Major criminal decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: 1997 term.

• Author: Hemmens, Craig

During its 1997-1998 term the U. S. Supreme Court heard oral argument and handed down written decisions in 91 cases. The Court issued 38 opinions involving criminal law-related issues. This article summarizes the most significant criminal law-related decisions of the 1997-1998 term. The cases are arranged alphabetically by subject, and the case history, rationale of the Court, and the vote totals are included. Also included is a list of other criminal law-related cases from the 1997-1998 term.

Death Penalty

Buchanan v. Angelone, 66 U.S.L.W. 4075 (1998). Buchanan was convicted of capital murder for the killing of four family members in Virginia. During his sentencing hearing, his attorney introduced four mitigating factors to support a sentence of life in prison rather than the death penalty. These included Buchanan's age, diminished mental capacity, and lack of a prior criminal record. The attorney asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it "must consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, Buchanan's history and background, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense." The trial judge refused and instead instructed the jury to consider "all of the evidence" in pronouncing sentence. The jury sentenced Buchanan to death. After failing on direct appeal, Buchanan filed a habeas corpus petition seeking a new sentencing hearing in which the jury was to be expressly instructed that it must consider all of the mitigating evidence. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit denied the petition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, stating that the jury instructions in Buchanan's case were sufficient and did not prevent the jury from considering all of the mitigating evidence. All that is required is that the defendant be allowed to present any mitigating evidence (which Buchanan was) and that the jury be allowed to hear it and consider it (which the jury was). The Court thought it "unlikely" that the jury would not consider the mitigating evidence after hearing two full days of testimony on it and being instructed to consider "all of the evidence." 6-3 decision.

Hopkins v. Reeves, 66 U.S.L.W. 4449 (1998). Reeves was convicted on two counts of felony murder by a Nebraska jury and sentenced to death by a three-judge panel. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and death sentence. He asserted that the jury should have been instructed that it could find him guilty of either of two lesser included offenses (second degree murder or manslaughter). Nebraska law does not recognize lesser included offenses when the charged offense is felony murder; however, Reeves argued that Supreme Court precedent requires such instructions. The Eighth Circuit determined that Supreme Court precedent controlled and that the Constitution required an instruction on lesser included offenses.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, reversed the Nebraska decision. According to the Court, prior cases simply stand for the proposition that the state cannot treat capital and noncapital murder defendants differently with respect to jury instructions on lesser included offenses when state law recognizes the existence of such offenses. Since Nebraska does not recognize lesser included offenses for felony murder, there is no requirement that the jury be instructed on them. 8-1 decision.

Double Jeopardy

Monge v. California, 66 U.S.L.W. 4628 (1998). Under California's three strikes law, a convicted felon is subject to a doubling of sentence if he or she has a prior "serious" felony conviction. Monge was convicted of selling marijuana. During his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the sentence enhancement should apply, offering as evidence a prior conviction for assault. The prosecutor alleged that Monge used a stick to inflict great bodily harm during the assault, but did not introduce evidence to substantiate this allegation. The sentencing judge found the allegation to be true and, based on the prior convictions, enhanced the sentence for selling marijuana. On appeal the California Court of Appeals found that the state failed to prove that the prior felony involved assault with a deadly weapon or serious bodily injury, a requirement to classify the prior conviction as a "serious" felony. Moreover, the appeals court refused to allow the state to prove the allegation on remand, holding that to do so would violate the double jeopardy clause. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding the double jeopardy clause does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings.

Justice O'Connor's majority opinion for the Court affirmed the California Supreme Court, holding that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings in noncapital offenses. She refused to extend a prior decision (Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)) which held the double jeopardy clause applied in capital sentencing proceedings, reasoning that the Bullington precedent was intended to apply only to the narrow class of capital cases, in which defendants are entitled to heightened due process protections. As the Court has said before, death is different. 5-4 decision.

Due Process

Campbell v. Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (1998). Campbell, a white man, was indicted by an all-white grand jury on a second degree murder charge. He challenged his indictment on the ground that the procedure for selecting grand jury forepersons in Louisiana was racially biased. In Louisiana, the judge selects the foreperson from grand jury venire. Between 1976 and 1993 no black person served as a foreperson, despite the county being 20 percent black. Campbell was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He appealed his conviction, but the trial court and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected his claim, saying he lacked standing as a white man to complain of racial discrimination against black men.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed, holding that white defendants have the requisite standing to raise legal challenges to the exclusion of blacks as grand jurors. In essence, whites have standing to assert the equal protection rights of blacks in the selection of grand jury forepersons because both white defendants and potential black grand jury members 1) have an interest in a criminal justice system unsullied by unconstitutional racial discrimination, and 2) share a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the criminal justice system. Racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the entire judicial process. Justice Kennedy reiterated the important function the grand jury performs...