CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - IRRATIONAL DISTRICT COURT DECISION FORCES NEW TRIAL.

• Author: Richradson, James

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--IRRATIONAL DISTRICT COURT DECISION FORCES NEW TRIAL--United States v. Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2018).

Within the realm of criminal procedure, courts are typically granted a fair amount of discretion in their decision to accept or reject plea deals. (1) In United States v. Cota-Luna (2) , the Sixth Circuit found the district court abused this discretion in rejecting a plea deal that would otherwise have drastically reduced the Defendant's imposed sentence. (3) Not only did the court hold that Alejandro Cota-Luna (Cota-Luna) required a new trial due to the district court's irrational decision making, but also that the case would be reassigned upon remand. (4)

Defendant Cota-Luna, along with a second defendant, Antonio Navarro-Gaytan, were pawns in a large-scale drug trafficking operation run by a Mexican cartel. (5) They were caught trafficking a secret compartment, initially smuggled from Mexico underneath a tractor trailer. (6) The compartment was later found to contain 92 kilograms of cocaine. (7) The two were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute. (8)

The two defendants claimed that they only took part in this operation fearing for the safety of their families, as well as themselves. (9) The government believed the two, with the understanding that they were a small disjointed part of a much larger operation who had little knowledge of what was inside the secret compartment. (10) With this in mind, both sides reached a plea deal containing a series of reductions regarding the sentencing guidelines." For Cota-Luna, this meant reducing the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison to just thirty-six months. (12)

The district court immediately took issue with the proposed plea deal. (13) After the parties amended the plea agreement, the court finally accepted it, stipulating, however, that plea deals are merely advisory and that the court still had discretion. (14) At sentencing, the court rejected all but one sentencing reduction, giving Cota-Luna the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison. (15)

However, on appeal the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial and reassigned it to a new court on the grounds that the lower court came to an irrational conclusion. (16)

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 signified a substantial change in the realm of federal sentencing. (17) The previous format of sentencing left vast inconsistencies in the lengths of prison sentences for the same or similar convictions. (18) The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the Sentencing Reform Commission, which is charged with establishing and amending the federal sentencing guidelines. (19) As of today, while judicial discretion still exists, these sentencing guidelines restrict the disparate latitude of sentences that once existed. (20)

The sentencing guidelines themselves establish a point system for defendants, in which a high amount of points translates to a lengthier sentence. (21) Initially, a defendant is given a base level number of points that correlates with the crime committed. (22) This base level is then adjusted to factor in enhancements, which add to the base level, or reductions which reduce it. (23) According to the guidelines, the final offense level then corresponds with a range of time a defendant will spend in prison. (24) In thinking about the sentencing guidelines, the safety valve exception is a powerful reduction to consider. (25) At its core, the exception offers a way for a court to disregard the minimum mandatory sentences that come with certain controlled substance charges. (26) The exception was created to combat situations where mandatory minimum sentences could be enforced against defendants who were less culpable. (27) There are five criteria a defendant must meet in order to qualify for the safety valve exception, the primary being that the defendant must have only a minimal criminal record. (28)

In United States v. Cota-Luna, the Sixth Circuit ultimately found that the District Court employed unsatisfactory reasoning in determining Cota-Luna's sentence. (29) More specifically, the Sixth Circuit was alarmed by the District Court's disregard for the sentencing guidelines without explanation. (30) The Sixth Circuit decided to vacate the charges and remand the case, calling the District Court's decision "an abuse of discretion." (31)

The Sixth Circuit also found grounds for reassignment upon remand. (32) In reaching a decision, the Sixth Circuit considered judicial integrity, the potential for judicial waste, and the District Court's ability to reassess its previous reasoning. (33) Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit established that these three criteria were satisfied. (34) In reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit considered the simple nature of Cota-Luna along with the District Court's irrational decision-making process. (35)

