Court Disqualifies Attorney Hired by General Partner

AuthorKelso L. Anderson
Pages7-7
Published in Litigation News Volume 45, Number 3, Spring 20 20. © 2020 by the Ameri can Bar Association. Re produced with per mission. All rights re served. This info rmation or any porti on thereof may not be c opied or disseminated in any
form or by any means or sto red in an electronic da tabase or retrieval sy stem without the ex press writt en consent of the Amer ican Bar Associatio n.
AMERICA N BAR ASSOCIATION SPRING 20 20 • VOL. 45 NO. 3 | 7
n attorney hired by a gen -
eral partne r may be dis-
qualified from represent-
ing the partne rship if the
partnership agreement
does not specifically authorize
that partner to a ct on behalf of
the partnership.
In Jarvis v. Jar vis, two broth-
ers, James and Todd, were general
partners and 50 percent owners of
Jarvis Prope rties, a limited partner-
ship that owned a two -acre parcel
of land. Jar vis Properties was the
only asset of the pa rtnership, and
the brothers were the only partners.
The partnership agreement required
the partner ship to act only with the
consent of a “majo rity” of the general
partners. The general partners could
not agree on how to disp ense with
Jarvis Properties, and the partner-
ship agreeme nt did not address how
to make decisions in t he event of a
deadlock.
James hired counsel and filed
an action in the M onterey County
Superior Cou rt for partition by sale of
Jarvis Properties, naming both Todd
and Jarvis Properties as defendants.
In response, Todd hire d counsel to
represent him in th e partition action
and also hired se parate counsel to
represent the partnership. Both Todd
and the partnership filed demurrers
to James’s action . Responding to the
hiring of counse l, James filed a mo-
tion to disqualif y the partnership’s
counsel on grou nds that the attor-
ney was not authorized to a ct on be-
half of the partn ership because the
requisite “major ity” of partners did
not approve h is hiring. More over,
James argued, counsel representing
the partner ship was not acting in the
best interest of the p artnership be-
cause counsel was incurring unneces-
sary litigatio n costs, thereby deplet-
ing partnership assets.
The trial court granted James’s
motion to disqualif y the partnership
Court Disqualifies Attorney Hired by
General Partner
counsel. Todd then appealed the trial
court’s disqualification of counsel to
the California C ourt of Appeal, Sixth
Appellate Distr ict, which armed the
trial court’s ruling.
Observing th at the trial court has in-
herent authori ty to control the “con-
duct of its minis terial ocers,” the
appellate court noted that disqualifica-
tion of counsel usu ally occurs to avoid
two situations: con flicts of interest or
adverse use of confi dential informa-
tion. Conflic ts of interest usually occur
where counsel se eks to represent a cli-
ent whose interest s are adverse to a
former client o r where counsel seeks to
concurrently represent multiple parties
in a single actio n.
In dicta, the a ppellate court cited
California Sta te Bar Rule of Professional
Conduct 3-310 for the proposition that
an attorney’s dut y of loyalty is cen-
tral to his or her conc urrent represen-
tation of clients . In addition, citing Dino
v. Pela yo for the point that stand ing is
not required for a p arty to file a mo-
tion to disqualif y counsel, the appel-
late court emph asized that James’s dis-
qualificatio n motion was based on his
role as an interested p arty in the part-
nership. The a ppellate court also cited
California Sta te Bar Opinion 1994-137
for the principl e that an attorney rep-
resenting a par tnership may act only if
he or she has act ual authority from the
partner auth orized to act on behalf of
the partnership, which was absent here.
Lastly, the court no ted that legal val-
ues and interest s that support substan-
tial justice—in cluding a client’s choice
of counsel and th e best interest of the
partnership—were not oended by the
trial court ’s determination to disqualify
counsel because counsel’s service was
improperly commissioned.
ABA Section of Liti gation lead-
ers consider th e result in Jarvis rea-
sonable base d on the facts involved
and that Jarvis has broader impli-
cations prodde d by the partnership
agreement. “ The result was dictated
By Kelso L. Anderso n, Litigation News Associate Editor
by one of the most basi c principles of
partnersh ip law: unless a partnershi p
agreement or other governing docu-
ment provides otherwise, a partner-
ship can act on ly with the assent of
a majority of the pa rtners. In a two-
party par tnership, a majority equa ls
unanimity,” concl udes Steven Finell,
Santa Rosa, C A, chair of the Appellate
Rules & Statutes Sub committee of
the Section of Liti gation’s Appellate
Practice Committee.
“Partnership agreements should be
drafted caref ully to articulate how de-
cisions on beha lf of the partnership will
be made. Importantly, those agree-
ments should a lso be updated to ad-
dress changed circumstances,” urges
Blanca F. Young, San Franc isco, CA,
cochair of the Sec tion’s Trial Practice
Committee. Indeed, “deadlock avoid-
ance” is one of the ch anged circum-
stances that sho uld be considered
in partners hip agreements in which
the “voting struc ture can produce a
tie,” explains Joh n M. Barkett, Miami,
FL, cochair of the S ection’s Ethics &
Professionalism Committee.
Deadlock avoidance and disqual-
ification are not th e only consider-
ations in factu al circumstances similar
to Jarvis. One Sec tion leader concludes
that the case also h as pecuniary im-
plications. “The case has implications
beyond disquali fication.For exam-
ple, the law firm may have to disg orge
fees if it was retaine d without prop-
er authorization ,” observes Michael S.
LeBo, Newpor t Beach, CA, cochair o f
the Section’s Commercial & Business
Litigation Committee. Another Section
leader emph asizes the ethical issue that
counsel must consider in representing
an entity-clie nt like a partnership. “Th e
proper role of a lawye r for an organi-
zation is to carry o ut the organization’s
objectives as dete rmined by those
constituents within the organization
that determine it s policies,” reminds
Finell, citing M odel Rule of Professional
Conduct 1 .13.

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