Constitutional law - evidence seized based on reasonable police mistake of law held admissible in North Carolina court - State v. Heien.

• Author: Friedman, Brittanee

Constitutional Law--Evidence Seized Based on Reasonable Police Mistake of Law Held Admissible in North Carolina Court--State v. Helen, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012)

Under established constitutional law, a police officer's search or seizure premised on his mistake of law is typically held unconstitutional. (1) Some jurisdictions, however, permit an officer to base his reasonable suspicion or probable cause on a reasonable mistake concerning an ambiguous or confusing law to justify a traffic stop. (2) In State v. Helen, (3) the North Carolina Supreme Court considered as a matter of first impression whether a police officer's reasonable mistake of law concerning the defendant's one malfunctioning brake light could provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop and subsequently search his vehicle. (4) The North Carolina Supreme Court held that an officer's reasonable mistake of law may give rise to reasonable suspicion. (5)

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse stopped a vehicle in which the defendant, Heien, was a passenger. (6) When one of the vehicle's brake lights failed to illuminate, Sergeant Darisse believed Heien's vehicle was in violation of North Carolina state law. (7) After Sergeant Darisse approached the vehicle, his interaction with Heien and the vehicle's driver, Vasquez, raised his suspicion and he requested--and received--Heien's consent to search the vehicle. (8) The search produced cocaine, leading Sergeant Darisse to arrest both Heien and Vasquez and charge them with trafficking cocaine. (9)

Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the vehicle's search--arguing state law does not allow for a traffic stop based on one malfunctioning brake light--which the trial court subsequently denied. (10) As a result, Heien pled guilty while reserving his right to appeal. (11) On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, reversing and vacating the trial court's judgment, held that a lawful traffic stop cannot be the result of a single malfunctioning brake light. (12) Following the appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed to hear the State's Petition for Discretionary Review. (13) The court determined that Sergeant Darisse's traffic stop was constitutional and held that the mistake was a reasonable misinterpretation regarding a "counterintuitive and confusing" statute. (14) Focusing on the "reasonableness" required by the Fourth Amendment, the court determined that a traffic stop based on an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law may give rise to reasonable suspicion, and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment. (15)

The Fourth Amendment has significantly developed over time, specifically regarding nuanced concepts such as Terry stops, the exclusionary rule, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. (16) Probable cause was the initial standard necessary to conduct Fourth Amendment searches and seizures, but the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio established the objective reasonable suspicion standard for searches that are less invasive than searches requiring probable cause. (17) Reasonable suspicion is based on the "totality of the circumstances," and its low threshold allows an officer to objectively assess each situation without rigid specifications or requirements to which they must adhere. (18) The exclusionary rule developed through Mapp v. Ohio to deter police misconduct as well as individual officer and systemic negligence by suppressing evidence that is illegally obtained. (19)

Following the establishment of the reasonable suspicion standard and exclusionary rule, courts developed the good-faith exception to the rule in instances where suppression does not otherwise discourage police misconduct or negligence, as is often the case where the error results from magistrate or departmental errors with no bearing on police behavior. (20) While generally decreasing the scope of the exclusionary rule, the good-faith exception does not apply in certain specific circumstances. (21) Since the exception developed, however, some courts have broadened its scope and included analogous concepts involving mistakes of law, arousing concern that the exception itself overshadows the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement and the exclusionary rule altogether. (22) Critics of this expansion fear and anticipate the introduction of subjectivity into ideally objective police standards. (23)

The good-faith exception analogously relates to the relatively recent trend in some circuits of admitting evidence based on a police officer's objectively reasonable mistake. (24) While some courts admit evidence that is based on an officer's mistake of fact, a majority of jurisdictions still subject evidence from an officer's mistake of law to the exclusionary rule. (25) Where courts exclude mistake-of-law evidence, the presence or absence of a violation is a dispositive factor in determining the constitutionality of a stop. (26) Courts that admit evidence based on an officer's mistake of law emphasize that the mistake must be reasonable in order to avoid violating the Fourth Amendment. (27)

In Heien, the North Carolina Supreme Court, following the Eighth Circuit, held that a police officer's reasonable mistake of law may give rise to reasonable suspicion and a search that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. (28) To support its reasoning, the court limited the exclusionary rule and analogously relied on other persuasive authority concerning good-faith exceptions. (29) The court held that Sergeant Darisse's reasonable mistake met the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a traffic stop. (30) If the court suppressed the evidence against Heien, it would ineffectively discipline Sergeant Darisse's reasonable actions, thereby imposing what the court perceived as an unwarranted expectation of perfection in police understanding of the law and complex legal concepts. (31) The majority also suggested that the state initiative to keep roads safe outweighed the minimal invasion citizens stood to endure as a result of an officer's misguided but reasonable interpretation of the law. (32) Finally, the court reasoned that its holding would encourage uniformity regarding police mistakes of law or fact. (33)

The Heien majority erred by introducing subjectivity into what should be an objective, reasonableness-based interpretation of the law. (34) Although the court retained some objectivity by emphasizing the apparent reasonableness of the officer, the court unnecessarily addressed the issue altogether by focusing on the officer's reasonableness rather than the more relevant issue on appeal: whether or not a statutory violation occurred. (35) Heien follows the Eighth Circuit, which not only completely departs from its own precedent, but also ignores the overwhelming majority of federal circuits. (36) Because North Carolina already enacted a statutory good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the majority's ruling excessively expands the exception and lessens the deterrence that the exclusionary rule seeks to establish. (37)

By condoning police mistakes of law, the Heien majority recklessly alters the application of the legal maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." (38) The majority risks fostering citizen distrust of the police by insisting that the public adhere to the same counterintuitive laws they permit police to misinterpret. (39) Although the reasonable suspicion standard does not require that police officers interpret the nuances and particularities of the law with expertise, they are arguably capable of both understanding current law and adapting to its changes. (40) While the law may arguably be complex or counterintuitive, police officers currently have more technology and tools available to them than ever before to effectively increase their awareness and understanding of such rules. (41) Permitting reasonable mistakes of law may diminish the deterrence that the exclusionary rule would otherwise have on police misunderstanding or uncertainty towards the law, potentially encouraging police ignorance or creative interpretation of the law. (42)

Rather than...