Criminal Procedure: Judicial Error on Motion to Suppress Involving Traffic Stop and Vehicle Search and Seizure - Commonwealth v. Tavares.

• Author: Barry, John

Criminal Procedure--Judicial Error on Motion to Suppress Involving Traffic Stop and Vehicle Search and Seizure--Commonwealth v. Tavares, 126 N.E.3d 981 (Mass. 2019)

All individuals are constitutionally protected against unreasonable searches and seizures by officers in his or her person or effects. (1) While an individual maintains the Fourth Amendment's protection during a traffic stop, officers may still search a vehicle without a search warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment. (2) In Commonwealth v. Tavares, (3) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) considered whether a Massachusetts Superior Court judge erred when he denied Paulo Tavares's motion to suppress evidence that officers obtained during a search and seizure of a vehicle in which Tavares was merely a passenger. (4) The SJC held that the motion judge erred in denying Tavares's motion to suppress because the officers obtained the evidence in question as a direct result of an illegal seizure of the vehicle. (5)

On May 21, 2007, John Lima was killed after being shot three times from a vehicle driving beside him down a street in Brockton, Massachusetts. (6) On the night of the shooting, an eyewitness told officers that he saw a Chevy Malibu speed around a corner and hit a curb near his house moments after hearing eight to nine loud bangs that sounded like gunshots. (7) The next day, Brockton detective Michael Schaaf and Massachusetts state trooper Robert Fries were patrolling Brockton in an unmarked cruiser on warrant apprehension duty. (8) A Brockton detective provided Schaaf with the eyewitness's description of the vehicle. (9) During their patrol that afternoon, Schaaf observed three individuals in a Chevy Malibu driving in the opposite direction. (10) Based on a three-second observation as the vehicle drove by, Schaaf believed that one passenger was Jose Correia, an individual Schaaf knew had an outstanding arrest warrant, leading Schaaf and Fries to pursue the vehicle and pull it over. (11)

As Schaaf and Fries exited their cruiser and approached the stopped vehicle, Schaaf realized that the rear passenger, despite his initial and justified belief, was not Correia. (12) Regardless of this realization, Schaaf continued to talk with the men because he recognized the passengers, including the front seat passenger--Paulo Tavares. (13) During his conversation with the three occupants, Schaaf asked the driver, Christopher Hanson, for his driver's license, and asked for and inspected the vehicle rental agreement. (14) After the three men left on foot pursuant to Schaaf's orders, Schaaf impounded the vehicle at the police station because he realized the vehicle might be the one from the prior night's shooting. (15) The officers did not release the vehicle to Tavares's girlfriend, the true renter of the vehicle, because her contract was void for allowing an unauthorized individual to operate it, and subsequently the eyewitness identified the vehicle at the police station as the one from the shooting the night before. (16) The officers received permission from the rental company to search the vehicle, where they found scrape marks on the bumper and undercarriage, as well as Tavares's fingerprints inside the vehicle. (17)

About a week after the shooting, Tavares was arrested and charged with three counts related to the shooting, including first-degree murder. (18) The motion judge denied Tavares's pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle. (19) At trial, the jury found Tavares guilty on all three counts, and Tavares appealed. (20) On appeal, Tavares argued that the motion judge erred by allowing into evidence the eyewitness's identification of the vehicle at the police station, the scrape marks on the vehicle matching the eyewitness's description of where they would be, and Tavares's fingerprints from the vehicle's interior. (21) The SJC concluded that the motion judge erred in denying Tavares's motion to suppress because the evidence was the direct result of the officers' illegal seizure of the vehicle. (22)

Both the United States Constitution and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide that an individual has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (23) If officers conduct a nonarrest investigatory detention, they must do so in a reasonable manner, as this type of detention constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (24) One type of nonarrest investigatory detention is a traffic stop. (25) Any traffic stop by officers is a seizure not just of the vehicle itself, but also of all the vehicle's occupants. (26) Courts determine the legality of a traffic stop based on whether the initial stop was reasonable, as well as whether the duration and extent of the stop were reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. (27) If an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle's occupant has an outstanding arrest warrant, then the officer may stop the vehicle within the parameters allowed by the Fourth Amendment. (28)

Even if the initial traffic stop is reasonable, the remainder of the stop may become unreasonable if the duration of the stop is excessive, or if the scope of the officer's actions during the stop exceed the stop's justified reason. (29) A traffic stop can only last as long as the officers need to reasonably complete investigative actions related to the stop's initial justification. (30) Any actions the officer takes after he or she has reasonably completed the actions needed to resolve the justification for the traffic stop creates an unreasonable seizure by prolonging the stop's duration. (31) Common officer actions during a traffic stop that relate to the stop's initial justification include checking the driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and researching whether there are any outstanding warrants. (32) An officer may take actions beyond the scope of the traffic stop's initial purpose, however, if during the stop the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. (33) Nevertheless, detaining a vehicle's occupants after the initial justification has been addressed, without suspicion of other criminal activity, constitutes an illegal seizure. (34)

A defendant must have standing to bring forth a motion to suppress evidence that violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights, which requires the defendant to prove he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a constitutionally-protected area that was either searched or seized by officers. (35) In contrast to the Fourth Amendment however, article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights separates the issue of standing from the issue of a reasonable expectation of privacy. (36) If a court finds that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the exclusionary rule, under which all evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded from trial. (37) Even if evidence is obtained from a place where a defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, the evidence may be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." (38) Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule that may allow admission of evidence obtained from an illegal search or seizure, such as the attenuation exception. (39)

In Commonwealth v. Tavares, the SJC held that the motion judge erred in denying Tavares's motion to suppress because the officers had obtained evidence as a direct result of an illegal seizure in violation of Tavares's Fourth Amendment rights. (40) Tavares argued that the initial stop became an illegal seizure because the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop, and the subsequent impounding and searching of the vehicle at the police station resulted in evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree. (41) The SJC agreed with Tavares's arguments on these issues. (42) In analyzing whether the initial stop was valid under the circumstances, the SJC reasoned that the officers had sufficient facts to support the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity threshold to stop the vehicle, due to Schaaf's belief that an individual with an active arrest warrant was in the vehicle. (43) Despite the officers' constitutional initial stop of the vehicle, the SJC disagreed with the motion judge's conclusion that the duration and scope of the detention were constitutional under the circumstances. (44) The SJC reasoned that, as the initial justification for the stop was to arrest Correia on an active arrest warrant, the officers had no justification to continue the stop after Schaaf discovered that Correia was not in the vehicle. (45)

The SJC addressed the Commonwealth's arguments that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged by the officers' actions and did not constitute an unlawful seizure, but ultimately rejected this argument. (46) The SJC compared this case to precedent of similar cases in which an officer's knowledge of another individual renting a vehicle did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (47) Further, the SJC held that impounding the vehicle at the police station was unconstitutional because the officers only obtained knowledge sufficient to impound the vehicle during an illegal seizure. (48) The SJC also held that Tavares had standing to challenge the evidence because the illegal seizure of himself and the other occupants by the...