Corruption and bank efficiency: Expanding the ‘sand or grease the wheel hypothesis’ for the Gulf Cooperation Council

Published date01 December 2022
AuthorMohammad Kabir Hassan,Rashedul Hasan,Mohammad Dulal Miah,Muhammad Ashfaq
Date01 December 2022
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2737
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Corruption and bank efficiency: Expanding the ‘sand or grease
the wheel hypothesis’for the Gulf Cooperation Council
Mohammad Kabir Hassan
1
| Rashedul Hasan
2
| Mohammad Dulal Miah
3
|
Muhammad Ashfaq
4
1
Department of Economics and Finance,
University of New Orleans, New Orleans,
Louisiana, USA
2
School of Economics, Finance and
Accounting, Coventry University,
Coventry, UK
3
Department of Economics and Finance,
University of Nizwa, Nizwa, Sultanate
of Oman
4
IUBH University of Applied Sciences, Bad
Honnef, Germany
Correspondence
Rashedul Hasan, School of Economics, Finance
and Accounting, Coventry University,
Coventry, UK.
Email: ad6284@coventry.ac.uk
We draw upon the broader theoretical framework of rent-seeking to empirically ana-
lyze the impact of corruption on the efficiency of the banking industry in the Gulf
Cooperation Council. We have used various databases, including Bankscope, World
Bank, and Transparency International, to gather Bank-specific and macro-economic
data for 77 banks covering the period 2005–2014. We perform ordinary least square
(OLS) and generalised methods of moments regression (GMM) using a balanced panel
and find (1) Islamic banks as less efficient and stable as compared to conventional
banks in the GCC region, (2) corruption has a negative (positive) impact on Islamic
(conventional) banks' stability. Our findings provide support for the ‘sand the wheel’
hypothesis of corruption for Islamic banks. This finding supports the view that under
the current weak governance structures and complex policy framework, corruption
acts as an ‘escape hatch’for conventional banks. Our empirical findings could pave
the way for further policy reform for the banking sector in the GCC region.
KEYWORDS
corruption, efficiency, GCC countries, Islamic banks, rent-seeking
1|INTRODUCTION
In a corrupt society, firms find it profitable to avoid normal administra-
tive processes and resort to underground means. This tendency
wanes states the capacity to collect revenues required for providing
essential public goods, including efficient law and order (Aghion
et al., 2016). Weak law and order, coupled with insecure property
rights, amplifies corruption and discourages foreign capital inflows
(Lambsdorff, 2003). This welfare-reducing impact of corruption is
commonly referred to as the ‘sand or grease the wheel’hypothesis
(Méon & Weill, 2010; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Sharma & Mitra, 2015).
On the contrary, Bhagwati (1982) shows that in an already dis-
torted market, corruption, or rent-seeking (Bhagwati terms it ‘directly
unproductive profit-seeking’), may lead to a welfare-enhancing effect.
Bardhan (1997) refers to such an environment as ‘the second-best
world’, characterised by policy-induced distortions such as pervasive
and cumbersome regulations. Huntington (1968) argues that a higher
level of corruption can improve growth bypassing bureaucratic
processes. Blessed by the gift of natural resources, economies in the
GCC countries have been relying heavily on hydrocarbon products,
which accounts for almost half of the total gross domestic product
(GDP). Corruption is one obstacle that may hinder the financial devel-
opment of the GCC region.
The effect of corruption on financial development is inconclusive.
Moreover, this issue remains largely unexplored in the context of
GCC countries. In particular, there is a limited number of studies
(Mohamed et al., 2021; Saif-Alyousfi & Saha, 2021; Saw et al., 2020)
that investigate the diverse impact of corruption on bank efficiency
with a theoretical perspective. The primary objective of this paper is
to provide empirical evidence on the impact of corruption on the effi-
ciency of the GCC banking sector. More specifically, we attempt to
test the ‘sands or grease the wheel’hypothesis for the GCC banking
sector. In the process, we collect secondary data from various data-
bases such as Bankscope for bank-specific data, World Bank database
for macroeconomic data, and Transparency International for the
country-level corruption data.
Received: 3 October 2020 Revised: 23 July 2021 Accepted: 26 July 2021
DOI: 10.1002/pa.2737
J Public Affairs. 2022;22(Suppl. 1):e2737. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1of17
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2737
The timeliness of the research is crucial, given the backdrop of
the GCC countries ongoing political and economic maladies. The cur-
rent research expects to provide clues for the region to set its future
reforms agenda in the financial sector. Third, the Islamic finance
industry has grown rapidly in the GCC region, accumulating about
35% of the total assets of banking industries in 2007 (Srairi, 2010).
