Containing Nationalism: Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica

• Author: André Fazi,David S. Siroky,Sean Mueller,Michael Hechter
• Published date: 01 May 2021
• Date: 01 May 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957671
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957671

Comparative Political Studies

2021, Vol. 54(6) 1023 –1057

© The Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0010414020957671

journals.sagepub.com/home/cps

Article

Containing Nationalism:

Culture, Economics and

Indirect Rule in Corsica

David S. Siroky1,2 , Sean Mueller3,

André Fazi4, and Michael Hechter1

Abstract

Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to

contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources

for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to

the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can

fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing.

When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can

open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how

culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations,

specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new,

disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica,

we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in

culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on

public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state

dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness

associated with nationalist voting.

Keywords

nationalism, indirect rule, territorial politics, Corsica, principal-agent relations

1Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

2Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

3University of Lausanne, VD, Switzerland

4University of Corsica, Corte, Corse, France

Corresponding Author:

David S. Siroky, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902, USA.

Email: david.siroky@asu.edu

957671CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020957671Comparative Political StudiesSiroky et al.

research-article2020

1024 Comparative Political Studies 54(6)

Nationalist demands for greater regional autonomy and even outright seces-

sion are on the rise (Griffiths, 2017; Roeder, 2018; Sambanis & Milanovic,

2014). Many different explanations have been proposed for this rise, which

has occurred in both the developed and developing world. Despite varieties of

nationalism, there is a broad consensus that differences in culture—notably, a

distinct language and a separate religion—along with legacies of prior state-

hood (Sorens, 2012) and lost autonomy (Cederman et al. 2015; Siroky &

Cuffe, 2015; Germann & Sambanis, 2020) play an important role. Since

nationalists aim to make the boundaries of their nation congruent with those of

the state (Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 2000), this implies that nationalism ought to

be strongest in the most culturally distinctive, “historic” peripheries that

“missed their turn” in becoming independent states. Well-known European

examples include Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders, and Scotland.

A lesser-known case is Corsica—probably because nationalism there has not

been notable, at least until recently. In fact, nationalism sometimes fails to

emerge just where conventional explanations suggest it should. Corsica has long

seemed to constitute such an outlier: the Corsican language is distinct from

French,1 the island has a prior history (albeit brief) of statehood, is at a remove

from the capital, and has maintained a strong cultural identity, despite repeated

foreign occupations and assimilation efforts.2 The mainland has also tended to

ignore the economic development of the island, making cultural frustration, eco-

nomic deprivation and the development of peripheral nationalism all the more

likely (Fazi, 2014). Moreover, Paris has long resisted concessions to any historic

minority language, including Alsatian, Breton, Occitan, and Corsican.3

Yet despite all these ingredients, modern Corsican nationalism only

appeared in the 1970s, and initially received a marginal share of the vote—

even in regional elections most favorable to nationalism (De la Calle & Fazi,

2010, p. 406).4 Nationalism has experienced a strong electoral surge since

2008, following the breakdown of the party system and a sharp decline in

armed violence, which prompted moderate and radical nationalist lists to

merge and garner a significant share of the vote.5 In the 2010 and 2015

regional elections, their vote share climbed to 35%, and then to a remarkable

56% in 2017 (Fazi, 2018; Supplemental Appendix 1). Between 2004 and

2017, the absolute number of votes cast for nationalist parties more than tri-

pled (from ca. 21,000 to 67,000), and since 2015 the leaders of both the main

regional institutions have come from nationalist parties.

While French remains the only official language, nationalists have been

the main advocates for the Corsican language. Thus, speaking Corsican in

official settings represents a political statement—precisely what was intended

when the head of the regional assembly held his inaugural speech in Corsican.

Siroky et al. 1025

Lugo−di−Nazza

Scolca

Lopigna

Popolasca

Cuttoli−Corticchiato

Riventosa

Ampriani

Barrettali

San−Damiano

Patrimonio

Manso

Levie

Serra−di−Fiumorbo

Prunelli−di−Fiumorbo

Foce

Cateri

Matra

Pietralba

San−Gavino−di−Fiumorbo

Algajola

Sant'Antonino

Moca−Croce

Bisinchi

Piedicorte−di−Gaggio

Villanova

Figari

Cambia

Linguizzetta

Bastelica

Ville−di−Pietrabugno

Pastricciola

Lucciana

Calacuccia

Guagno

Antisanti

Farinole

Lecci

Casanova

Olmeto

Canavaggia

Corrano

Casaglione

Cardo−Torgia

Isolaccio−di−Fiumorbo

Tavaco

Poggio−Mezzana

Pero−Casevecchie

Penta−di−Casinca

Pioggiola

Zévaco

San−Martino−di−Lota

Casalabriva

Afa

Vallica

Castellare−di−Casinca

Belvédère−Campomoro

Pietraserena

Olcani

Loreto−di−Tallano

Coti−Chiavari

Albertacce

Carticasi

San−Giuliano

Sorio

Arbori

La Porta

Santo−Pietro−di−Venaco

Valle−di−Rostino

Piobetta

Bigorno

Perelli

Ortiporio

020406

08

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Figure 1. Spatial variation (left) and ranked (right) nationalist voting in Corsica by

commune, 2015 regional elections (1st round).

Several French politicians called this “unacceptable” and “a danger to the

unity of France” (Quinault-Maupoil, 2015).

Not only was the rise of Corsican nationalism late, it was also territorially

uneven (see Figure 1). More puzzling still, nationalist parties have often

done particularly well in some of the least culturally Corsican areas along

the coast, whereas some of the traditional communes in the island’s rural and

mountainous interior have seemed impervious to nationalism (De la Calle &

Fazi, 2010). If nationalism really is driven by cultural factors, why have

nationalist parties been least successful in some of the most culturally tradi-

tional parts of Corsica? By comparison, nationalist parties in Catalonia,

for instance, fare much better in the areas where Catalan is widely spoken

(Bartomeus, 2018).