Court Summaries, 1217 WYBJ, Vol. 40 No. 6. 44

AuthorAnna Reeves Olson, Park Street Law Offices Casper, Wyoming
PositionVol. 40 6 Pg. 44

Court Summaries

Vol. 40 No. 6 Pg. 44

Wyoming Bar Journal

December, 2017

Anna Reeves Olson, Park Street Law Offices Casper, Wyoming

Sara E. Hurst, et al. v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co.

2017 WY 104

S-17-0082

September 12, 2017

In 2014, Larry and Sara Hurst were riding their bicycles when a car, driven by Hannah Terry, suddenly struck them. Larry was killed and Sara was seriously injured.

As Terry was uninsured, the Hursts fled a claim with their UIM carrier, MetLife. The MetLife Policy provided UIM coverage for “$300,000 each person/$300,000 each accident.” MetLife contended that the Hursts’ injuries resulted from one accident, so there was a maximum of $300,000 in coverage. The Hursts argued that their injuries were the result of two accidents, warranting $600,000 in coverage.

After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court applied a legal doctrine known as the “cause theory” and concluded that only one accident had occurred and, thus, MetLife’s policy limit was $300,000.

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that under the “cause theory,” the number of accidents is determined by the court asking whether there was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries. However, more than one accident occurs when an intervening cause demarcates the collisions. For instance, if the driver maintained or regained control of his or her vehicle before going on to hit a second car, the collisions can be deemed separate accidents.

The Supreme Court determined that while the district court correctly applied the cause theory to the case, there were issues of material fact as to whether Terry regained control of her vehicle during her collisions with the Hursts. The Court reasoned that the district court did not give much, if any, consideration to the notion of Terry’s control of her vehicle, and the stipulated facts revealed that the collisions with Larry and Sara could be separate incidents. Tere was no chain reaction or causal connection between the impact with Larry’s bicycle and Sara’s bicycle and nothing that necessitated an impact of the latter by virtue of the impact with the former. As there were issues of material fact regarding whether Terry regained control of her vehicle between crashes, the case was reversed and remanded.

Lon V. Smith Foundation v. Devon Energy Corporation, et al.

2017 WY 121

S-17-0021

October 10, 2017

Thirty-four years ago, a California court issued a probate order distributing the estate of Lon V. Smith. A couple of years later, a Wyoming court entered an ancillary probate order to distribute Mr. Smith’s Wyoming property, including a Carbon County overriding royalty interest (ORRI). It is undisputed that Smith’s intent, as expressed in his will, was for the ORRI to be distributed to his wife, Marguerite B. Smith, for her life, and then to be distributed to the Lon V. Smith Foundation. That is not, however, what the courts ordered in the California and Wyoming probates. Consequently, the Foundation sued Devon Energy Corporation, which was the lessee and operator of the oil and gas...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT