Court Recognizes Tortious Interference with Inheritance

• Pages: 21-22
• Date: 01 October 2022
• Author: Jonathan W. Lounsberry
• Subject Matter: Civil Law

they also believe there a re signif‌icant

admissibilit y limitations that must be

considered by litig ants and courts.

In Pineda v. Abbot t Laboratories,

Inc., the plainti sue d his former

employer in the U.S. Distr ict Court for

Central District of California, alleging

age and disabi lity discrimination fol-

lowing a traumatic br ain injury. The

undisputed fa cts established at trial

revealed that the defe ndant provided

the plainti with 11 of h is 12 requested

accommodatio ns. The twelfth request ,

a four-hour workday for six we eks, was

in fact provided fo r two weeks before

the plainti ’s doctor cleared him to

return to work full time .

To buttress his claim, th e plainti

pointed to f‌ive pieces of evi dence: (1)

a supervisor ’s criticism of him for sigh-

ing during a mee ting; (2) a supervi-

sor’s comment s on his performance

at meetings; (3) a n email from his

supervisor t hat his medical leave put

him further b ehind on performance;

(4) an alleged def‌icienc y in the defen-

dant’s discrimination investigation

with respect to fail ing to interview his

supervisor ; and (5) the defendant’s

termination of him a fter his medical

leaves. Notwithstanding the foregoing

evidence, the dis trict court granted the

defendant’s motion for summary judg-

ment on all the pla inti’s claims.

The U.S. C ourt of Appeal for the

Ninth Circuit armed the distric t court

f‌indings on all cl aims, save the plain-

ti’s age discri mination claim, which

the court reversed and remanded.

Referencing the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shif ting framework for estab-

lishing a discrim ination claim, the

appellate cour t ruled that the district

court applie d the wrong standard in

f‌inding the plai nti failed to satisfy the

fourth criterio n.

To establish a prima fac ie case of

age discrimin ation under McDonnell

Douglas, the court noted , a plainti

need only show h e or she was over age

40, suered an adverse employment

action, that o bjective evidence showed

the plainti was qu alif‌ied, and that the

adverse employm ent action was sug-

gestive of unlawfu l discrimination. The

Ninth Circuit concl uded the record

showed genuine i ssues of material fact

existed as to whether th e plainti was

replaced by some one under 40 years

old, thereby ma king the grant of sum-

mary judgm ent improper as to whether

the defendant ’s act of replacing the

plainti with a young er employee was

unlawful.

“Once the plainti  presents the

prima facie ca se, the defendant

employer must ar ticulate a legiti-

mate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action,”

explains Dustin L. Crawford , Atlanta,

GA, chair of the E mployment Litigation

Subcommitte e of the Section’s Civil

Rights Litigation Committee.

Crawford furt her explains that once

a defendant pro ers a legitimate, non-

discriminatory, reason for the adverse

employment action, “the burden then

shifts back to th e plainti to show that

the employer’s alleged, nondiscrimina-

tory reason for th e adverse employ-

ment action is p retextual, that is, not

the real reason .” Here, the appellate

court concluded that declarations

from two super visors indicating they

were instructed to “m anage out” more

“senior empl oyees” were probative of

age discrimin ation even though the

declarants subsequently qualif‌ied por-

tions of their decl arations.

Despite the Ninth Ci rcuit’s reason-

ing that conf‌lic ting “me too” evidence

from the super vising employees of the

defendant was m ore probative than

not to withstand a moti on for summary

judgment, Section leaders caution that

such evidence ha s potential admis-

sibility limitations. “Relevancy is likely

to be an importa nt factor in determin-

ing admissibil ity, that is, whether the

evidence tends to ma ke a consequen-

tial fact more or l essprobable,” oers

Jerry M. Cu tler, New York, NY, cochair

of the Section’s Emp loyment & Labor

Relations Law Com mittee.

To determine relevancy of “m e too”

evidence, Cutle r continues, courts will

have to “make a fact-based a ssess-

ment as to whether th e circumstances

surroundingth e dismissal of other

employees are simi lar to those alleged

by the plainti, what role th e supervi-

sor played in the emp loyment action

being challe nged, the temporal and/

or geographi cal proximity of the evi-

dence, whether the employees were

similarly situate d in relevant respects,

andthe nature of eac h employee’s alle-

gations. Cou rts will also need to con-

sider whether relevant evidence should

nonetheless b e excluded if its proba-

tive value is outweig hed by the danger

of unfair prejud ice.”

Pointing out another admissibil-

ity shortcomi ng, Jerey C. Brodin,

Phoenix, AZ , past cochair of the

Secti on’s Employment & Lab or

Relations Law Com mittee observes

that “such eviden ce should be limited

to practices at that e mployer. It may

also be limited by time ifevi dence is

oered of actio ns distant in time and

there is noevidenc e of further discrim-

inatory actio ns in the interim.”

Court Recognizes

Tortious Interference

with Inheritance

By Jonathan W. Louns berry, Litigation

News Contributing Editor

In a case of f‌irst impression, one state’s

high court has recognized the tort of

interference with an inheritance, f‌ind-

ing that it is a natural extension of the

tort of intentional interference with

economic expectancy. ABA Litigation

Section leaders note that the opinion

marks a growing trend toward recog-

nizing this claim but warn that its scope

is limited to wrongdoing that occurred

before the testator’s death.

In Barclay v. Castruccio, Dr. Peter

Castruccio and his wife Sadie had sev-

eral businesses together. After the

couple divided up their real estate, in

2010, Castruccio signed his last will and

testament bequeathing $800,000 to a

long-time employee, Darlene Barclay,

and the remainder of his estate to Sadie

on the condition that she execute and

f‌ile a will before he died; otherwise,

the remainder would go to Barclay.

When Castruccio died in 2013, his wife

had not fulf‌illed the requirement, and

Barclay inherited the $6.7 million resid-

uary estate. In response, Sadie f‌iled

seven unsuccessful lawsuits seeking to

overturn the estate plan.

In 2017, Barclay sued Sadie for inten-

tional interference with an expectancy,

malicious use of process, and abuse of

process, alleging that Sadie’s actions

caused her to incur attorney fees and

litigation costs defending against mul-

tiple groundless lawsuits, reducing

the value of the estate. The trial court

FALL 2022 • VOL. 4 8 NO. 1

21 | ABA LITIGATION SECTIO N

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