Crisis and Convergence: How the Combination of a Weak Economy and Mainstream Party Ideological De-Polarization Fuels Anti-System Support

• Published date: 01 June 2021
• Author: Zack P. Grant
• Date: 01 June 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414020970222
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020970222

Comparative Political Studies

2021, Vol. 54(7) 1256 –1291

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414020970222

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Article

Crisis and Convergence:

How the Combination

of a Weak Economy

and Mainstream

Party Ideological De-

Polarization Fuels Anti-

System Support

Zack P. Grant1

Abstract

When do radical parties gain support? Previous studies cite the economy

and mainstream party ideological convergence as important. Responding to

earlier inconsistent findings, I provide evidence for an interactive approach.

Anti-system parties succeed when mainstream parties are simultaneously

presiding over an ailing economy and failing to provide the diversity of

political opinion for the electorate to meaningfully challenge the policies

associated with this malaise, through which dissatisfaction with the status

quo could otherwise be channeled. Two studies support this “crisis and

convergence” model. At the aggregate-level, the anti-system vote is

strongest during times of negative economic growth and widespread

mainstream party ideological de-polarization. At the voter-level, the link

between negative economic evaluations and radical party voting is stronger

during establishment convergence and, vice versa, personal perceptions

of convergence are themselves more closely related to support for these

parties when the macroeconomy is sickly. Mainstream party homogeneity

radicalizes the economic vote and strengthens anti-system challengers.

1University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Corresponding Author:

Zack P. Grant, St John’s College, University of Oxford, St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3JP, UK.

Email: zack.grant@sjc.ox.ac.uk

970222CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020970222Comparative Political StudiesGrant

research-article2020

Grant 1257

Keywords

anti-system parties, economic voting, polarization, radical politics, party

competition

Introduction

In recent decades the once high institutionalized party systems of the West

have begun to unravel. Relative to their mid-twentieth century predecessors,

contemporary voters are less likely to identify with a single political party

(Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Dassonneville et al., 2012; Fieldhouse et al.,

2020, pp. 51–55; Mair, 2013, p. 35), more likely to switch between parties at

successive elections (Bischoff, 2013; Drummond, 2006; Fieldhouse et al.,

2020, pp. 9–14; Mair, 2013, p. 33), and more prone to negative evaluations of

government as a whole (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Catterberg &

Moreno, 2006; OECD, 2017).

Who has benefited from these patterns of distrust and dealignment? The

exact answer varies from country-to-country. From populist mavericks in

Italy, to the nativists of northern Europe, from secessionists in Scotland and

Belgium, to the resurgence of the radical left in southern Europe, from

Eurosceptic challengers in the United Kingdom, to the insurgent Icelandic

Pirate Party. Recent elections have been punctuated by the successes of a

heterogenous mix of “anti-system parties” who stand outside the governing

establishment, and fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of the dominant

norms, values, practices, actors, or boundaries of their political community

(Zulianello, 2018). While the specific ideology or character of these parties

might differ, nearly every advanced Western parliamentary democracy has

witnessed the rise of some form of radical political entrepreneur exploiting

the growing coolness toward the establishment in the past few decades.

What determines the popularity of such parties? Most previous studies have

two notable limitations. First, they tend to only focus on one particular ideo-

logical party family or another. In particular, there is an overwhelming publica-

tion bias toward the so-called “radical right” (Mudde, 2016, p. 2). This does not

reflect the true range of alternatives available for voters looking to express their

disillusionment with the establishment (Abedi, 2002, p. 557). Second, and

more importantly, there is a tendency to focus on demand- and supply-side fac-

tors as separate phenomena (Golder, 2016, pp. 490–491). The former are the

grievances that stimulate desire for radical shifts in policy or modes of repre-

sentation, the latter are the political opportunity structures that determine

whether these latent sentiments actually coalesce around a viable anti-system

party, get co-opted by a pre-existing party, or simply go unrepresented (Eatwell,

2003). Looking at either of these factors in isolation is problematic.

1258 Comparative Political Studies 54(7)

For example, a demand-side grievance that is often linked to the spread of

political radicalism is a weak economy. Recessions are likely to be associated

with many unpleasant experiences for the electorate, most notably mass

unemployment and declining real incomes (Hurd & Rohwedder, 2010;

Singer, 2018). These problems may have the potential to undermine the legit-

imacy of the established constitutional order in the eyes of more output-ori-

ented citizens (Przeworski et al., 1996). Conversely, increasing prosperity

mitigates against defection to untested outsiders by raising the opportunity-

costs of political uncertainty (Brückner & Grüner, 2010, pp. 2–3).

However, it is somewhat unclear why downturns should produce mass

defection to radical anti-system challengers, rather than the simple rotation

between mainstream incumbent and opposition parties described in conven-

tional models of economic voting (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, p. 50; Key, 1966;

Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Whitten & Palmer, 1999). In

severe recessions, parties without a prior history in government or the con-

straining likelihood of actually having to carry out their promises can more

credibly claim non-responsibility for current hardships and be more radical in

proposing resolutions (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016, pp. 972–974). However, it seems

equally plausible that, given the gravity of the situation, risk-averse voters sim-

ply re-elect established parties with substantial governing experience, rather

than leap into the unknown. Research linking radical party fortunes to fluctua-

tions in the macroeconomy has yielded mixed results. While some studies find

a positive association (Arzheimer, 2009; Brückner & Grüner, 2010; Hobolt &

Tilley, 2016; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015; van der Brug et al., 2005),

many others uncover null or even negative findings (Abedi, 2002; Arzheimer

& Carter, 2006; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Spies & Franzmann, 2011).

These inconsistencies suggest the influence of supply-side factors, and the

role of the political opportunity structure in denying anti-system candidates

the opportunity to exploit latent anti-establishment sentiment. An obvious

example is mainstream party behavior. Radical parties may find it easier to

mobilize their support when the mainstream parties have become more simi-

lar ideologically. The classic statement comes from Downs (1957). When

established parties of the left and right converge on the median voter, who is

usually assumed to be a centrist, they create a vacuum of unrepresented polit-

ical preferences that can be usurped by parties positioned at the extremes

(Hainsworth, 1992, p. 11). However, the evidence that mainstream party de-

polarization facilitates anti-establishment breakthroughs is, once again,

inconclusive. Some demonstrate a positive association (Abedi, 2002; Carter,

2005; Hino, 2012; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Spies & Franzmann, 2011;

Spoon & Klüver, 2019) others do not (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Bustikova,

2014; Ignazi, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005).