Contesting Counterpublics: The Transformation of the Articulation of Rural Migrant Workers’ Rights in China’s Public Sphere, 1992–2014

• Author: Mujun Zhou
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211042441
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211042441

Politics & Society

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DOI: 10.1177/00323292211042441

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Article

Contesting Counterpublics:

The Transformation of the

Articulation of Rural Migrant

Workers’ Rights in China’s

Public Sphere, 1992–2014

Mujun Zhou

Zhejiang University

Abstract

This article extends the theoretical discussion of counterpublics and applies the

concept to an authoritarian context. The article contends that it is necessary to

distinguish between the counterpublic oriented by liberal ideology that criticizes

authoritarianism at an abstract level (Counterpublic I) and the counterpublics that are

concerned with substantive inequality (Counterpublic II). To illustrate the approach

taken, the articulation of rural migrant workers’ rights between 1992 and 2014 is

documented, demonstrating that, in the 1990s and early 2000s, most public discussion

on the issue tended to reduce workers’ rights to civil rights. It was not until the late

2000s that alternative forms of rights, such as social rights, were thematized. As the

article argues, this was because the power balance between Counterpublic I and

Counterpublic II had been changed. The empirical study explains the transformation

and highlights the heterogeneity within Counterpublic II by comparing the diverse

strategies employed by different actors.

Keywords

public sphere, counterpublics, labor rights, civil society, China

Corresponding Author:

Mujun Zhou, Zhejiang University, 866 Yuhangtang Road, 1133 Innovation Building A, Hangzhou, Zhejiang

Province, 310058, China.

Email: Mujun_Zhou@protonmail.com

1042441PASXXX10.1177/00323292211042441Politics & SocietyZhou

research-article2021

2022, Vol. 50(3) 351–383

Since the 1990s, the development of information technology and the loosening of state

control in universities and the mass media have allowed for the flourishing of new

venues for public communication in China. In newly rising NGOs, commercialized

newspapers, and the internet space, people have criticized state policies and expressed

various demands. Many scholars, both in China and in the West, have seen these phe-

nomena as a sign of a rising public sphere.1 Most studies until now have focused on

how citizens have carved out space for participation vis-à-vis the authoritarian state.

However, few have considered the issue of power inequality within the sphere. Have

the newly rising venues privileged certain classes? To what extent are the disadvan-

taged groups able to make use of these venues to voice their concerns? Has the acces-

sibility of the public sphere changed over the past three decades?

The idea of the public sphere has come to the study of politics as a normative

theory.2 It portrays an ideal speech situation in which participants reach consensus

through rational-critical debates.3 In his early work, Jürgen Habermas locates the ori-

gin of the modern public sphere in the bourgeois society that existed between the late

Middle Ages and the eighteenth century. In his description, in the bourgeois conversa-

tions in salons, coffeehouses, and table societies during the transition from feudalism

to capitalism, a new norm was established—one in which economic power and the

prestige of public office were held in suspense and good arguments were deemed the

only legitimate means of persuasion. He contends that the bourgeois public sphere

performed the function of checking the absolutist state and that it laid a solid founda-

tion for the later expansion of democracy.4

Habermas’s interpretation has been widely criticized, both empirically and theoreti-

cally. Historical studies reveal that his analysis ignores the existence of various “plebe-

ian public spheres,” such as those organized by peasants and the working class. These

plebeian public spheres have developed alongside the bourgeois public sphere and

have been in conflictual relations with bourgeois publicity.5 Moreover, important parts

of the struggle to establish some of the features Habermas describes as integral to

bourgeois publicity, like freedom of the press, have largely been carried out by activ-

ists in those plebeian public spheres.6 From a different perspective, feminist theorists

hold that the bourgeois public sphere has never been as inclusive as it claims, as

women are for the most part excluded.7

In response to these criticisms, several scholars have argued for a notion of multiple

public spheres.8 Nancy Fraser’s discussion of subaltern counterpublics offers an illustra-

tive case. According to Fraser, subaltern counterpublics are those “parallel discursive

arenas” formulated by subordinated groups.9 These counterpublics have at least two

functions. On the one hand, by sheltering subordinated groups from the influence of the

public at large, subaltern counterpublics facilitate the circulation of counterdiscourses.

For example, in the conferences and local meetings organized by feminist activists in the

United States in the late twentieth century, women invented new terms, such as the “dou-

ble shift” and “sexual harassment,” to describe social reality. Armed with such language,

participants were able to recast their needs and identities.10 On the other hand, subaltern

counterpublics also assume a publicist orientation and are in the long run against separat-

ism. When the solidarity among the subordinated becomes strong and participants gain

352 Politics & Society 50(3)

confidence, counterpublics may serve as the basis for launching agitational activities.

Fraser thus contends that it is in the dialectic between withdrawal and agitation that sub-

altern counterpublics realize their emancipatory potential.11

While the idea of subaltern counterpublics provides us with an approach for under-

standing how disadvantaged groups can be included in the public sphere, the context

in which the conceptualization is based is rather parochial. Fraser’s discussion of

counterpublics has been limited to late capitalist societies, where the power of the state

is contained, and the freedom of speech and association is institutionally guaranteed

by formal democracy. In such a context, it is the power of privileged groups in society

(e.g., the white, male, propertied class) that subordinated groups intend to contest.

However, in an authoritarian context, the state monopolizes consensus formation, and

the freedom of speech and association is not guaranteed. It is arbitrary state repression

that participants in public discussions have to guard against. In this sense, in an author-

itarian regime, any communication networks that have been established for the sake of

questioning the state’s monopoly of politics—no matter whether they are established

by the privileged or the disadvantaged—can be seen as a kind of counterpublic.

What adds to the complexity of my analysis is that counterpublics in authoritarian

contexts can exist in many different forms. Some counterpublics tend to criticize

authoritarianism at a more abstract level, arguing that unchecked state power is essen-

tially bad. These counterpublics often claim to represent the general interest—as long

as the authoritarian control is dismantled, everyone will benefit. Other counterpublics

are more concerned with substantive inequality and injustice. These counterpublics

are often associated with socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in society. To dis-

tinguish between these two kinds of counterpublics, I will hereafter call them

Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II respectively.

I contend that the relationship between Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II is con-

tingent. In some cases, Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II merge. Notable examples

include workers’ resistance in Brazil, South Africa, and South Korea in the 1970s and

1980s. Such examples of resistance have not only criticized the exploitation of workers

in capitalist accumulation in late industrialized countries (Counterpublic II) but have

also evolved into movements that challenge authoritarian rule (Counterpublic I).12 But in

other cases, Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II can be separated. This can be due to

the fact that the major communicative venues of Counterpublic I are dominated by elites,

while ordinary people have little to no opportunity to participate. It can also be that,

although disadvantaged groups are formally incorporated into Counterpublic I, the inter-

nal structure of Counterpublic I is nonetheless highly hierarchical. In such a Counterpublic

I, although the disadvantaged can speak, their voices tend to be marginalized, and their

agenda is often labeled as of secondary importance. To address their concerns, the disad-

vantaged sometimes have to formulate an alternative communicative space

(Counterpublic II). When that happens, Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II may even

come into contestation with each other.

Central to my argument is that, when Counterpublic I and Counterpublic II do not

merge, it is necessary to consider the tripartite relations between Counterpublic I,

Counterpublic II, and the authoritarian state; whether the disadvantaged are able to

353

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