Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment

• Author: Avidan Y. Cover
• Position: Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy
• Pages: 1441-1502

1441

Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the

Populist Fourth Amendment

Avidan Y. Cover



ABSTRACT: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence currently leaves it to

technology corporations to challenge court orders, subpoenas, and requests by

the government for individual users’ information. The third-party doctrine

denies people a reasonable expectation of privacy in data they transmit

through telecommunications and Internet service providers. Third-party

corporations become, by default, the people’s corporate avatars. Corporate

avatars, however, do a poor job of representing individuals’ interests.

Moreover, vesting the Fourth Amendment’s government oversight functions

in corporations fails to cohere with the Bill of Rights’ populist history and the

Framers’ distrust of corporations.

This Article examines how the third-party doctrine proves unsupportable in

the big data surveillance era, in which communicating and sharing

information through third parties’ technology is a necessary condition of

existence, and non-content data, such as Internet subscriber information or

cell site location information, provides an intimate portrait of a person’s

activities and beliefs. Recognizing the potential for excessive government

surveillance, scholars, courts, and Congress have endorsed corporations as

one solution to Executive branch overreach and privacy invasion.

This Article demonstrates through both government and corporate reports that

companies have rarely challenged government requests for their users’ data.

Incentives to cooperate with government surveillance, including highly

profitable relationships with government, government regulation of

companies, and statutory immunity, make it unlikely that corporations will

ever be adequate avatars. This Article further documents how expansive

search powers originated in England with the aid of private industry, making

corporations dubious guardians of the Fourth Amendment.

 Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Director,

Institute for Global Security Law and Policy. I am grateful to Jessie Hill, Sharona Hoffman, Lew

Katz, Orin Kerr, Raymond Ku, and Cassandra Burke Robertson for their helpful comments.

Additional thanks to Andrew Dorchak, Judith Kaul, Lisa Peters, and Hui Wu for their assistance

with legal research.

1442 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1441

This Article offers three practicable solutions to increase individual agency.

First, the third-party doctrine should be limited in order to permit an

expectation of privacy in some non-content data. Second, Congress should

enact proprietary rights in certain personal data. Finally, technological

advances should facilitate individuals’ selection of corporations’ services and

devices that ensure notice of government surveillance and enable direct

communication between the people and government over searches and

seizures.

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1444

II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND BIG DATA ............................. 1446

A. ORIGINS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE .............................. 1446

B. BIG DATA ............................................................................. 1447

C. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN THE BIG DATA ERA .............. 1450

1. Internet Subscriber Information ............................... 1450

2. Cell Site Location Information .................................. 1451

3. Email Contents ............................................................ 1453

4. Telephony Metadata ................................................... 1454

III. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC ........................................... 1456

A. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE THIRD-PARTY

DOCTRINE ............................................................................. 1456

B. JUDICIAL DISCUSSION OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC .. 1457

C. STATUTORY ENACTMENT OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR

DYNAMIC .............................................................................. 1460

IV. THE LIMITS OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC ................... 1463

A. CORPORATE AVATAR CHALLENGES......................................... 1463

B. THE PROBLEM OF NONDISCLOSURE ........................................ 1467

C. CORPORATE AVATAR ARGUMENTS ......................................... 1469

V. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC FALLACY ............................. 1473

A. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC’S FUNCTIONAL

LIMITATIONS ........................................................................ 1473

1. Tech Companies’ Relationships with the

Government ................................................................. 1473

2. Government Control over Private Communications

Systems ......................................................................... 1475

3. The Private Tech Company as a Public Actor ........... 1477

4. Tech Companies’ Attitudes Toward Privacy ............. 1478

5. Immunity ..................................................................... 1479

B. COUNTERARGUMENT: THE MARKET AS A PRIVACY

MOTIVATOR .......................................................................... 1481

2015] CORPORATE AVATARS 1443

C. THE NORMATIVE WEAKNESSES OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR

DYNAMIC .............................................................................. 1485

1. The Fourth Amendment as a Check on

Government ................................................................. 1485

2. English History of Corporate Searches and

Seizures ........................................................................ 1485

3. Constitution-Era Distrust of Corporations ................ 1487

4. Fourth Amendment Minority Viewpoint

Protection .................................................................... 1488

5. The Corporate Fourth Amendment Right ................ 1489

6. The Dangerous Power of the Private Few ................. 1490

VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC FALLACY ..... 1492

A. NOTICE ................................................................................. 1493

B. LIMITING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE ................................. 1493

1. Non-Content Data Exception ..................................... 1494

2. Involuntary Provision of the Personal Data

Exception ..................................................................... 1495

C. THE PEOPLE’S PROPRIETARY RIGHT TO DATA ........................ 1497

1. Monetization of Personal Data ................................... 1497

2. Legislating Data Ownership ....................................... 1498

3. Automated Privacy Preferences .................................. 1498

4. Automated Big Data Popular Notice Regime ........... 1499

VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1501