Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

• Author: Julián González Guyer,Nicole Jenne
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19877211
• Published date: 01 July 2021
• Date: 01 July 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Controlling Blue Berets:

The Consequences

of Political Neglect

in the Case of Uruguay’s

Participation

in Peacekeeping

Juli´

an Gonz´

alez Guyer

1

and Nicole Jenne

2

Abstract

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to

democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of

Uruguay,today a fully democratic statethat has consistently rankedamong the world’s

top peacekeepingcontributors per capita. Specifically, weask whether participation in

peacekeepinghas increased civilian controlover the military. To answer thisquestion,

we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight,

civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that

peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of

military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the

armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to politicalneglect by civilian authorities,

the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of

ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

Keywords

peacekeeping, civilian control, armed forces, Uruguay

1

Departament of Political Science, Universidad de la Rep´

ublica, Montevideo, Uruguay

2

Institute of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Cat´

olica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

Corresponding Author:

Nicole Jenne, Institute of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Cat´

olica de Chile, Vicuna Mackenna

4860, Santiago, Macul, Chile.

Email: njenne@uc.cl

Armed Forces & Society

2021, Vol. 47(3) 435-456

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19877211

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Civil–military relations have long been a topic mainly for students of undemocratic

regimes. More recently, however, the question of who controls the military and how

has found its way into debates on the quality of democracy. Yet, disagreements over

what democratic control over the armed forces exactly entails persist (Bruneau &

Matei, 2008; Croissant & Kuehn, 2010; Feaver, 1996). Interestingly, the lack of

agreement on a definition contrasts with a fairly strong consensus on the use of

peacekeeping as a means of establishing, consolidating, or simply maintaining such

control: peacekeeping, thus has been the general consensus, promotes democratic

values within the military, keeps officers away from internal politics, and reduces

the gap between the military and civilians (Bruneau, 2005, p. 116; Bruneau &

Mendee, 2015; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2001; Moskos, 1975; Sotomayor,

2014, p. 2; Worboys, 2007).

Only recently, a number of studies began questioning the peacekeeping-

democratization thesis. Sotomayor (2014), in his book on Latin American peace-

keepers, called the claim a “myth.” Cunliffe (2018) studied military interventions in

politics in Bangladesh, Fiji, and the Gambia and found that “in each case, peace-

keeping was a necessary but insufficient condition” not of democratization but “of

military rule” (p. 232). The “link between peacekeeping abroad and democracy at

home” (Cunliffe, 2018, p. 219) was further called into question by Levin, MacKay,

and Nasirzadeh (2016), who argued that authoritarian regimes can draw on resources

from peacekeeping to bolster their rule.

What about peacekeeping’s effects on civilian control in countries that transi-

tioned successfully to democracy? This article is concerned with Uruguay, a country

with a strong tradition in civilian control over the armed forces that was significantly

interrupted only during the dictatorship of 1973–1985 (Gonz´alez Guyer, 2013, pp.

100, 116). Like in other Latin American countries, the return to democracy was

accompanied by a steep rise in Uruguay’s contribution to UN peacekeeping. While

the country had previously participated with military observers, from 1992 on Uru-

guay has kept significant numbers of troop contingents abroad. During 1992–1997

and again since 2001, the country has consistently ranked among the 25 top troop

contributors to UN peacekeeping (United Nations, 2019). This is especially remark-

able considering that Uruguay’s population counts less than 3.5 million. In peace-

keeping contributions per capita, this places it way ahead of major troops

contributing states such as Bangladesh and India.

Although fostering democratic control over the military has never been a declared

objective of Uruguay’s contribution to peacekeeping, it certainly has been an indi-

rect one. In the 1990s, politicians and lawmakers prese nted peacekeeping as an

opportunity for the armed forces to acquire a new mission after the leftist guerrilla

had ceased to exist (Sotomayor, 2014, p. 61). Furthermore, authorities across the

political spectrum have highlighted peacekeeping’s economic benefits ever since

Uruguay has turned into a top contributing country (C´amara de Diputados, 1996,

p. 6; C´amara de Senadores, 1992, 2013; Sotomayor, 2014, p. 58). Both motivations

are intrinsically linked to civilian control. For the democratic governments, defining

436 Armed Forces & Society 47(3)