Contempt for Oversight and Investigation: Congressional Contemnors, the Grand Jury, and Constitutional Order

• Author: Nathan A. Williams
• Position: J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2020; M.Sc., London School of Economics & Political Science, 2017; B.A., University of Georgia, 2016
• Pages: 603-631

Contempt for Oversight and Investigation:

Congressional Contemnors, the Grand Jury, and

Constitutional Order

NATHAN A. WILLIAMS*

ABSTRACT

Congressional demands for information from the Executive Branch are often

resolved through political negotiations. Investigations during recent presiden-

tial administrations, however, demonstrated the Legislature’s impotence in

compelling production of documents and witness testimony to support a con-

gressional investigation when those negotiations failed. Without a reliable

mechanism to enforce congressional subpoenas, the Legislature is left nearly

powerless in fulfilling its constitutional duty of oversight, at least in light of

modern experience. This indicates a gap in understanding the full scope of

authorities accessible to lawmakers when compelling information access.

Although a last resort, the Legislature is capable of protecting its compelled pro-

cess through enforcement of its criminal contempt statute, which provides

Congress with authority to refer recalcitrant officials for prosecution. Historic

practice demonstrates, however, that the Executive has obviated the Legislature’s

information-gathering processes by failing to undertake the mandatory command

of grand jury referral for such contemnors, citing the separation of powers. Yet in

a constitutional sense, the scheme preserves the Executive’s prerogative of prose-

cutorial discretion based on the institutional nature of the harm and the prosecu-

tor’s ultimate power to decline prosecution, regardless of the grand jury’s

recommendation. In supplementary form, courts have rejected claims of “absolute

immunity” for presidential aides, even though the Department of Justice views ex-

ecutive privilege as an absolute defense against a congressional subpoena. This

leaves enforcement of criminal contempt, despite its draconian nature, as the

Legislature’s most effective mechanism to secure documents or testimony in a con-

gressional investigation, even if only used in limited circumstances as a tool to

incentivize compliance with its informational demands.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605

I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606

* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2020; M.Sc., London School of Economics & Political

Science, 2017; B.A., University of Georgia, 2016. I thank Professor Paul Clement for his guidance in

selecting this Note topic.

603

A. The Constitutional Separation of Powers: Principles in

Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606

B. The Executive Branch and Prosecutorial Discretion . . . . . . . 607

C. The Legislative Branch: Investigative and Oversight

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609

1. Subpoena Enforcement Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610

II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613

A. Constitutional Confrontation: Executive Defiance of

Congressional Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613

III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616

A. Mandatory Referral for Prosecution: Balancing of

Constitutional Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616

1. The Legislature’s Contempt Power is Comparable to the

Judicial Power of Contempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616

2. The Nomenclature of Traditional Prosecutorial

Discretion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619

a. Grand Design of the Grand Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619

b. The Balancing of Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622

A. Practical Limitations of Criminal Contempt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622

B. Policy Proposal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623

V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625

A. Executive Privilege as an Independent Limit on

Congressional Contempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625

1. Overview of Executive Privilege. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625

a. The Executive Branch Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 626

b. Executive Privilege versus Congressional

Contempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 628

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631

604 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:603