Corruption and electoral campaigns in Mexico: A case study of the federal electoral process in 2018

• Date: 01 February 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1992
• Published date: 01 February 2020
• Author: Andrés Valdez Zepeda

ACADEMIC PAPER

Corruption and electoral campaigns in Mexico: A case study of

the federal electoral process in 2018

Andrés Valdez Zepeda

1,2

1

Administración, Universidad de Guadalajara,

Zapopan, Mexico

2

Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico

Administrativas, Universidad de Guadalajara,

Zapopan, Mexico

Correspondence

Valdez Zepeda Andrés, Administración,

Universidad de Guadalajara, Periférico Norte

No. 799, Núcleo Los Belenes CUCEA,

Zapopan, Jalisco 48180, Mexico.

Email: andres.zepeda@cusur.udg.mx

The article analyzes the relationship that exists between electoral campaigns and cor-

ruption, studying the case of Mexico. The most common ways and means of practic-

ing and presenting corruption during these electoral processes are described. In

addition, the circle of corruption that begins during the electoral processes and con-

tinues once in the government is described. In the same sense, the results of an opin-

ion survey in the Metropolitan Zone of Guadalajara (ZMG) on corruption during

electoral campaigns are presented. It is concluded that, many times, corruption in

the government begins during the electoral stage, so it is important to articulate var-

ious strategies and legal instruments to inhibit it from the electoral stage.

1|INTRODUCTION

As part of the political system, every 3 or 6 years, depending on a

case‐by‐case basis,

1

different electoral processes are organized in

Mexico, either at the federal, state, or municipal levels, to elect the

popular representatives by means of the universal, secret, and direct

vote of the citizens who are enrolled in the national voter list.

During these political processes, different electoral campaigns are

promoted by candidates

2

and/or political parties, who seek to occupy

a position of popular vote, trying to win as many votes as possible and

thus to be able to defeat their opponents.

For the purpose of gaining power, some of the candidates and the

leaders of the political parties undertake a series of actions outside the

law, for example, the purchase and coercion of voters, the use of pub-

lic resources in the electoral campaigns, and financing coming from

illicit sources. That is to say, in many cases, the origin of the corruption

that is generated in the government originates from the electoral

stage, when the candidates are “most at need”of economic resources

and seek, by any form, to arrive or to try to remain in the power.

In this regard, in the report entitled “Money under the table”that

was developed by the Mexican Civil Association against Corruption

and Impunity and the consultant group Integralia, it is stated that for

each peso reported to the electoral authority in an election for gover-

nor, the political parties spend 15 pesos more “under the table”and in

cash.

3

This corruption

4

is manifested in a different way (Ariel, 2005;

Blanco, 1979; Cárdenas, 2005) and reaches different proportions,

depending on the type of election in question. In this paper, it

describes and analyzes the relationship between corruption and elec-

toral campaigns in the lens of neo‐institutionalism

5

theory, as well as

the forms or means that corruption is manifested or carried out, taking

as a case study Mexico.

In particular, the objective of this research was to account for and

describe traditional forms of corruption as they occur from the elec-

toral stage, as well as to explain the origin of corruption in govern-

ments from the analysis of election campaigns, that is, explaining the

1

In Mexico, the Republic, senators and governors of the states are elected every 6 years, and

every 3 years to the federal deputies, the local deputies and the municipal Presidents and

trustees.

2

Candidates for a public representation position as independent to political parties are con-

templated by the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States in articles 35 and 116,

from the year 2012.

3

See Mathieu Tourliere “Matches Spend on Campaign Up To 15 Times more.”In Lo Dark's

report: Money under the table, in Process magazine No. 2169, May 29, 2018, https://

www.proceso.com.mx/536310/partidos‐gastan‐en‐campanas‐hasta‐15‐veces‐mas‐en‐lo‐

oscurito‐informe‐dinero‐bajo‐la‐mesa, date of consultation: May 29, 2018.

4

In this paper, corruption shall mean the use or abuse of public power by certain persons for

private purposes. The private sector get appropriate of the public goods (Gómez, 1993). It

includes the use and appropriation of privately sourced resources diverted from its original

purpose (funding election campaigns) to be used for personal purposes.

5

In this regard, institutionalism (North, 1990) points out that there is a correspondence

between institutional weakness and corruption. That is to say, the greater institutional weak-

ness (manifested, e.g., by the lack or laxity of laws and institutions to combat it) corresponds

to a higher level of corruption. And the other way around, the greater the institutional

strength, the lower the levels of corruption.

Received: 8 April 2019 Accepted: 7 May 2019

DOI: 10.1002/pa.1992

J Public Affairs. 2020;20:e1992.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1992

© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of8