The comparative study between the two types of banking operations
(i.e., Islamic and conventional), which remains wholly ignored in con-
temporary literature, will provide an extra dimension for policy
options.
We make three unique contributions. First, our results contribute
to reducing the gaps in the literature on corruption and financial
development. Since the existing literature is inconclusive, we expect
to provide additional evidence and the factors through which corrup-
tion affects financial development. Second, we examine the impact of
corruption on banks' efficiency in the GCC countries, which is limited
in supply. Unlike previous studies, which mainly attribute the bank's
inefficiency to internal factors, including management myopia and
technical inefficiency, this study considers both internal and external
factors in examining the bank's inefficiency.
We structure the rest of the paper as follows: Section 2discusses
the rent-seeking theory that encompasses the broader concept of cor-
ruption. Section 3presents the methodological aspects of the study,
which covers sample selection, variable definition leading to the
econometric model development for empirical analysis. In Section 4,
we discuss the efficiency of the banking section before moving
toward the theoretical discussion that leads toward hypothesis devel-
opment. We explain empirical results in Section 5, discuss the results
in Section 6, while the final section summarises and concludes the
study findings.
2|LITERATURE REVIEW
GCC countries have been able to establish and sustain monarchies in
all member states. Soon after ending the prolonged period, the Arab
states established a kingdom or sultanate. The restoration of social
stability in the GCC region proves the concentration of power at the
centre. State society relation is hierarchical, where an administrator at
the top governs the society through a mutual social contract. GCC
states possess a durable power to penetrate society. Hence, rent-
seeking competition is not pervasive, which keeps the rent-seeking
cost low.
Especially after the event of the Arab Spring, the region has faced
tremendous pressure from different societal groups internally and
externally. Internal forces have taken various forms, including popular
mobilisation and social discontent, resulting in economic handouts,
patronage, limited political and economic reforms (Colombo, 2012).
Although GCC states have tactically managed such challenges without
much social chaos, which shows their resilience to tackle adverse
internal political circumstances, the social contract has been loosened
since then. Rougier (2016) offers by analysing various data that after
the Arab Spring, authoritarianism that characterises the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) has been vanished for very high levels due
to social transformation. Such a level of authoritarianism may entail a
negative rent-seeking outcome.
Ramanathan (2007) reports improvement in MPI among banks in
Bahrain and records the highest reduction in productivity among
selected banks in Qatar. Saw et al. (2020) report a higher level of effi-
ciency for both Islamic and conventional banks in Qatar. Such results
complement the findings of Grigorian and Manole (2005), as their
study found banks in Bahrain with a higher level of technical effi-
ciency as compared to other GCC countries. Aghimien et al. (2016)
investigated the efficiency level of banks operating in the Gulf region
and highlighted the impact of corruption on the efficiency of baking
operations in the region.
Kamarudin et al. (2017) makes a unique contribution by compar-
ing the efficiency of foreign and domestic banks in Southeast Asian
countries and conclude that foreign-owned banks demonstrate a
higher level of efficiency as compared to domestic banks. Alqahtani
et al. (2017) find domestic banks in the GCC region are more cost-
efficient than foreign banks. Kamarudin et al. (2016,2018) provide
empirical evidence that control of corruption enhances the revenue
efficiency of both Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region.
Furthermore, Islamic banks in the GCC region suffers from financial
turmoil caused by the subprime crisis (Al-Gasaymeh, 2016; Belanès
et al., 2015; Mohanty et al., 2016).
3|THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Corruption was a widely discussed phenomenon in the literature of
development economics in the 1990s (see, e.g., Bardhan, 1997; East-
erly & Levine, 1997; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Khan, 1998;
Mauro, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Most
studies, however, found evidence that corruption deteriorates eco-
nomic development. Mauro (1995), analysing international data,
shows that corruption hinders investment and lowers economic
growth. Corruption increases uncertainty in an economy, leading to
higher transaction costs (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). Also, corruption
leads to inefficient economic outcomes because it influences the mis-
allocation of scarce resources, encourages rent-seeking, and distorts
sectoral priorities and technology choices (Zhang & Barnett, 2014).
Lui (1985) provides empirical evidence on the positive impact of
corruption on efficiency through the optimal allocation of available
resources. Subsequently, the mainstream literature on corruption has
extended to various branches. For instance, literature examining the
impact of corruption on financial development is comparatively new.
Bougatef (2017) finds that corruption reduces bank profitability by
diverting funds to undeserving projects. Tran et al. (2020) confirm
such findings in the context of Vietnam.
On the other hand, Treisman (2000) demonstrates that corruption
eventually finds a way out to disrupt efficiency in jurisdictions with
higher levels of corruption. In developing countries, Song et al. (2020)
confirm the findings of Treisman (2000). However, Cherif and
2of17 HASSAN ET AL.

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