe the ideology that guides policy in each case and consider the structure of policy implementation and the effect of the policy on resource allocation and the extent of resource employment. The policies of both Bernanke and Miller presumed inherent instability of financial markets, at least for the conditions under which they implemented their policies. Both policymakers sought discretionary allocation of credit and, therefore, real resources. I compare this to Walter Bagehot's prescription for monetary policy, which only indirectly influences allocations by setting the rate charged by the central bank or, more liberally interpreted, by open market operations intended to impact lending rates. Finally, I argue that Bernanke's policy and its transformation of the Federal Reserve operating framework were sustained because Bernanke's policy framework significantly benefited the U.S. Treasury. Similarly, Miller's Federal Reserve Board set precedent for supporting the U.S. Treasury by purchase of government debt, setting the stage for cooperation with the U.S. Treasury that continued at least until the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord (Bordo 2015, 230).

The Role of Ideology

Although interpretation of events in monetary history ought always to include the significance of changes in the supply of and demand for money and credit, monetary and price aggregates are insufficient for understanding the nature of particular economic fluctuations (Wagner 2020). Explanation of the unraveling of monetary events must include the beliefs of actors responsible for policy along with a detailed presentation showing how the path of policy implementation influenced economic outcomes (Mises [1957] 2007, 266). (1)

What follows builds on the work of institutional scholars (Buchanan 1964; Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Buchanan 1979; Denzau and North 1994; North 2005; Lewis and Dold 2020) who assert that the neoclassical framework leaves an incomplete view of human decision making. All decision making is supported by mental models of actors. Even subtle differences between otherwise similar approaches can lead to vastly different outcomes.

An ideology that ties together different ideas often differentiates itself by means of a particular goal or disposition. To clarify its significance, we must elaborate ideology in theoretical terms. Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger provide several "prominent interpretations" of ideology:

Ideologies are collections of ideas with intellectually derivable normative implications for behavior and for how society should be organized. Ideologies are economizing devices by which individuals understand, and communicate about, politics. Ideologies are complex, dogmatic belief systems by which individuals interpret, rationalize, and justify behavior and institutions. ... Ideologies perform an important psychological service because without them people cannot know, assess, and respond to much of the vast world of social relations. Ideology simplifies a reality too huge and complicated to be comprehended, evaluated, and dealt with in any purely factual scientific, or other disinterested way. (1994, 10) Building on these ideas, the authors summarize that "an ideology tells us what is good, who gets what, and who rules" (1994, 11). Although the authors claim that an ideology is "[a]n internally consistent set of propositions that makes both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behavior," they allow for a weaker claim concerning logical consistency. Logical inconsistencies do not promote the health of an ideology, but it is quite difficult to iron out all inconsistencies in one's worldview, if only owing to human ignorance and particular circumstances that make perfect application of ideology especially costly. Persistent inconsistencies can spell the end of an ideology whereas the ability of an ideology to adapt in the direction of consistency can enable its persistence. The success of an ideology depends in part on its ability to coherently integrate empirical observations and beliefs in the relevant domain of agents and social activity.

Arthur Denzau and Douglass North view ideology as artifacts developed through communications of agents who employ shared mental models. Communication "allows the creation of ideologies and institutions in a co-evolutionary process" (1994, 20). The evolutionary nature of shared mental models and ideologies allows for internal consistency to serve as a likely guiding force in their development but is not a strict requirement of either category, at least not in application. The success of an ideology depends on the ability of a simple principle to economize on decision making in a manner that adherents believe to promote future states that manifest the good.

Ideology serves as a means of coordinating shared perception within a community of actors. It simplifies rankings of desired states of the world according to some general end that can, ideally, allow actors to conform their own preference rankings according to the principles of ideology. As Hinich and Munger point out, reducing the problem space to a consistent application of a general end helps actors to economize on costs of coordination. "If some entrepreneur can identify a single issue that unites the apparently disparate disputes into a single cause, the situation is ripe for the propagation of a successful ideology" (1994, 64). Without ideology, communicating about phenomena within the community and advocating for particular outcomes and institutional orientations would be ineffective. Although ideology reduces the costs of communicating, it also anchors interpretation in a manner that privileges certain events as being more significant and certain interpretations as being more valid. As F. A. Hayek (1949) recognized, ideology plays a pivotal role in coordinating beliefs of intellectuals and, over long periods of time, these beliefs tend to exert significant influence over politics and culture. This is, of course, true of coordination of beliefs in all communities.

Ideology and Monetary Policy

Concerning monetary policy, ideology is an interpretive anchor upon which also rests policymakers' beliefs about monetary policy. Policymakers with beliefs not representing the status quo who are also Big Players may have opportunity to transform policy by articulating new policy frameworks or transforming existing frameworks (Koppl 2002). The policymaker's own theoretical assertions about the relationship between the object of intervention and the entity carrying out the intervention will be embedded in the resultant framework.

Those who shape and administer monetary policy are concerned about the relationship between financial markets and the central bank. A policymaker's conception of this relationship includes assertions about the state of this object of intervention absent such intervention. In other words, the policymaker employs a theory about financial markets, however crude or sophisticated, that predicts how these markets would operate absent monetary intervention. This theory is itself situated within the policymaker's more general ideology.

In analysis of the ideology guiding monetary policy, it is necessary to view ideology at differing levels. Ideologies are domain specific. Some ideologies are all encompassing. This is certainly the case, for example, with religious ideologies. Obviously, ideology guiding monetary policy will tend to be more limited than, say, religious ideology. I will, therefore, relate policymaker ideology to the broader currents identified above in terms of the efficacy of competitive financial markets. Although I orient the ideology of the policymaker in terms of broader ideological currents, elaboration of these broader currents is beyond the scope of this study.

Since the turn of the twentieth century, ideologies in the...