Countering questionable tactics by crying foul.

• Author: Innocenti, Beth
• Position: Essay

How can arguers effectively counter questionable tactics? Researchers have inventoried or recommended some moves arguers may make in response to such tactics, such as saying that "no reason has been given to suggest that those doubts are well-founded" (Jackson & Jacobs, 2006, p. 96) or ignoring the questionable tactic, using it reciprocally, or challenging the use of it (Vasilyeva, 2010). Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have advised that arguers not "automatically" counter questionable tactics by invoking rules with a "goody two-shoes response" (p. 436). Certainly effective countermoves depend on the situation. In this essay I analyze one kind of countermove-crying foul-and explain why it may be reasonably expected to pressure opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics, as well as situational factors that contribute to its effectiveness.

Crying foul strategies include saying opponents are trying to terrify others into a decision, using inflammatory language, and the like. I submit that speakers who cry foul pressure opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics by making a norm determinate, and by making manifest the badness of the tactic and that the speaker is exercising forbearance. These design features involve the speaker manifestly undertaking risks and creating risks for opponents to continue using questionable tactics, and thus generate pressure or persuasive force to repair or abandon the questionable tactic. To support these claims, I first outline how a normative pragmatic theory of countering questionable tactics supplements comparable pragmatic theories of argumentation, and then analyze crying foul strategies used in a case of high-stakes political argumentation.

NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF COUNTERING. QUESTIONABLE TACTICS

Normative pragmatic theories, based on Kauffeld's (2001, 2009) work in philosophy of language, generate models of how strategies are designed to work to pressure auditors to recognize premise adequacy (Goodwin, 2003; Innocenti, 2005), accept a claim simply on a speaker's say-so (Goodwin, 2001), respond to an accusation (Kauffeld, 1998), and more (e.g., Jacobs, 2000, 2006). The models comprise practical reasoning by both speaker and auditors and explain how strategies both bring to bear in the situation norms of argumentation and create risks for both speaker and auditors of not adhering to them. The practical reasoning need not be conscious thoughts; the aim is to provide a plausible theoretical account of why strategies may be reasonably expected to work based on tacit knowledge or an ordinary, pragmatic understanding of what makes sense (Goodwin, 2001; Kauffeld, 2001, 2009). The nature of these theoretical models as well as key assumptions may be detailed by comparing them to other pragmatic theories of argumentation.

The comparable theories most relevant to explaining why crying foul can be reasonably expected to counter questionable tactics are those that approach argumentation as interaction, as an exchange between speaker and auditors involving bilateral vectors of communication. In contrast to models that attempt to explain unilateral communication vectors only, such as a message-to-receiver vector, an interaction model aims to account for how saying something both enables and constrains what both speaker and auditors may subsequently say. A speaker may counter a questionable tactic at least in part in order to pressure opponents to repair or abandon the tactic, so a model of how a speaker may accomplish this ought to cover both speaker and opponents and how message design features enable and constrain the ongoing performances of each.

The desirability of incorporating an interactive dynamic into theories of argument analysis and evaluation has been recognized by theorists who have developed pragmatic theories of argument. As Johnson (2000) has noted about the traditional conception of argument:

[I]t failed to see that the development of the argument is just one phase of the entire dialectical process that also includes the response by the critic, the arguer's response to that intervention, modification of the original argument, further criticism, and so on. (p. 144)

He describes arguing as "an unfolding dynamic in which the arguer puts forth an argument, the Other responds, the arguer responds, now the Other may respond again and so on, until they agree to stop" (Johnson, 2000, p. 157). He captures the bilateral nature of the communication vectors when he amplifies the position that argument is dialectical: "An exchange is dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one's own logos (discourse, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way" (Johnson, 2000, p. 161). Likewise, van Eemeren and colleagues and Walton have constructed pragmatic theories of argumentation that analyze and evaluate arguments in the context of interactions (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Walton, 1995). A normative pragmatic theory of countering questionable tactics advances these pragmatic theories in several ways.

First, a normative pragmatic theory accounts for reluctant auditors. Doing so advances argumentation theory because if a model can explain difficult situations where auditors are reluctant to, say, argue at all, it should also be able to explain what seem to be easier cases of arguing where speaker and auditors have goodwill toward each other and share common goals such as resolving a difference of opinion. One example of stipulating cooperation as a normative ideal comes from Johnson (2000): "the arguer agrees to let the feedback from the Other affect the product. The arguer consents to take criticism and to take it seriously" (p. 161) and the arguer, critic, and those interested in the issue "agree to do nothing that would compromise either the substance or the appearance of rationality" (p. 163). Normative pragmatic theories, in contrast, explain situations where auditors cannot be counted upon to agree to take criticism, to take it seriously, or to agree to manifest rationality in just the way demanded by a speaker. For example, auditors may be reluctant to seriously consider a speaker's counter-plan because it may be in their self-interest to get their own proposal accepted. It may be possible for them to reasonably dismiss a counter-plan on the grounds that decision-makers have time to consider serious proposals only. To constrain their ability to dismiss a counter-plan, the speaker needs to design a message that pressures even reluctant auditors to give it serious consideration; a speaker can make manifest that a counter-plan is serious, for example, by making manifest that it is well thought out and takes into consideration auditors' interests. Other things being equal, if auditors were to quickly dismiss a proposal designed as such, they risk criticism for acting irresponsibly (Kauffeld, 1998; see also Goodwin, 2001; Innocenti, 2005). Thus it is possible to account for how message design features, such as manifesting that a proposal is well thought out and considers auditors' interests, pressure even reluctant auditors to act.

Second, normative pragmatic theories provide a rationale for why message design features may reasonably be expected to work. To see how this advances other pragmatic theories of argument, consider for example the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, and in particular strategic maneuvering, as a way of explaining how to counter questionable tactics. Speakers strategically maneuver in an effort to get their own way (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002) and at the same time to resolve a difference of opinion on its merits. The analytical elements of strategic maneuvering are topic selection, audience adaptation, and presentational devices (e.g., van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). As is the case for all strategies, it is possible to describe crying foul strategies in terms of strategic maneuvering. The normative pragmatic analysis of crying foul presented in this essay differs from a pragma-dialectical analysis in that it describes the strategies not in terms of topic potential, audience adaptation, and presentational devices, but instead in terms of actions (i.e., what speakers crying foul do when they cry foul). Analyzing strategies in terms of actions enables normative pragmatic theorists to generate practical, strategic rationales for why crying foul may reasonably be expected to counter questionable tactics.

To see how rationales provided by normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories...