Constitutionality of sexually oriented speech: obscenity, indecency, and child pornography

• Author: Alexandra Himonas, Rania AlRashoodi, Alexandra Brown, Kerry Matlack, Sarah McLaughlin, Kavisha Patel, Maya Pierce, and Olivia Roche
• Pages: 243-265

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED SPEECH:

OBSCENITY, INDECENCY, AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

EDITED BY ALEXANDRA HIMONAS, RANIA ALRASHOODI, ALEXANDRA BROWN,

KERRY MATLACK, SARAH MCLAUGHLIN, KAVISHA PATEL, MAYA PIERCE, AND

OLIVIA ROCHE

INTRODUCTION .............................................. 243

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SEXUAL SPEECH .................... 244

A. UNPROTECTED SPEECH: OBSCENITY ....................... 245

1. Community Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

2. Prurient Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

3. Patently Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

4. Societal Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

B. SEMI-PROTECTED SPEECH: INDECENCY ..................... 249

II. REGULATING SEXUAL SPEECH ............................... 252

A. REGULATING ADULT BUSINESSES ......................... 252

1. Zoning and Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

2. Nude Dancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

B. REGULATING THE MEDIA .............................. . 254

1. Broadcast Radio and Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

2. Cable Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

3. Telephone Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

4. Internet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

C. REGULATING PRIVATE POSSESSION AND DISTRIBUTION .......... 258

D. REGULATING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY ..................... 260

E. ENFORCEMENT BY POST-BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS ............. . 261

III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

A. FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

B. LIMITS ON REGULATING “VIRTUAL” CHILD PORNOGRAPHY . . . . . . . 264

CONCLUSION ............................................... 265

INTRODUCTION

Sexual speech has been singled out as a form of speech that does not receive

complete constitutional protection under federal law.

1

How a particular court

classifies sexual speech largely determines the level of protection accorded to the

1. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1957) (finding the law regulating obscene, lewd,

lascivious, and filthy material was permissible because the history of the First Amendment implicitly

excluded obscene speech from Constitutional protection).

243

speech. This article addresses three primary classifications of sexual speech: ob-

scenity, indecency, and child pornography.

Part I of this article elucidates the relationship between the First Amendment

and sexual speech, including obscene speech and indecency. Part II explores the

extent to which obscene and indecent speech may be regulated and criminalized,

in public and commercial arenas as well as in private possession, and discusses

enforcement by the Obama administration. Part III examines special regulations

pertaining to child pornography.

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SEXUAL SPEECH

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”

2

However,

there is not absolute protection for all speech.

3

In Roth v. United States, the

Supreme Court determined that “obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of

speech and press.”

4

Roth is a foundational case regarding obscenity laws and first

amendment speech, although the Oregon Supreme Court, in State v. Henry,

departed from Roth by granting obscene language speech protection on state con-

stitutional grounds.

5

Under the cases that follow from Roth, certain types of

speech are afforded more protection than others; generally, political speech is the

most favored and sexual speech is the least favored.

6

The First Amendment does

not protect obscene speech.

7

On the other hand, the First Amendment does offer

some protection to indecent speech.

8

Since the government must remain “neutral in the marketplace of ideas,”

9

reg-

ulation of speech based on its content is subject to strict scrutiny.

10

Content-neu-

tral regulation that nevertheless impacts speech is subject to a lesser level of

scrutiny. The Supreme Court explained this distinction in Turner Broadcasting

System, Inc. v. F.C.C.:

[Courts] apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,

disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of

its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech

bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.

In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are

2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).

3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of

free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).

4. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.

5. Id.; State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (Or. 1987) (“We hold that characterizing expression as

“obscenity” under any definition, be it Roth, Miller, or otherwise, does not deprive it of protection under

the Oregon Constitution.”)

6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992).

7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973).

8. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978).

9. Id. at 745–46.

10. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

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