Constitutionality of sexually oriented speech: obscenity, indecency, and child pornography
Author | Alexandra Himonas, Rania AlRashoodi, Alexandra Brown, Kerry Matlack, Sarah McLaughlin, Kavisha Patel, Maya Pierce, and Olivia Roche |
Pages | 243-265 |
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED SPEECH:
OBSCENITY, INDECENCY, AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
EDITED BY ALEXANDRA HIMONAS, RANIA ALRASHOODI, ALEXANDRA BROWN,
KERRY MATLACK, SARAH MCLAUGHLIN, KAVISHA PATEL, MAYA PIERCE, AND
OLIVIA ROCHE
INTRODUCTION .............................................. 243
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SEXUAL SPEECH .................... 244
A. UNPROTECTED SPEECH: OBSCENITY ....................... 245
1. Community Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
2. Prurient Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
3. Patently Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
4. Societal Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
B. SEMI-PROTECTED SPEECH: INDECENCY ..................... 249
II. REGULATING SEXUAL SPEECH ............................... 252
A. REGULATING ADULT BUSINESSES ......................... 252
1. Zoning and Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
2. Nude Dancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
B. REGULATING THE MEDIA .............................. . 254
1. Broadcast Radio and Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
2. Cable Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
3. Telephone Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4. Internet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
C. REGULATING PRIVATE POSSESSION AND DISTRIBUTION .......... 258
D. REGULATING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY ..................... 260
E. ENFORCEMENT BY POST-BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS ............. . 261
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
A. FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
B. LIMITS ON REGULATING “VIRTUAL” CHILD PORNOGRAPHY . . . . . . . 264
CONCLUSION ............................................... 265
INTRODUCTION
Sexual speech has been singled out as a form of speech that does not receive
complete constitutional protection under federal law.
1
How a particular court
classifies sexual speech largely determines the level of protection accorded to the
1. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1957) (finding the law regulating obscene, lewd,
lascivious, and filthy material was permissible because the history of the First Amendment implicitly
excluded obscene speech from Constitutional protection).
243
speech. This article addresses three primary classifications of sexual speech: ob-
scenity, indecency, and child pornography.
Part I of this article elucidates the relationship between the First Amendment
and sexual speech, including obscene speech and indecency. Part II explores the
extent to which obscene and indecent speech may be regulated and criminalized,
in public and commercial arenas as well as in private possession, and discusses
enforcement by the Obama administration. Part III examines special regulations
pertaining to child pornography.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SEXUAL SPEECH
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
2
However,
there is not absolute protection for all speech.
3
In Roth v. United States, the
Supreme Court determined that “obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of
speech and press.”
4
Roth is a foundational case regarding obscenity laws and first
amendment speech, although the Oregon Supreme Court, in State v. Henry,
departed from Roth by granting obscene language speech protection on state con-
stitutional grounds.
5
Under the cases that follow from Roth, certain types of
speech are afforded more protection than others; generally, political speech is the
most favored and sexual speech is the least favored.
6
The First Amendment does
not protect obscene speech.
7
On the other hand, the First Amendment does offer
some protection to indecent speech.
8
Since the government must remain “neutral in the marketplace of ideas,”
9
reg-
ulation of speech based on its content is subject to strict scrutiny.
10
Content-neu-
tral regulation that nevertheless impacts speech is subject to a lesser level of
scrutiny. The Supreme Court explained this distinction in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. F.C.C.:
[Courts] apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of
its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech
bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.
In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
4. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
5. Id.; State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (Or. 1987) (“We hold that characterizing expression as
“obscenity” under any definition, be it Roth, Miller, or otherwise, does not deprive it of protection under
the Oregon Constitution.”)
6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973).
8. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978).
9. Id. at 745–46.
10. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
244 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW [Vol. XXIII:243
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