The Supreme Court clarifies the primary purpose test: Michigan v. Bryant.

• Author: Badawy, Rami S.

The existence of an emergency or the parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the most important circumstances that courts must take into account in determining, whether an interrogation is testimonial because statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would subject them to the requirements of confrontation.

--Michigan v. Bryant 562 U.S.--, * 23-24 (2011).

IN Michigan v. Bryant, THE UNITED STATES

Supreme Court held that a dying man's statements to police identifying his shooter along with the location of the attack were not testimonial hearsay and, as such, the Confrontation Clause did not bar their admission at trial.

During the early morning hours of April 29, 2001, Detroit police officers responded to a gas station parking lot where they found Anthony Covington lying on the ground next to his car with a gunshot wound to his abdomen. (1) The police asked Covington "what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred." (2)

Covington responded that "Rick" (Respondent, Richard Perry Bryant) shot him approximately 25 minutes before, following a conversation he had with the Respondent through the back door of the Respondent's house. (3) The police's interaction with Covington lasted no more than ten minutes and ended when emergency medical services arrived to transport Covington to the hospital, where he died a few hours later. (4) The police found blood and a bullet on the back porch of the Respondent's house, a bullet hole through the back door, as well as Covington's wallet and identification. (5)

At the Respondent's trial, Covington's statements were admitted through police testimony. (6) The Respondent was convicted of second degree murder weapons possession charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding Covington's statements to the police were properly admitted because they were non-testimonial. (7) The Michigan Supreme Court, however, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, reversed the court of appeals, finding Covington's statements were testimonial hearsay and, as such, were barred by the Confrontation Clause. (8) Specifically, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on the primary purpose test established in Davis finding that the circumstances surrounding Covington's statements to the police, "clearly indicate that the 'primary purpose' of the...