Constructing a performance‐based accountability system for the Chinese government

Published date01 May 2014
Date01 May 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1519
Special Issue Paper
Constructing a performance-based
accountability system for the Chinese
government
XiuXia Tan*
School of Government, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
Purpose: This study constructs a valid performance-based system to monitor accountability within the Chinese government.
Design/methodology/approach: First, a normative analysis model was constructed to include four factors, which form a
complete accountability system: accountability to whom, accountability for what, how to demand accountability, and
its effectiveness. This normative model was then used to explore existing practices of Chinese government
performance evaluation and accountability.
Findings: Our study revealed the need to accelerate two integrationsin order to develop performance-based account-
ability. This would involve accelerating the integration of government performance assessment and accountability
and accelerating the integration of external control and internal control.
Research Implications: This study is a preliminary study that pointsout the direction of performance-basedaccountability
system reform inChinese government. It will further promote the transformation of government functions and change
the way administration is carried out,promote to achieve the goal of the responsible government, and service-oriented
government. Establishing an effective performance-based accountability system in China may yet require further
research and policyrecommendations.
Originality/value: This article is original in its attempt to construct an accountability index for the Chinese government.
Its specic focus on China increases its originality as no known study has attempted to construct such an index.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
According to Scott (2000), the traditional concept of
accountability encompasses the formal duties of
public bodies in accounting for their actions to
ministers, parliament, and to courts. Following key
and recent administrative reforms, signicant
changes to the concept of accountability has seen
key government functionaries stripped of their
coverand held directly responsible for their
personal performance and that of their subordinates
(Barberis, 1998). Behn (2001) denes accountability
as focusing on three main functions of nance, fair-
ness, and performance. He notes that the traditional
administration paradigm places too much emphasis
on nances and fairness and not enough on perfor-
mance. Behn further introduces a fourth function of
personal probity to the accountability framework. In
practical terms, accountability implies that the
actions of administrative organizations and their
members are closely monitored by the legislature,
judiciary, administrative organs, civil organizations,
and the public. When the need arises, public bodies
and public servants may be asked to share details of
their actions with monitoring bodies based on politi-
cal, constitutionalor contractual powers (Scott, 2000).
As China continuesto move towards a transparent
system of democratic governance, the need for
accountability as an essential element of democracy
can no longer be ignored. Under the current social
democratic structure of the Chinese government,
accountability and transparency are indeed very
essential for Chinese citizens to impose reliance on the
*Correspondence to: XiuXia Tan, School of Government, Beijing
Normal University, No.19, Xinjiekouwai Street, Haidian District,
Beijing, China.
E-mail: xiangzitan@126.com
Journal of Public Affairs
Volume 14 Number 2 pp 154163 (2014)
Published online 14 April 2014 in Wiley Online Library
(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1519
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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