Corporate Governance and the Goal of the Firm: In Defense of Shareholder Wealth Maximization

Date01 November 2016
AuthorDiane Denis
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12115
Published date01 November 2016
The Financial Review 51 (2016) 467–480
Corporate Governance and the Goal
of the Firm: In Defense of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization
Diane Denis*
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
This essay is based on my keynote address at the 2016 annual meeting of the Eastern
Finance Association. I propose that misunderstandings about the traditional model of corpo-
rate governance, with its emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization, contribute to negative
societal attitudes about corporations. I discuss the implications of shareholder wealth maxi-
mization for other corporate stakeholders, the dangers of deviating from shareholder wealth
maximization, and the roles that the media and the government play in the governance of
corporations.
Keywords: corporate governance, shareholder wealth maximization, objective of the firm
JEL Classifications: G34, G38
1. Introduction
The modern corporation as we know it took shape during the 19th century.
Though much of its early evolution took place in Britain and the United States, the
Corresponding author: Joesph M Katz Graduate School of Business and College of Business Adminis-
tration, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,PA 15260; E-mail: dkdenis@pitt.edu.
I thank David Denis, Ken Lehn, Mark Walker, seminar participants at the Eastern Finance Association
annual meeting, and the Editors, Srinivasan Krishnamurthy and Richard Warr, for very helpful comments
and suggestions.
C2016 The Eastern Finance Association 467

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