Constitutional Innovation and Imitation in the American States

• Published date: 01 March 2022
• Date: 01 March 2022
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912921991673
• Author: Erik J. Engstrom,John T. Scott,Matthew T. Pietryka
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 75(1) 244 –258

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912921991673

Political Research Quarterly

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912921991673

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The widespread adoption of written constitutions is one

of the most notable developments in institutional design

in politics over the past 250 years. Constitutions are com-

mitment devices intended to overcome principal–agent

problems among political actors and between representa-

tives and the represented, and which establish and

entrench political powers, institutions, and rights (Hardin

1989, 2013; Hirschl 2013; North and Weingast 1989).

Yet, constitutions are also subject to revision and replace-

ment. Indeed, although the U.S. Constitution is often

taken to be a model, in actuality it is an outlier among

nations in several respects. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,

most constitutions endure a short time, are considerably

longer and more detailed, and undergo frequent revision

and replacement (e.g., Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton

2009; Versteeg and Zackin 2014, 2016). The frequent

revision and replacement of constitutions makes possible

the diffusion of institutional design as states learn from

one another (Goderis and Versteeg 2013).

To examine constitutional innovation and imitation,

we turn to a particularly rich area for studying the origins

and spread of constitutionalism: the American states.

Today, there are about two hundred sovereign states

across the world, and only a handful do not have written

constitutions, notably the United Kingdom. The near uni-

versal adoption of written constitutions is part of a trend

stretching back over two centuries. Fifty years ago, there

were about 150 written constitutions for approximately

170 states, and 100 years ago, there were about 60 written

constitutions for approximately 75 states (Lutz 2006, 4).

In turn, if we go back 250 years, there were precisely zero

written constitutions. As Zink (2009, 442) explains, “The

worldwide prevalence of written constitutions today may

obscure the fact that written constitutions were virtually

unprecedented in America’s revolutionary and founding

era.” The principal incubator of constitutional develop-

ment from the revolutionary period forward was the

American states. These early state constitutions were at

the forefront of a lively experiment in constitutional

design that produced sixty-four constitutions by the Civil

War, as compared with about twenty written constitutions

991673

PRQXXX10.1177/1065912921991673Political Research QuarterlyEngstrom et al.

research-article2021

1University of California, Davis, USA

2Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA

Corresponding Author:

Erik J. Engstrom, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616,

USA.

Email: ejengstrom@ucdavis.edu

Constitutional Innovation and Imitation in

the American States

Erik J. Engstrom1, Matthew T. Pietryka2, and John T. Scott1

Abstract

The widespread adoption of written constitutions is one of the most notable developments in institutional design

in politics over the past 250 years. The American states offer a rich place to study constitutional innovation and

imitation as being among the first political bodies to adopt constitutions and also given that they often replaced

them, in both cases innovating and learning from one another. In this paper, we use quantitative text analysis to

identify constitutional innovation and to investigate patterns of imitation. First, we find substantial textual borrowing

between state constitutions. On average, 20 percent of a state’s constitutional language was borrowed directly from

another state constitution. Second, states were more likely to borrow text from geographically proximate states,

from temporally proximate state constitutions, and from states that shared similar partisan profiles. Finally, we offer

a brief discussion of the most influential constitutions as an exploratory example for extending our approach of

identifying textual innovation and imitation. These findings offer new contributions to both the study of constitutional

design and institutional diffusion.

Keywords

policy diffusion, policy innovation, constitutional change, state constitutions, state politics, federalism, federal, state,

text analysis

Article