The concurrence in United States v. Cota-Luna, written by the Sixth Circuit's Judge Kethledge, took issue with part of the majority's opinion. (36) More specifically, Judge Kethledge argued that while the District Court should at least consider plea agreements, they have the ability to freely accept or reject them. (37) Judge Kethledge's assertion is both right and wrong. (38) Though there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that dictate sound reasoning, case-law mandates it. (39)

The Sixth Circuit was certainly correct in finding the District Court's abuse of discretion was proper grounds for remand and reassignment. (40) After all, allowing a Federal Court to categorically reject a certain form of plea agreement would condemn that specific provision to futility. (41) Furthermore, the reductions offered in Cota-Luna, including those offered through the safety valve exception, are being put to their true intended use. (42)

The direct impact of Cota-Luna is clear in that the case will be remanded to a new judge, whose impartiality will hopefully guide the court to an appropriate decision. (43) However, it is unclear why the Sixth Circuit failed to focus more intensely on the District Court's conduct given the prior history of similar behavior. (44) Moreover, a question one might ask is what impact this might have on future cases with this particular judge. (45) However, in fairness to the Sixth Circuit, the kind of power this question demands rests with Congress and is seldom put on display. (46)

In conclusion, United States v. Cota-Luna demonstrates when failing to consider plea agreements can constitute abuse of discretion. The ruling also validates the notion of sound judicial reasoning, especially in connection with sensible plea agreements. The case will be remanded and reassigned, rightfully so. Though, in the end, Cota-Luna falls short of revealing if repeated abuse of discretion will ever become a larger issue.

(1.) See Plea Bargain, L1I / Legal Information Institute (2019), CORNELL L. SCHOOL, https://www.law.eornell.edu/wex/plea_bargain (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (describing plea bargains). Plea agreements, deals or bargains "are agreements between defendants and proseeutors in which defendants agree to plead guilty to some or all of the charges against them in exchange for concessions from the prosecutors." Id. In the United States, the role of judges in these agreements varies based on jurisdiction. Id. Some jurisdictions limit the role of judges in determining the outcome of a plea bargain. Id. Other jurisdictions give judges much more say when it comes to plea bargains. Id. In federal court, a judge's authority falls more on the side of this latter category, where they possess the final decision in sentencing. Id. See also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reform, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150 (2012) (examining Supreme Court's regulation of plea bargaining). Bibas contended that "the Supreme Court has usually treated plea bargaining as an afterthought, doing little to regulate it. When it has regulated please, the Court has largely focused on the procedures for waiving trial rights, not the substantive pros and cons of striking a deal." hi. See also Adam Stern, Plea Bargaining, Innocence, and the Prosecutor's Duty to "Do Justice," 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1027 (considering mixed criticism of plea bargains). While plea bargains can be a welcome opportunity to many, they often create a unique problem in themselves. Id. More specifically. these deals create scenarios where defendants may be tempted to take a plea bargain rather than risk going to trial, even if they are innocent. Id. Stern called this the "innocence problem." Id. However, for prosecutors and judges, the upside of these deals is that they promote "speed and efficiency," not to mention opportunities to reduced sentences for defendants. Id. See also Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Eederal Judges, 1993 U. III. L. REV. 809, 809 (1993) (considering Executive Branch's role in impeachment of judges). Peterson wrote that the Executive Branch has a role in prosecuting Federal Judges for crimes they have committed. Id. However, traditionally, this has not been the case. Id. at 810. In the last decade:

[T]he executive branch has assumed a much more prominent role in the judicial disciplinary process. For the first time in the history of the United States, the executive branch prosecuted a federal judge for crimes committed while in office. In fact, within the relatively short span of ten years, the Department of Justice prosecuted five federal judges and obtained convictions in four of those cases.

Id. This generally leads to the impeachment process when a federal judge refuses to resign, even after a conviction. Id. See also Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith. How to Remove a Eederal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 72 (2006) (discussing methods of removing federal judges). According to Prakash and...