Corruption and Bribery at the Border: Strategies of Survival and Adaptation between People Smugglers and Border Enforcement

• Published date: 01 September 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00027162241245504
• Author: David L. Suber
• Date: 01 September 2023

ANNALS, AAPSS, 709, September 2023 65

DOI: 10.1177/00027162241245504

Corruption and

Bribery at the

Border:

Strategies of

Survival and

Adaptation

between People

Smugglers and

Border

Enforcement

By

DAVID L. SUBER

1245504ANN THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYCORRUPTION AND BRIBERY AT THE BORDER

research-article2024

Border corruption can help facilitate the smuggling of

people and irregular migration, but it receives limited

attention in academic research. In this article, I explore

how smugglers use corruption and bribery to circum-

vent border restrictions. I focus on the role of bribery

in the survival economy of border communities, includ-

ing migrants, smugglers, and border authorities, and on

its role in facilitating cross-border movement. This

study draws on extensive ethnographic research con-

ducted on land routes between West Asia and Europe,

interviewing smugglers specifically on the Syrian–

Turkish border and the Evros border between Turkey,

Greece, and Bulgaria. My findings indicate that on

both borders, smugglers and border guards accommo-

date each other’s interests in creative collaborative

processes. As such, corruption and bribery are not

merely illegal practices but rather strategic adaptations

in response to harsher border enforcement policies,

stemming from specific needs of local border realities.

Keywords: corruption; bribery; people smuggling;

border enforcement; securitization

I

heard about the hostel’s reputation even

before arriving at the border. Some partici-

pants I had interviewed on the way recom-

mended that I speak to the owner. He greeted

me at the gate and agreed to be interviewed on

one condition: “Next time you come here, you

stay at my hostel.”1

Amez owns a small hostel in a Turkish town

a few kilometers from the Evros river border

with Greece and Bulgaria.2 His hostel is known

among people on the move—refugees, asylum

David L. Suber is a researcher and freelance journalist,

working on the intersections between organized crime,

people smuggling, and border policing at the University

College London (UCL) Department of Security and

Crime Science. He is the codirector of the journalism

platform Brush&Bow, producing multimedia investiga-

tions and documentaries.

Correspondence: david.suber.19@ucl.ac.uk

66 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

seekers, and migrants—as a place to rest before attempting to cross the border

to Europe on foot or by truck. But it wasn’t the role played by the hostel in illegal-

ized cross-border movement that interested me. There was more to its owner’s

reputation.

Amez called himself a Kurdish Turk and, before owning the hostel, used to

work for the Turkish border police as a customs enforcement officer. He had

initially been stationed at the border for 16 months during his compulsory mili-

tary service. “Because the [Turkish] state always sends Kurds [to do military

service] in the worse places,”3 he added. By the time his service period was over,

Amez had married and decided to stay, finding work as a customs officer at

Turkish–Bulgarian border checkpoints.

During the course of the interview, I tried to verify the rumors I had heard

about him: that he was sent away from the border force because he was accused

of taking bribes from smugglers bringing in goods and migrants hidden in trucks;

that his wife’s cousins were border officers in Bulgaria; and that during the rise

in border crossings in 2015, Amez and his extended family had established one

of the most functional collaborations with people smugglers operating on the

Evros border. Amez confirmed all of the above, adding that “at some point [the

Turkish Jandarma] found out and told me I couldn’t stay any more. That’s when

I bought the hostel. But I know they just took over what we had set up and gave

the task [of coordinating with smugglers] to someone else.”4

At the time of the interview (March 2022), Amez’s hostel was not only a place

hosting people on the move to Europe. It was also where border guards and

smugglers met to agree on collaboration deals. “I have family members working

as border officers on the Bulgarian side of the border,” Amez explained. “We

work with smugglers constantly, and I am the bridge between them [officers and

smugglers].” It’s the mutual interest of making some money that brings smugglers

and border officers to the same table, Amez explained. The combination of

Turkey’s rising inflation and Bulgaria’s low wages means that police officers in

both countries are struggling too (Duvar English 2022), and so, the profit to be

made from working with smugglers is more than a simple opportunity. “Some say

smugglers and police are like water and oil,” Amez said. “That’s not true.

Smugglers and police work well together when they have the same interest and

someone to make good connections [between them].”5

In this article, I present research that creates a more nuanced picture of peo-

ple smuggling and border enforcement on the land routes between West Asia

and Europe. I focus on corruption and bribery as strategies performed by

migrants, smugglers, or border guards, all of whom are actively engaged in nego-

tiating their own interests, opportunities, and risks at the border (Campana and

Gelsthorpe 2021). Thus, I provide evidence of how actors on the border receive,

react, and respond to the implementation of border securitization policies on the

ground. I focus especially on the negotiation between smugglers and border

guards, arguing that corruption and bribery can be understood as practices of

accommodation and collaboration between supposedly antagonistic actors. With

the heightening of border enforcement across Europe, bribery and corruption