Coping with Moral Threat: Moral Judgment amid War on Terror

DOI10.1177/0022002719854209
Published date01 February 2020
AuthorShaul Kimhi,Michal Shamai,Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom,Shani Fachter,Daphna Canetti
Date01 February 2020
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Coping with Moral
Threat: Moral Judgment
amid War on Terror
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom
1
, Shaul Kimhi
2
, Shani Fachter
1
,
Michal Shamai
3
, and Daphna Canetti
4
Abstract
Moral dilemmas amid war on terrorism include repeated harsh moral choices, which
often pose threats to one’s moral image. Given that people strive to view themselves
as moral, how do they cope with such morally compromising decisions? We suggest
and test two strategies to cope with morally threatening decision-making under in-
group moral responsibility amid war on terrorism: (a) trivialization of the moral
dilemma and (b) resentment toward the target. Four experimental studies measured
(study 1) and manipulated (studies 2–4) these hypothesized mechanisms, presenting
a similar collateral damage dilemma to Israeli Jews in the context of the 2014 Gaza
conflict (studies 1 and 2) and to Americans in the context of the US campaign against
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (studies 3 and 4). Results demonstrate that both
trivialization and resentment facilitate harsh moral choices under conditions of
moral accountability. Studying the mechanism underlying moral decision-making in
conflicts is key to understanding moral injury and the process of moral repair.
Keywords
moral dilemma, war on terrorism, coping strategies, exposure to terrorism, conflict
resolution
1
Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
2
Department of Psychology, Tel Hai College, Tel Hai, Israel
3
School of Social Work, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
4
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Corresponding Author:
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus,
Jerusalem 91905, Israel.
Email: pazit.bennun@mail.huji.ac.il
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2020, Vol. 64(2-3) 231-260
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719854209
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
While people strive to view themselves as moral (e.g., Aronson 1992), in armed
conflicts, they repeatedly encounter dilemmas that pose threats to their moral self-
image. How do they cope with making morally compromising decisions? In partic-
ular, the war on terror, a form of asymmetrical warfare, poses moral dilemmas that
require citizens to choose between conflicting rules of morali ty (Broeders et al.
2011; Lammers and Stapel 2009). This is because in asymmetrical warfare, terror
organizations often hide among members of a civilian population (Schoenekase
2004). Under these circumstances, states can either opt for the moral rule of mini-
mizing collateral damage, thus decreasing the risk of harm to out-group civilians, or
they can follow the moral rule of ensuring the success of the military action, thus
fortifying the safety of the in-group civilians (Kamm 2005; Kasher and Yadlin
2005). This moral dissonance leads individuals to struggle in making choices and,
after making them, to find a way to calm the moral self. What coping strategies do
they use?
Moral dilemmas in the context of war on terrorism, such as the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict and the US offensive against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), may
require unique coping mechanisms because of their particular characteristics includ-
ing repeated moral choices, tangible physical threat, and intergroup dynamics. In
this work, we suggest and test two strategies for coping with morally threatening
dilemmas: trivialization of the dilemma and resentment toward the target, identified
by Bandura’s (1990) moral disengagement theory (MDT) and by Monin’s (2007)
application of social comparison theory.
The scenario we examine concerns collateral damage (i.e., physical harm to
uninvolved out-group members) perpetuated by in-group members. When individ-
uals use trivialization as a coping mechanism, they treat the dilemma as a technical,
amoral decision. With resentment, hostility toward the target can help individuals
to cope.
We tested our hypothesis in two contexts: the Israeli operation in Gaza against
Hamas (studies 1 and 2) and the US operation in Syria against ISIS (studies 3 and 4).
Both raised moral questions concerning civilian victimization similar to those often
faced by decision makers in other asymmetrical conflicts. We presented a similar
moral dilemma to Israeli Jews and to Americans: how many uninvolved civilians
can justifiably be killed when bombing a house in which three of the most-wanted
terrorists are meeting? We either measured (study 1) or induced (studies 2–4) the
coping mechanisms and choices involved in the dilemma.
The examination of these mechanisms has important theoretical implications. It
is often argued that the war on terrorism erodes the moral backbone of states.
Asymmetrical warfare requires citizens to take sides in dilemmas involving col-
lateral damage with clear moral implications. One can think of the psychological
mechanisms that enable citizens to make difficult moral decisions repeatedly
(i.e., reducing the importance of decisions that cause harm to others, emptying
them of moral significance, and transferring responsibility to the other side) as the
232 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(2-3)

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