Corrigendum
Published date | 01 June 2012 |
DOI | 10.1177/1065912912442486 |
Date | 01 June 2012 |
Subject Matter | Corrigendum |
6Bowman et al.Political Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly
65(2) 460 –461
Corrigendum
© 2012 University of Utah
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912912442486
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Bowman, Ann O’M., Neal D. Woods, and Milton R. Stark II. 2010. “Governors Turn
Pro: Separation of Powers and the Institutionalization of the American Governorship.”
Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 304-15. Original doi:10.1177/1065912908328858.
In the course of responding to a data request from another
analyses, legislative staff expenditures are a significant
scholar, we discovered that in the original article we
determinant of legislative governor’s office expenditures
made an error in adjusting our expenditure values for
(models 2 and 4), but not governor’s office staff (models
inflation. We apologize to PRQ readers for this error. We
1 and 3). Third, the governor’s party in the legislature is
subsequently reran the models presented in Table 1
no longer statistically significant in a nonhypothesized
(p. 311) using corrected expenditure measures. The new
manner in the expenditure models (models 2 and 4),
analysis confirms the general patterns reported in the
although the anomalous finding remains in the staff
original article: government growth and workload fosters
models (models 1 and 3). Moreover, a new anomalous
the institutionalization of governor’s offices, as does
finding emerges: the governor’s relationship with the
rivalry with the legislature, while bargaining relationships
public now proves to be a weakly significant explanation
with external actors have a more limited impact. However,
in model 4, suggesting that a governor institutionalizes
changes in the performance of particular variables in the
as his or her electoral margin increases, a finding that
four models we report cause us to modify our conclusions
also does not conform to theory.
...
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