CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES AND HETEROGENEITY OF INVESTOR BELIEFS

AuthorAn Yan,Jie Jiao
Date01 June 2015
Published date01 June 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12059
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES AND HETEROGENEITY OF
INVESTOR BELIEFS
Jie Jiao
Tsinghua University
An Yan
Fordham University
Abstract
We conjecture that convertibles can better attract investors with different beliefs about a
rms future cash ows compared to straight bonds and stocks. Our empirical ndings
are consistent with this conjecture. We nd that a rm is more likely to issue convertibles
rather than seasoned stocks and straight bonds in the public markets when investors
beliefs are more heterogeneous. The positive effect of heterogeneous beliefs on the
relative likelihood of convertibles is greater when investors are more optimistic. Overall,
our ndings provide a novel rationale based on investorsheterogeneous beliefs for the
use of convertibles in corporate external nancing decisions.
JEL Classification: G32, G34
I. Introduction
Investors have heterogeneous prior beliefs on a rms value. The relation between
heterogeneity of investor beliefs and security values has received a great deal of attention
in the nance literature. This research dates back to Miller (1977) and subsequently
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Mayshar (1983), and Morris (1996). Miller argues that when
investors with heterogeneous beliefs are subject to short-sale constraints, stock prices
reect the opinion of optimistic investors and sell at a premium over fundamental values.
Recently, many studies have empirically tested Millers predictions. For example, Chen,
Hong, and Stein (2002) and Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) focus on the effect of
heterogeneity of investor beliefs on future stock returns. They nd evidence supporting
the predictions of Millers model (see also Dufe, Garleanu, and Pedersen 2002;
Scheinkman and Xiong 2003; Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2006).
1
However, most empirical research in this literature examines the effect of
investorsheterogeneous beliefs on stock value. Little empirical research has studied the
effect of heterogeneous beliefs on the value of other types of securities. Also, it is not well
understood how heterogeneity of investor beliefs affects a rms corporate nancing
We would like to thank the JFR editors and two anonymous referees for their comments.
1
In contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict unbiased stock price in the presence of heterogeneous
investor beliefs.
The Journal of Financial Research Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 Pages 255281 Summer 2015
255
© 2015 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association
RAWLS COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED FOR THE SOUTHERN AND SOUTHWESTERN
FINANCE ASSOCIATIONS BY WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
decisions among various securities. In this article, we address these questions by
focusing on convertible securities, an important type of security in corporate nancing
decisions. We study how the heterogeneity of investor beliefs on a rms future cash
ows affects the rms incentive to issue convertible securities rather than straight bonds
and seasoned stocks.
We conjecture that convertibles attract investors with heterogeneous beliefs on a
rms future cash-ow distribution better than do straight bonds and seasoned stocks. In
the following, we discuss briey the intuition behind this conjecture. We provide a more
complete discussion and develop our hypotheses more fully in Section II.
Consider Millers (1977) framework where investors have heterogeneous
beliefs and they are subject to short-sale constraints. Also consider two types of
heterogeneous investors who could invest in the rms securities. The rst type prefers to
invest in equity based on their beliefs, and the second type prefers to invest in straight
bonds. In this case, the issuing rm could nd it undesirable to issue both straight bonds
and stocks, as both securities appeal to only one type of investor. Unlike straight bonds
and stocks, convertible securities can help attract both types of investors with different
preferences. A convertible security is a hybrid comprising a debt component and a stock
component. It has different consequences from straight bonds and stocks because the
entire issuance is in the form of debt if the convertible is never converted, and the
entire issuance becomes common stock upon conversion. The stock component
helps the issuing rm attract the rst type of investors who prefer to invest in equity. The
debt component helps the issuing rm attract the second type of investors who prefer
to invest in straight bonds. Thus, a convertible security has an advantage over straight
bonds and stocks in that it can attract investors who have different beliefs and thus
different investment preferences over stocks and straight bonds. This is our rst
hypothesis.
In consideration of the above discussion, we hypothesize that the likelihood of a
convertible issuance rather than straight bond and stock issuances is higher when
heterogeneity of investor beliefs is higher. Furthermore, in Millers (1977) framework,
any securities issued by a rm are purchased by investors who are more optimistic than
other investors. Thus, the heterogeneous belief argument also predicts that the effect of
heterogeneity of investor beliefs on the relative likelihood of a convertible issuance is
greater when investors are more optimistic in the capital markets. This is our second
hypothesis.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of U.S. public offerings of convertibles,
straight bonds, and seasoned stocks. We use four proxies for heterogeneity of investor
beliefs. Our rst proxy is analyst dispersion, based on the standard deviation of nancial
analystsforecasts on a rms one-year-ahead earnings. A higher level of analyst
dispersion indicates a higher level of heterogeneous investor beliefs (Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina 2002). Our second proxy is stock trading turnover. An increase in
heterogeneity of investor beliefs is associated with an increase in trading turnover (see,
e.g., Harris and Raviv 1993; Hong and Stein 2003; Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). Our
third proxy is idiosyncratic volatility. A rm facing a higher level of heterogeneous
investor beliefs experiences greater idiosyncratic volatility (see, e.g., Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina 2002; Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu 2006). Our nal proxy is breadth
256 The Journal of Financial Research

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