Controlling the Sword: the Democratic Governance of National Security.

• Author: Warnke, Paul C.

Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security

Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Bruce Russett. Harvard University Press, $22.50. Professor Russett asks whether public opinion influences national security policy and, if so, whether this is a good idea. He answers both questions affirmatively.

His analysis finds a "complex interaction between leaders and led," with public opinion sometimes influecing policy and policymaking sometimes being shaped in an attempt to obtain the desired popular reaction. His conclusion is that, despite the complexities of national security problems, the public has enough information to answer the key questions: "When is the use of military force justified? . . . Should we seek military superiority over the Soviets, or should we settle for parity? . . . Are our military defense levels basically adequate or seriously wanting? . . . How important is it to have a modus vivendi with the Soviets? . . . What risks are we prepared to run to avoid being red? Or dead?" Experience in the years since World War II seems to me to confirm Professor Russett's thesis. Some striking examples come to mind.

On the Vietnam war, public opinion outpaced official policy and eventually forced our withdrawal from that costly and quixotic enterprise. In contrast, some presidential decisions to employ military force have evoked a "rally around the flga" reaction and increased the approval rating of the incumbent. Illustrative is the general approval of President Gerald Ford's military action to rescue the Mayaguez crew, although it turned out that the crew had already been released and many American servicemen died in the mission. Other examples cited are the wide popular support for our invasion of Grenada, the bombing attack on Libya in response to its sponsorship of terrorism, and the military action to get Manuel Noriega out of Panama and into a Miami prison. But as Russett points out, all these actions were of brief duration and at least cosmetically successful. Moreover, the boost in presidential popularity was also short-lived.

His book also suggests that the combination of electoral politics and economic distress is a dangerous one for international relations. In this regard, he refers to the failure of the SALT II Treaty to achieve ratification, in 1979. He fails to note, however, that, although never ratified and expiring by its terms at the end of 1985, the treaty today...