Countering Boko Haram’s Violence: A Deterrence–Backlash Perspective

• Date: 01 October 2019
• Published date: 01 October 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18756284
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Countering Boko

Haram’s Violence:

A Deterrence–Backlash

Perspective

Adam Dulin

1

and Jairo Patin

˜o

2

Abstract

This article examines efforts to counter Boko Haram’s campaign of terrorism in

Northern Nigeria from a deterrence–backlash perspective. Drawing from previous

research, the authors develop hypothetical expectations for deterrence and back-

lash effects when counterterrorism policies are conducted at governmental and

community levels. Using parametric survival analysis, the authors conclude that

government policies designed to curb Boko Haram attacks resulted in backlash.

Conversely, community-based efforts resulted in deterrence.

Keywords

Africa, conflict resolution, military effectiveness, civil wars

Introduction

In recent years, the analysis of terrorist group behavior in response to counterterror-

ism policy has received increased attention from criminologists. Drawing from the

work of classical criminologists, such as Beccaria and Bentham, the criminological

approach has adopted a deterrence–backlash perspective through which

1

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, USA

2

Henry C Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences, University of New Haven, West Haven,

CT, USA

Corresponding Author:

Adam Dulin, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20522, USA.

Email: stdald15@gmail.com

Armed Forces & Society

2019, Vol. 45(4) 723-745

ªThe Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18756284

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counterterrorism can be effectively analyzed in light terrorist group behavior

(LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). The capacity of policy to promote dete rrence,

through the swiftness and sever ity of sanctions, has been huge ly influential for

decades. But deterrence paints only part of the picture.

Backlash to the threat or imposition of sanctions is an observed reality, particu-

larly, in the realm of dedicated terrorist offenders. The literature suggests that back-

lash, or no observed effects, is the norm in counterterrorism scenarios. Further, harsh

policies are met with harsh responses in this policy environment. But what remains

to be scrutinized are the components of coercive policy responses, particularly the

role that outsiders (noncommunity members) and insiders (community members)

and perceived legitimacy play in promoting deterrence and backlash responses.

The current research examines these key components of coercive policy through

two approaches undertaken in the Nigerian context to combat Boko Haram’s cam-

paign of terrorist violence. First is the military response as exemplified by the state

of emergency (SOE) enacted in various areas in the country’s northeast. The second

is the private response enacted by vigilante groups.

As detailed in later sections, literature on the deterrence–backlash perspective

provides the foundation for this study. We incorporate further research on in-group

enforcement efforts, as this additional perspective complements deterrence–back-

lash by providing a logic for how different policy components promote either deter-

rence or backlash. A data set was devel oped for this analysis comprising Bo ko

Haram activity from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2015. This data set was

utilized to conduct parametric survival analysis at both the regional and the local

level. The results of the analysis demonstrate empirical support for both deterrence

and backlash effects, contingent upon the out-group/in-group status of the actors and

their legitimacy in enacting coercive policy to combat violence. What follows in the

remainder of the Introduction section is a brief descriptive overview of Boko

Haram’s origins.

Boko Haram’s Insurgency

Boko Haram

1

emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri, in Nigeria’s northeastern state of

Borno. Muhammad Yusuf formed the group out of dissatisfaction with more main-

stream Salafist movements in the region (Pieri & Zenn, 2016; “The black,” 2015).

Boko Haram’s formation came at an opportune time, as the seeds of discontent had

already been sown in Nigeria’s Muslim-dominated northern states, where violent

Islamists had previously staged a failed uprising. At a local and international level,

Yusuf garnered the support of like-minded extremists, including jihadists in Algeria,

where he purportedly received training (Brigaglia, 2012).

For the first several years, Boko Haram’s relations with the government were

tense, but violence was only sporadic (Bavier, 2012). The defining moment in the

current conflict occurred in July 2009 after poli ce arrested several members. In

retaliation, fellow members clashed with police, triggering reprisals by the military.

724 Armed Forces & Society 45(4)