In search of democratic governance in Central America: political parties are controlled by a handful of people who profit from running the parties in a patrimonial style, and there are narrow prospects for economic reforms. Why has so little progress been made?

AuthorSojo, Carlos
PositionStrong and weak states: cases of governance

Governance embodies the most interesting aspects of the conflicting and unrelenting relationship between rulers and people, between citizens and institutions. The subject became particularly relevant to Latin American societies when they began the transition from authoritarian government forms to open, polyarchic ones, albeit insufficiently democratic. Authoritarian governance has never been problematic in scientific or political terms. Its rules are clear. It feeds on fear and repression. Control is exerted by violence or the threat of it. In real life, of course, authoritarian rulers devised their own governing routines: sometimes they tried to compensate for repression with social services for its victims, giving the appearance of reform. But when democracies establish new norms, they have great difficulty redistributing political power and wealth in societies marked by unfulfilled needs and lacking in-depth fiscal, institutional and political leadership. For the opposition, matters become ungovernable when, faced with irresponsibility in public management, patience runs out.

Conceptual approaches try to reconcile these different interpretations by recognizing the many types of relationships between state and society that can emerge under newly-democratic conditions (e.g. when distribution conflicts are resolved by appealing to the majority rule and to the Constitution). (1) But a precondition for democratic governance is the existence of a state and a government that function according to pre-established norms in the first place. This is the first caution we should take when analyzing democracy in Central America. After more than a decade of peace and institutional agreements conducted through elections, observers see significant deficiencies in building and consolidating democratic states, as well as in exerting democratic governance. (2) To social scientists, this reveals fragile institutional norms and insufficient compliance with them, because the institutions have failed to anticipate the multiplicity of conflicts that may actually arise between state and society; and because factors that are external to the rules of the democratic game are affecting them. But how can this observation translate into and inform public action?

THE USEFULNESS OF THE IDEA OF GOVERNANCE: SPHERES OF ANALYSIS

Democratic governance implies respect for, and the functioning of, two basic principles: Decisions regarding distribution are adopted following known procedures; and the results of those deliberations are unknown from the start by the actors involved in the process. (3) In a governable democracy, conflicts can express themselves with enough frequency and intensity that they draw the attention of the state; the state then satisfies some needs while keeping others "temporarily" unsolved by promising to pay attention to them in the future. When a democracy is ungovernable, there is a "deficit" of satisfaction or a "surplus" of demands that cannot be institutionally channeled on a constant basis, leading to political crisis. The democratic process can also be a sham, opaque or unfair, with the outcome decided by policy makers before the process has even begun. So in analyzing the effectiveness of democratic regimes, it is important to look at the norms that govern institutions, the way policy makers reach decisions, and the nature those decisions usually take.

But two additional spheres outside of the relationship between state and society seem relevant to me. First, institutions operate under structural limits that can be quite stringent and suffer from constant modifications, especially in societies in precarious, limited development, where natural and macroeconomic catastrophes can become disasters for strictly social reasons. The limits indicate what type of demands can occur, how intense they call be, and when they can be advanced. We are not talking exclusively about economic limits, as stated by a conservative understanding of politics; we are also referring to normative limits as well, as established by a liberal approach where the norm breaks away from the original social interest, conditioning and guiding its future evolution. (4) From this perspective, structural limits can take the form of citizenship rights. Defining them is essential for economic life and for the well-being of the people. They also mark the character of the social commitment, as a product of conflicts and tensions, as well as the character of future aspirations marked by consensus to some extent. Finally, they reflect the strength of the institutions themselves and their ability to implement effective policy and maintain order.

The second sphere is the influence of globalization, and here again, it is not confined to economics: It can influence where political power really lies. (5) Global forces can change the role of the state in society, and introduce new balances and constraints to its actions. When these influences are incorporated into the dynamics of societies, they can take the form of structural limits to the formation of rights.

Issues of governance examine whether institutions, their management, the discussion they create and the policies that result can produce social peace and political stability. In some Central American countries, economic reforms have been possible without permanent social resistance. Yet, the positive distributive effects are only promises, while the negative costs have already been realized.

POLITICAL MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

So far, we have established the elements of the governance equation in a rather conceptual way, but governance is above all the result of a complex process of interactions between society, the state and, increasingly, international actors. Understanding this allows us to reject the instrumental notions of governance that establish an easy synonymy between political productivity and good governance. (6) A good government is a necessity, but it is not enough.

The three spheres that condition governance interact differently according to the degree of development of institutional political patterns. One might expect political regimes in transition to be more sensitive to changes in economic structure and to the political influence generated by international actors. It is thus important to establish a relationship between the mechanisms of government, the limits placed on it, and the influence of globalization, specifically looking at the feasibility of strengthening democracy, which has been highly uneven in Central America.

Following Diamond, the dynamics of democratic consolidation involve three facets: democratic deepening, political institutionalization and regime performance. (7) The question of democratic deepening concerns a wider adherence to the legal system and to accountability between powers and towards citizens. Other essential aspects are the reduction of institutional barriers limiting political participation and mobilization of marginalized social sectors; decentralization of power; and securing more space, energy and autonomy for civil society, as well as more effective protection of political and civil rights. Political institutionalization refers to the consistency of political practices and has to do with the predictability of the democratic game. (8) Governing bodies that increase their authority so that norms and laws prevail within efficient, reliable political structures and accepted norms can earn the respect of citizens by allowing for correct mediation of interests and conflict resolution. The question of regime performance cannot be ignored unless we accept the risk of falling for rigid prescriptions of what democracy and governance really mean. The idea of regime performance refers to the economic and social results of political exchange between state and society. Thus, it recognizes the effects of policy outcomes on the stability of the institutional regime. Indications of macroeconomic stability, or data about poverty and inequality, might also reveal to what extent democracy is consolidated and what possibilities Central American societies have for improving governance.

Finally, we must recognize that institutions and political practices are socially conditioned. It cannot be assumed that when conflicts over regime performance end, it is because all problems originating from institutional and normative fields have been solved; democratic regimes can be under constant pressure to prove their legitimacy. Occasionally, social progress actually impedes important institutional reforms that might have improved social institutions, because the regime seeks to avoid at...

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