Credibility and the Standpoint Expectation

• Author: Jessica Flanigan
• Position: Richard L. Morrill Chair of Ethics and Democratic Values and an associate professor of Leadership Studies and Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law (PPEL) at the University of Richmond
• Pages: 845-863

Credibility and the Standpoint Expectation

JESSICA FLANIGAN*

ABSTRACT

When listeners consider a speaker’s social identity or standpoint as evidence

of their credibility on questions related to social issues, this practice is usually

epistemically counterproductive. Though people’s standpoints are relevant for

understanding what it’s like to occupy a social position, the practice of boosting

or blocking a speaker’s credibility on the basis of their standpoint is often mis-

leading. The expectation that speakers will reveal their standpoints and that lis-

teners will consider the speaker’s standpoints when evaluating their claims is

also burdensome for speakers who would rather conceal information about

their standpoints.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPECTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. THE RISKS OF CREDIBILITY BOOSTING 850

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. THE RISKS OF CREDIBILITY BLOCKING 856

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. NORMS FOR BELIEVERS 859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. CONCLUSION 861

The standpoint expectation is the practice of granting or denying a speaker’s

credibility on a topic by revealing aspects of their identity, experiences, or their

personal history of oppression. People meet this expectation when they frame an

argument for their position by first disclosing the details of their standpoint within

a broader system of social hierarchy. People enforce this expectation when they

discount a person’s argument because the arguer speaks from a standpoint that

undermines their credibility on a particular subject.

The standpoint expectation evolved for several reasons. People increasingly

recognize that people from marginalized backgrounds have experiences that are

overlooked when only members of privileged groups are included in a conversa-

tion. As standpoint epistemologists argue, people can learn from the experiences

* Jessica Flanigan is the Richard L. Morrill Chair of Ethics and Democratic Values and an associate

professor of Leadership Studies and Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law (PPEL) at the University

of Richmond. © 2022, Jessica Flanigan.

845

of the oppressed. However, knowing whether a person occupies a privileged or

oppressed standpoint can be difficult. People increasingly express themselves in

online communities where their backgrounds and identities are less obvious to

listeners unless they are explicitly stated. In this context, audiences can have diffi-

culty evaluating claims where they lack information about the source. Creating a

public persona as a speaker, writer, or activist that includes information about

one’s standpoint is relatively low-cost and can provide helpful context to audien-

ces. This practice contributes to norms of disclosure that shift audiences’ expecta-

tions to believe that speakers will reveal details about their personal histories.

In this essay, I argue against the standpoint expectation as a speech norm. The

expectation is epistemically counterproductive in most cases. When a person

reveals their standpoint to boost their credibility, they can obscure other relevant

information and may prompt listeners to think that a person with a particular

standpoint speaks for their group or that people with shared experiences think in

the same way. When people discount someone’s credibility because of their

standpoint, they discount potentially valuable information and cause people

whose credibility is blocked to retaliate by denying others’ credibility. The expec-

tation also makes it harder to refuse this dynamic by concealing one’s standpoint,

to the extent that those who remain reticent are silenced, excluded from the com-

munity of listeners, or denied the ability to effectively convey their message.

In Section I, I introduce standpoint epistemology and the standpoint expecta-

tion. I then argue that proponents of standpoint epistemology should take a pause

in promoting the standpoint expectation because the expectation may not deliver

the epistemic benefits that are associated with considering different standpoints.

In Section II, I argue that the information about a person’s standpoint is often mis-

leading to the extent that their standpoint provides a credibility boost. I discuss

the conditions under which a standpoint does boost a speaker’s credibility. In

Section III, I argue information about standpoints is also misleading when people

cite it as a credibility blocker, discussing whether and when ad hominem is a fal-

lacy. I consider a potential solution—people could generally refuse to meet the

standpoint expectation—and the reasons that solution fails: that people who fail

to meet the expectation can also experience a loss of credibility, and opting out of

the expectation can itself be a misleading signal. In Section IV, I discuss a few

other problems with appealing to people’s standpoints as credibility boosts or

blocks. Finally, in Section V, I conclude that, whatever its epistemic merits, the

standpoint expectation is not epistemically reliable enough to justify the costs.

I. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPECTATIONS

The standpoint expectation refers to the social expectation to make personal

histories and social identities available when making arguments. When someone

makes information about their standpoint available, this information bolsters or

blocks the credibility of the arguments they are making. When people disclose bi-

ographical details of a speaker’s life as a way of bolstering the speaker’s credibil-

ity to discuss a more general topic, they are meeting the standpoint expectation.

846 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:845