Corporate dividend policy, minority shareholders right and equity value of firm: Evidence from Singapore

AuthorVarun Dawar,Santanu K. Ganguli,Rakesh Arrawatia
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2039
Published date01 May 2020
Date01 May 2020
ACADEMIC PAPER
Corporate dividend policy, minority shareholders right and
equity value of firm: Evidence from Singapore
Santanu K. Ganguli
1
| Varun Dawar
2
| Rakesh Arrawatia
3
1
Professor of Finance, Jaipuria Institute of
Management, Indore, India
2
Department of Financial Studies, University
of Delhi, New Delhi, India
3
Faculty of Finance, Institute of Rural
Management Anand, Anand, India
Correspondence
Santanu K. Ganguli, Jaipuria Institute of
Management, Indore, India.
Email: skganguli@rediffmail.com
The purpose of the paper is to find out empirically whether an ideal business environ-
ment coupled with adequate legal protection provides an enabling mechanism for the
minority shareholders to extract dividend from the firms and, as a consequence,
whether the equity value of the firms gets impacted by dividend policy.
The study (a) employs Tobit model on a sample of FTSE ST companies of Singapore
to show the relation between dividend and minority shareholders base and, then
(b) sought to explore the relation between equity value and dividend policy in the
backdrop of strong legal protection for minority shareholders through OLS and 2 SLS
regression models.
The study empirically demonstrates a positive relation between the dividend payout
and minority shareholders base indicating that, in a civil law origin country with
strong corporate governance code ensuring investors protection and property right,
the minority shareholders can extract dividend from the firms that, in turn, has a
favourable impact on equity valuation.
Consistent with the outcomeand catering model,the findings of the study
indicate that the overall business environment and legal protection enable minority
shareholders to assert their cash flow rights with positive valuation implication.
The paper objectively reveals how superior business environment, good governance
and property right impact inter-play between dividend payout, minority shareholders
base and valuation of a civil law country.
1|INTRODUCTION
Miller and Modigliani (1961) through a seminal paper observed that in
a frictionless capital market, that is - in the presence of perfect
information, smooth mobility of capital, absence of agency problem,
dividend has no role in value creation. But such frictionless situation
hardly exists in the real world. Firms around the world pay dividend to
address various issues pertaining to market imperfection like mitiga-
tion of information asymmetry, satisfying investors' preference for
dividend payment in presence of differential tax treatment,mitigation
of agency problem of free cash flow that can be partly viewed as
ethical issue as well. Since the publication of the paper, a number of
studies have been conducted globally in almost all capitalist econo-
mies looking for explanations of payment of dividend. In fact there is
a huge body of literature available on the firms' dividend policy as a
business decision keeping in mind the impact of the decision on firm
value, attracting investment for growth, tax implication of the distribu-
tion, respecting shareholders right and so on.
In the backdrop,the present study sought to find answers to the
questions a) Does an ideal setting of business environment coupled
with adequate legal protection of minority shareholders serve as a
basis or mechanism of extracting dividend from the firms ?, b) if divi-
dend is extracted as an outcome of legal protection and catering to
the needs of investors, does the equity valuation get impacted as a
consequence thereof?
Primarily, the argument for dividend payment is based on the
objective of mitigating information asymmetry through dividend
signalling and clientele approach. Managers possessing superior
Received: 25 July 2019 Revised: 19 September 2019 Accepted: 5 October 2019
DOI: 10.1002/pa.2039
J Public Affairs. 2020;e2039. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1of8
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2039
J Public Affairs. 2020;20:e2039. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1of8
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2039

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