Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13024
• Date: 01 July 2019
• Published date: 01 July 2019

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis 523

Abstract: Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their

effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed,

other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these

puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected

anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes

a four-cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the

resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new

conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions

concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and

practice.

Evidence for Practice

• Anticorruption policies should be supported by clearer corruption concepts.

• Reflecting on resource transfer and primary beneficiary can help address the conceptual confusion

surrounding corruption.

• A new typology-based conceptualization of corruption explains a wide range of corrupt activities and the

possible impacts of anticorruption policies on them.

• Tailor the anticorruption strategy to specific types of corruption.

Despite the considerable amount of resources

invested in anticorruption policies, the track

record of such measures is perplexing. On the

one hand, a growing body of scholarship claims that

most anticorruption reforms have failed (Bauhr 2017;

Heywood 2017; Ledeneva, Bratu, and Köper 2017, 7;

Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell

2013). On the other hand, several studies report that

anticorruption tools do reduce corruption (Armantier

and Boly 2011; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003;

Olken 2005). What is the reason for such ambiguity?

This article argues that the problem is poor alignment

between actual forms of corruption and policy

responses. The existing public administration research

holds a poorly conceptualized view of corruption;

therefore, anticorruption efforts often fail. To fix this,

a typology of different types of corruption is offered,

and propositions are formulated concerning how

each of them could be curbed. This typology-based

conceptualization integrates new perspectives from

other disciplines into public administration.

While the impacts of some anticorruption policies,

especially formal top-down measures such as rewards,

penalties, monitoring, and regulations, have been

studied extensively, the effectiveness of bottom-up

tools, such as whistle-blowing, staff morale, or

community monitoring, has attracted little attention

from empirical researchers (Gans-Morse et al. 2018).

Macro-level cross-sectional studies conclude that

rewards, specifically higher government wages,

have limited or no contribution to lowering levels

of corruption (Alt and Lassen 2014; Dahlström,

Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Treisman 2000).

Moreover, the presence of a dedicated anticorruption

agency in a country has no significant effect on

the control of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015,

106–9). In contrast to the common argument

that strong legal systems are key anticorruption

components, cross-country models suggest the

opposite: corruption undermines the rule of law,

which, in turn, increases corruption and reduces

the probability of being detected and punished

(Herzfelda and Weiss 2003). Surprisingly, many

nations that demonstrate a higher rate of corruption

are even more likely to have in place robust and strict

anticorruption regulations (Mungiu-Pippidi and

Dadašov 2017).

David Jancsics

San Diego State University

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary

Synthesis

Research Article

David Jancsics is assistant professor

of public administration in the School of

Public Affairs at San Diego State University

Imperial Valley Campus. He earned his

doctorate in sociology at the Graduate

Center of the City University of New

York. His research focuses on corruption,

white-collar crime, organizational deviance,

and informal practices. His current research

agenda focuses on corruption in customs

and border protection agencies.

E-mail: djancsics@sdsu.edu

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 79, Iss. 4, pp. 523–537. © 2019 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13024.