Illinois v. Lidster: continuing to carve out constitutional vehicle checkpoints.

• Author: Nickelsberg, Jessica E.

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Illinois v. Lidster, (1) the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit motorist checkpoints carried out with the purpose of requesting information from vehicle occupants about a previously-committed crime. (2) The Court deemed such stops to be constitutional when they advance the public interest in solving a crime to a degree that outweighs any interference with individual liberties as a result of the stop. (3)

   This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly reasoned that its decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, (4) in which the Court held unconstitutional checkpoints conducted without any individualized suspicion and "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," (5) is distinguishable from Lidster and should not control. The Supreme Court was correct in reasoning that a lack of individualized suspicion is not fully determinative of an informational stop's constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Supreme Court was consistent in holding that special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify such stops, as the Court had previously articulated in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (6) and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. (7) Finally, the Supreme Court properly held that the reasonableness of the checkpoint stop in Lidster--and, thus, its constitutionality--should be determined by applying the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas. (8) However, this Note also argues that although the Supreme Court used the proper analysis in finding that these types of checkpoints are not per se unconstitutional, the Supreme Court erred in engaging in the balancing test to decide Lidster. Instead, it should have remanded the case to the Illinois courts to decide whether the facts of the case satisfied Brown's multifactor test.

2. BACKGROUND

   The Fourth Amendment states:

   The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (9) It is well established that a vehicle checkpoint stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, just as stopping a pedestrian on the street is considered a seizure. (10) In cases involving such checkpoints, the question that then arises is whether those seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (11) When a seizure is less intrusive than a formal arrest, courts balance "the amount of intrusion upon individual privacy against the special law enforcement interests that would be served by permitting such an intrusion" in order to determine whether it is reasonable and thus does not require some element of suspicion in order to be constitutional. (12) While some amount of individualized suspicion is generally required in a constitutional seizure, "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." (13) When the public interest concerns advanced by a seizure outweigh the interference with individual liberties as a result of the seizure, the seizure is constitutional even in the absence of any degree of individualized suspicion. (14) Conversely, if the balancing test falls in favor of individual liberties, a suspicionless seizure is unconstitutional. (15)

   The following cases outline the Supreme Court's assessment of seizures employed in a variety of circumstances, including vehicle checkpoints. First, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court weighed public interest concerns against intrusions on individual liberties in finding vehicle checkpoints set up to assist with border control efforts constitutional. (16) Then, in Brown v. Texas, the Court formally set forth a balancing test to be used in determining the reasonableness of suspicionless seizures. (17) Next, the Court applied the Brown test in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz in holding that sobriety checkpoints executed without any individualized suspicion of the drivers were constitutional. (18)

   Then, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court held that suspicionless checkpoints conducted for the purpose of general crime control were unconstitutional. (19) In this case, there was no use for the Brown balancing test because the checkpoint at issue was factually distinguishable from those in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. (20)

   1. THE SUPREME COURT FINDS CHECKPOINTS TO ASSIST WITH BORDER CONTROL CONSTITUTIONAL IN UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

      In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court considered several consolidated cases that had been decided by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. (21) In those cases, the original defendants were individuals arrested at permanent checkpoints set up along roads that led away from U.S. border crossings with Mexico. (22) At these stops, located not at border crossings, but generally within 100 miles from the border on major highways frequently traveled by vehicles coming from the border, officials slowed or stopped all traffic. (23) Each vehicle was visually inspected and those that were determined to require additional inquiry were directed to pull out of the traffic flow. (24) In some circumstances, officials who determined vehicles required additional inquiry did so without any "articulable suspicion." (25) Each of the original defendants had been arrested for transporting illegal aliens, discovered upon further inquiry at their respective checkpoints. (26)

      In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court considered whether reasonable suspicion was "a prerequisite to a valid stop" by balancing the interests at stake. (27) The Court put great weight on the public interest of operating routine stops, because controlling the inflow of illegal aliens was an important concern and could not be accomplished at the border crossings alone. (28) It reasoned that requiring reasonable suspicion in order to stop a car would be "impractical," because too many vehicles traveled on the roads to allow "particularized study" of each one. (29) The Supreme Court also found that vehicle occupants' Fourth Amendment rights were intruded upon in a very limited way. (30) The court considered both the objective intrusion on individuals' Fourth Amendment interests, as well as the subjective intrusion. (31) From the objective perspective, the vast majority of vehicles were detained very briefly and the seizure itself (that is, the preliminary checkpoint inspection) was limited to a visual inspection of only that which could be seen from the outside of the car. (32) The subjective intrusion--"the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers"--was also not great at a checkpoint stop. (33) Thus, even without articulable suspicion, the government interests in operating the checkpoints outweighed those of the private citizen. (34)

      In holding that permanent checkpoints to screen for illegal aliens were constitutional even in the absence of individualized suspicion, the Supreme Court noted that the expectation of privacy in a car is appreciably less than such expectation during a search of one's person or belongings, or while in one's residence. (35) The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision and remanded the individual Ninth Circuit cases. (36)

   2. A BALANCING TEST FOR REASONABLENESS IS ESTABLISHED IN BROWN V. TEXAS

      The Supreme Court's first direct articulation of the appropriate test by which the reasonableness of seizures should be determined appeared in its unanimous opinion in Brown v. Texas:

      The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. (37) In Brown, two patrolling police officers saw the defendant as he walked away from another individual in an alley. (38) The police officers did not suspect him of any specific misconduct or of being armed. (39) However, they stopped the defendant, and demanded that he identify himself, and explain what he was doing in the alley. (40) The defendant refused to identify himself, and the police arrested him under a provision in the Texas penal code that deems failure to provide one's name when lawfully requested by a police officer a criminal act. (41) The defendant claimed that the police officers' seizure of him--here, the short seizure when they detained him on the street--violated the Fourth Amendment, and as such he was wrongfully arrested. (42) The officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, so the Court in deciding the case considered the public interest concerns at stake, the degree to which they were advanced by detaining the defendant, and the defendant's right to personal security and privacy. (43) Here, the public interest concerns (prevention of crime) were great, and the Texas statute under which the defendant had been stopped may have been designed to advance those concerns. (44) However, to demand that any individual identify himself even when he is not suspected of having committed any criminal activity was found to be arbitrary and at risk of abuse. (45) Thus, the Court found that the balance "tilt[ed] in favor of freedom from police interference" and held that the statute as applied violated the Fourth Amendment. (46)

   3. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF POLICE V. SITZ SETS FORTH CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS TO SCREEN FOR INTOXICATED DRIVERS

      In Michigan Department of Police v. Sitz, (47) the Supreme Court considered whether Michigan's use of sobriety checkpoints...